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Macao, to conduct social science research in China. Not only are household or in­
dividual interviews and questionnaires inhibited, the export of documentary materials is 
restricted by customs control. Hence, the writer was forced to abandon a questionnaire 
survey in Shenzhen in 1982 and with it the idea of the proposed in-depth social analysis 
of the impacts of the special economic zone policy. Thus, a macro study based on of­
ficial and  published materials had to be substitu ted  as the dissertation topic.
This refurnished topic led to interviews being undertaken with government officials 
in Shenzhen and the academia in Guangzhou. Nevertheless, the gathering of useful da ta  
at th a t  time was impeded by the government imposition of the ‘internal circulation’ 
regulation for most of the discussion papers and periodicals. The circulation of the 
weekly Shenzhen  Special Zone Herald  in May 1982 in both Hong Kong and Shenzhen 
was, therefore, the major source of information.
After much time-consuming effort, arrangements were made to teach in the 
Shenzhen Intermediate Vocational School in June and July 1982. This permitted the 
gathering of some ‘inside information’. More press releases and publications appeared in 
1983 and 1984, but the information was still rather sketchy and unsatisfactory. Finally, 
another field trip was undertaken at the end of 1984. This trip proved to be more fruit­
ful than  the previous excursion. Various handbooks, investment guides and directories 
were readily available. The first yearbook of the Zones was also published by a Hong 
Kong agency. Further, the Shenzhen  Special Zone Herald  changed to a daily in Decem­
ber 1983, providing more useful data . Adequate information for studying the social 
geography of Shenzhen, however, was not forthcoming until the Shenzhen  Special 
E conom ic Zone Yearbook 1985 was published in early 1986. At last, the basic material 
for undertaking a macro analysis of the development of Shenzhen was available.
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A B S T R A C T
The Special Economic Zones have been designed by the Chinese Government as a 
two-pronged strategy in its ‘open-door’ policy: expanding exports and encouraging foreign 
technology imports. Also, they are intended to be test-grounds for hybrid socialist- 
capitalist  experiments - a reflection of the coun try ’s search for efficient methods of 
production to bring about the country’s much-delayed modernization. The Shenzhen 
Special Economic Zone, in particular, has been given a pivotal role, because it is planned 
to incorporate both a full -fledged economy and a well-developed urban area. Its 
progress, therefore, has a ttrac ted  much attention. The assessments of Shenzhen’s initial 
performance have, however, resulted in polarized opinions. Yet a detailed evaluation of 
Shenzhen's progress as an export processing zone - a phenomenon similar to those in 
o ther developing countries - has not been made. Hence, this study has undertaken the 
task.
Industrial performance and social conditions within the zones have been perennial 
themes of export processing zone studies. As a result, the economic progress of Shenzhen 
is measured in this study against its specific planning goals and directives. Particular 
a tten tion  is centred on industrial performance and the outward-orientation of the Zone’s 
economy - the twin objectives of its economic development. Then the ‘well-being’ of 
Shenzhen’s population, specifically income and accessibility to social goods, is canvassed. 
In turn , the economic and social developments are evaluated with reference to the perfor­
mance of o ther export processing zones. Finally, Shenzhen’s initial contribution and its 
potential to promote modernization in China as a large coastal city possessing export 
processing facilities are estimated.
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1IN T R O D U C T IO N
Shenzhen Special Zone is an experiment. We still need to discern whether it is 
on the right track. It is our desire th a t  it should succeed. If it fails, it is an 
experience (Deng Xiaoping, Shenzhen  Special Zone D a ily , 30 June 1985).
C h ina ’s economy changed tack in 1978 after the rise of Deng Xiaoping and the 
downfall of the Gang of Four. This new development has resulted in marked changes in 
economic and urban policies covering agriculture, industry, trade and settlement. A key 
feature of these policies has been a more liberal a tt i tude  towards foreign influences and 
the development of the coastal region in particular. A striking feature of this change has 
been the establishment of four Special Economic Zones - Shantou, Shenzhen, Xiamen 
and Zhuhai - in 1980. An even more relaxed a tt i tude  has been reflected in the opening 
of fourteen coastal ports and Hainan Island to foreign investment and trade in 1984.
A tten tion  in this study, however, is focused on the special economic zone policy by 
raising a series of general questions: why has China adopted a special economic zone
policy; and how have similar phenomena been evaluated? This discussion gives rise to 
more specific questions on a particular Special Economic Zone - Shenzhen - the most 
developed of the four Zones. After discussing the approaches adopted to study the 
Shenzhen Special Economic Zone and the debate pertinent to the Zones, a tten tion  is 
concentrated on two key questions: how has the economic structure and performance of 
Shenzhen Special Economic Zone developed; how has the Shenzhen Special Economic 
Zone performed; and what have been its social repercussions? With this information, we 
can proceed to tackle more general questions: how successful has the policy of
developing the Special Economic Zones been in facilitating modernization within their 
boundaries; and how attrac tive  have the Zones been in inducing economic development 
in China?
In tackling these questions, the thesis is divided into three parts (Fig. 1). P a r t  I 
examines C hina’s policies on economic development and urbanization, and the 
controversy over the performance of similar types of special economic zone phenemona. 
After a review of the Shenzhen debate, P a r t  II concentrates on the Zone’s economic 
structure , performance and social consequences. Part  III studies the achievements of the 
Shenzhen experiment in the context of the export processing zone debate before
2considering their effects on China’s modernization. Within this broad framework, 
C hapter 1 reiterates the significance of the special economic zone policy in C h ina’s rapid 
drive for modernization based on economic and urban development. Initially, an 
examination is made of the economic and related urban policies to uncover their 
contributions to C hina’s modernization program pursued by successive leadership in the 
communist Government since 1949. With reference to city development, a brief outline 
is given of the swings in economic policy between 1949 and 1976, before highlighting the 
key features of post-Mao economic and urban policies since 1977. Given this 
background, a tten tion  is directed to the roles and objectives of the Special Economic 
Zones, and Shenzhen in particular.
Chapter 2 details the arguments within the export processing zone debate. The 
origin and development of the export processing zones are initially surveyed. Then the 
pertinent literature is reviewed to illustrate the debate over the viability of the zones as 
an effective measure for economic and urban development. After summarizing the 
positions of the different schools of thought, the literature on C hina’s Special Economic 
Zones is examined with particular reference to Shenzhen.
The special economic zone debate is reviewed in Chapter 3. An analysis of the 
literature  on the Chinese Special Economic Zones is given before discussing the divergent 
views and the approaches undertaken in the various studies. The shortcomings of this 
literature  and the lacunae on Shenzhen suggest th a t  rather than recycling an old 
approach, a new one based on the experience of other export processing zones is required.
Following this new approach, Chapter 4 focuses on the economic geography of 
Shenzhen. In particular, interest is centred on the fulfilment of government directives. 
Thus, a ttention is focused on the planning goals, economic structure and performance. 
Since the Zone is intended to become an industrial city based on an externally-oriented 
economy, emphases are placed on Shenzhen's industrial development and the a ttrac tion  
of foreign capital. After these analyses, we are in a position to consider the social 
repercussions triggered by the economic changes.
Chapter 5 discusses the social geography of Shenzhen. Given that the basic aim of 
socialism is to improve the living standards of the masses, interest is centred on the 
ability of the special economic zone policy to upgrade the ‘well-being' of the residents in 
Shenzhen. Accordingly, the Zone’s population structure is primarily examined before 
analysing income. Finally, access to social goods is probed. Having ascertained the 
economic and social performance of the Zone, a return is made to the export processing 
zone phenomenon and C hina’s modernization in the last chapter.
Chapter 6 gauges Shenzhen’s overall performance in the context of the export
3GENERAL
1.
CHINA
Special Economic 
Zone
2 .
EXPORT PROCESSING 
ZONE POLICY
PART I
SHENZHEN
3.
SPECIAL ECONOMIC 
ZONE DEBATE
4.
ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY
5.
SOCIAL IMPACTS
IMPLICATIONS
PART II
6.
SHENZHEN
EXPORT PROCESSING 
ZONES AND 
CHINA
PART III
Figure 1: Thesis outline.
4processing zone development. In particular, the respective arguments of export 
processing zone protagonists will be used to determine the potential impact of Shenzhen 
on China. As Shenzhen is a recent phenomenon, an assessment of its economic and 
social effects on China must inevitably be preliminary and conjectural.
Finally, the Conclusion summarizes the Findings of this thesis and underlines its 
contribution to understanding Shenzhen’s development and extending the compass of the 
special economic zone debate.
5P A R T  I
6C H A P T E R  1
SPECIAL ECO N O M IC  ZONES: A S T R A T E G Y  
FO R  R A P ID  M O D E R N IZ A T IO N
... to develop external economic cooperation and technical exchanges and 
promote the socialist modernization program (Article One of the Regulations 
on Special Econom ic Zones in  Guangdong Province).
This fundamental objective of the special economic zones policy is dependent upon 
external contributions. It is not a new departure for China as the country’s past history 
has been punctuated by a ttem pts  to import foreign capital and technology through the 
large cities in a bid to modernize the country. These a ttem pts , however, have been 
frustra ted  by both international and internal strife. It was only after the signing of the 
Shanghai Communique with the United States in 1972, the demise of the ‘Gang of Four’ 
in October 1976, and the second rehabilitation of Deng Xiaoping in July 1977, tha t  
China has been able to implement the ‘open door’ policy at full swing. Among other 
measures, the Special Economic Zones have been designated as both ‘pioneers’ and 
‘pacesetters’ in the current drive for modernization. Hence, a mere listing of the 
declared objectives of the Zones does not suffice to illustrate the full significance of this 
new policy. Instead, their entrusted roles have to be considered in the context of China's 
past and present development strategies.
The review of C hina’s development strategies is necessarily focused on the
periodically
economic and urban policies because they have^been the main motors of national 
development. Indeed, the recent changes in economic and urban policies created the 
Zones. Two fundamental questions can be posed: what have been the changes in foreign 
economic policies; and what have been the roles of large cities? Specifically, when 
discussing the post-Mao economic and urban policies, the following questions will be 
addressed: what have been the country’s changing relationships with the world
economy; what has been C hina’s changing a tt i tude  towards capitalist economic 
practices; and what have been the renewed roles of coastal cities? After addressing these 
questions, we can proceed to examine a second set: why has China adopted the special 
economic zone strategy which hitherto has been a non-communist phenomenon; what are 
the roles entrusted to these Zones; why was Shenzhen chosen; and what specific roles 
have been assigned to Shenzhen?
In tackling these questions, this Chapter is divided into three sections: the first
reviews the economic and urban development and strategies of China between 1949 and 
1976; the second examines the post-Mao development and policies since 1977 in fuller 
detail, with a particular emphasis on foreign economic relations, economic reforms and 
the function of coastal cities; and the third summarizes the development of the Special 
Economic Zones, their general objectives and the special roles of Shenzhen. The creation 
of the Zones is arguably a more advanced means of achieving the long-established and 
yet much-delayed intention of using foreign technology and investment to modernize 
China.
ECONOM IC AND U R BA N  DEVELOPM ENT 1949-76
As the history of economic and urban development in communist China is a vast
topic, the present account is necessarily brief. It focuses specifically on changes in
intermittently
foreign economic policies and on the role of cities because these have^been the twin 
engines behind China's drive towards modernization. As the cities and their growth 
have been subservient to economic policies, the la tte r  will be considered first (Kwok, 
1981; Xu, 1984a). These economic policies are discussed in terms of six periods: 
Rehabilitation 1949-52; the First Five Year Plan 1953-57; the Great Leap Forward 
1958-60; Recovery and Moderate Construction 1961-65; the Great Proletarian Cultural 
Revolution 1966-69; and Moderate Socialist Construction 1970-76.
R ehabilitation 1949-52
This period was essentially a period of recovery during which peace and order were 
restored to war-damaged China. Inflation was speedily curbed, and transport 
connections put back to order. By 1951, the communist Government had controlled and 
stabilized m onetary, fiscal, and trade systems. On the w'hole, the economy was growing 
rapidly despite the strains and stresses occasioned by China 's  entry into the Korean War 
in 1950 (K latt ,  1980).
The most traum atic  policy was the land reform carried out in the countryside. It 
eliminated the political and economic power base of the landlords by distributing their 
assets among the peasantry. The incentives offered to individual peasants, coupled with 
the post-war peace, restored agricultural ou tput to the highest pre-war levels (Howe, 
1978).
In the industrial sector, drastic nationalization was limited to avoid any major 
interruption to the national economy. M ao’s ‘Democratic Reform’ permitted the 
continued operation of private enterprises, provided they were not hostile to the new 
leadership. Foreign enterprises were, however, progressively forced to close down 
because they could not withstand the heavy losses induced by the new laws.
8Modernization, with the assistance of foreign aid and technology, was an early goal 
of the communist regime. The supply of aid and technology was, however, limited to 
the communist bloc - the Soviet Union being the favoured comrade-in-arms. The 
Chinese leaders maintained tha t  the country should not only ally itself militarily with 
the Soviet Union but also copy its institution and basic policies (Barnett, 1981). Hence, 
the Soviet and East European theories of urban planning began to permeate Chinese 
thinking while an anti-city mood emerged.
Rapid growth in urbanization occurred during Rehabilitation (urban population 
grew from 57.6 million to 71.6 million), despite the development of an anti-city a ttitude  
sparked off by the Marxist ideology (Table 1.1). Urban places were criticized as 
‘consumer cities’, implying tha t  most urban residents were parasites. The ‘three-anti’ 
and ‘five-anti’ campaigns were thus launched to eradicate corrupt bureaucratic and 
illegal business practices (Buck, 1981). Meanwhile, it was stressed that cities should be 
transformed into centres of production. The large-scale construction of industrial cities, 
however, had to await the inception of the First Five Year Plan.
T h e F ir st F iv e  Y ear P la n  1953-57
In 1953, the Five-year planning strategy was adopted by the Chinese leadership to 
achieve the basic development objectives of building ‘a modern socialist economy within 
a relatively short span of t im e’.* The First Five Year Plan aimed at developing capital 
infrastructure and promoting heavy industry (with a particular emphasis on upgrading 
the defence establishment). Such a policy could only be realized at tha t  time by 
large-scale imports of capital goods and military equipment. Their sources were limited 
to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe because trade controls by the United States and 
its allies denied strategic materials to China (Eckstein, 1977).
The requisite capital for equipment purchases came from internal resources - taxes 
and profits from state  enterprises. Soviet aid also played a significant part in this initial 
industrialization. This aid was directed towards the provision of plant and equipment 
on medium-term credit and the supply of Russian technicians. Not surprisingly, as 
noted by Eckstein (1977), China became closely associated with, and dependent on, the 
Soviet Union. Sino-Soviet tensions, because of ideological, political and territorial 
disputes, increased during the 1950s. Hence, there was growing concern about C hina’s 
sole dependence on a single trading partner. Nevertheless, there were neither signs of
1. In his Opening Speech to the First Session of the First National People’s Congress in 1954, 
Mao Zedong pronounced that: ‘Within the time span of a few five-year plans, from the basis of 
an economically and culturally backward country, we will build a great industrial nation with 
modern culture ...’ (Tam, 1985:6).
9Table 1-1: Urban Population* and Non-agricultural
Population of Cities and Towns (N PC T), 1949-82
(Numbers in million)
Year
End
Urban Pop. 
(TPCT)
I
NPCT
II
National Pop. 
Ill
*7% of National 
Pop.
I/ II I  I I /I I I  
x 100 x 100
1949 57.7 541.7 10.6
1950 61.7 662.0 11.1
1951 66.3 563.0 11.8
1952 71.6 574.8 12.5
1953m 75.3a 580.6 13.0
1953 77.7 588.0 13.2
1954 81.6 601.7 13.6
1955 82.9 614.7 13.5
1956 89.2 627.8 14.2
1957 99.5 646.5 15.4
1960 130.7 660.2 19.8 16.8
1964m 127.1 97.9 691.2b 18.4 14.2
1965 101.7 725.4 14.0
1970 100.8 825.4 12.2
1975 111.7 919.7 12.1
1978 119.9 958.1 12.5
1979 128.6 970.9 13.2
1980 134.1 982.6 13.7
1981 138.7 996.2 13.9
1982“ 206.6 146.6 1003.9b 20.6 14.6
Notes: * Based on the Total Population of Cities and Towns (T PC T ). m Mid-year, a
The first figure reported in 1953 Census was 77.257. SSB (1982) has adjusted 
this to 75.260. b These are census figures known to exclude the military, which 
numbered 4.2 million in mid 1982. It is likely tha t  the military is also excluded 
in the figures for 1970-81, but is included for 1949-60 and 1965.
Source: Chan and Xu (1985:597).
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any shift away from the import of foreign technology nor the 'worship of foreign th ings’; 
there was also no pressure for autarky at tha t  time.
Soviet influence also dominated urbanization strategies. The Soviet model of 
developing heavy industry in major industrial bases and key point cities was adopted 
(Kwok, 1981; Buck, 1981). Accordingly, heavy investment was committed to the 
construction of new key point cities in the interior (Table 1.2). Existing industrial 
plants, located in the traditional industrial centres in the coastal belt and the north-east 
(e.g. Shanghai, Nanjing, Liaoning), established branches or complete factories in the new 
interior centres (e.g. Xian, Zhengzhou, Baotau, W uhan, Anshan and Luovang). 
Although 120 industrial centres were established, major industrial projects were 
concentrated in eighteen cities (Schenk, 1977; Buck, 1981). While the need to curtail 
over-concentration of industries in large cities was raised in 1956. Mao favoured the 
continual development of big cities in preference to the thin spread of cities in the 
interior. Consequently, suburban development, inner city redevelopment projects and 
satellite towns around big cities were planned, but never implemented due to a shortage 
of capital (Kwok, 1981).
Subsequent to the national emphasis on urban development, China experienced 
urban migration on a massive scale, triggered by considerable income differentials between 
the rural and urban population. As the rate  of urban industrial development could not 
absorb the surplus rural population, the mechanization of agriculture led to more serious 
unemployment problems. The Chinese leaders therefore began to doubt the 
appropriateness of the Soviet model for the modernization of China. Thus, indigenous 
methods of development began to take shape during the Great Leap Forward.
T h e G reat Leap F orw ard  1958-60
Recovery, high morale and institutional transformation contributed to the marked 
boom in productivity and output during the initial years of the communist regime. As 
the revolutionary momentum gradually subsided, however, disequilibria became 
increasingly apparent in a range of sectors of the economy. These imbalances led to food 
shortages (particularly in the urban areas), and shortfalls in agricultural raw materials 
to the non-farm sectors tha t  were vital in meeting the needs of the growing population. 
Confronted by these problems, policy-makers had to reconsider the development 
strategy.
A re-definition of the development strategy caused a division of opinion within the 
Chinese leadership over the different approaches to economic development. The reaction 
of the pragm atists , headed by Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping and Chen Yun, was to reduce 
the growth rates and place more emphasis on agriculture and light industry, and less on
T
a
b
le
 
1
-
2
: 
T
h
e
 
D
i
s
t
r
i
b
u
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
T
o
ta
l 
C
a
p
i
t
a
l
 
I
n
v
e
s
tm
e
n
t 
in
 
C
h
in
a
b
y
 
S
e
le
c
te
d
 
A
r
e
a
s
, 
1
9
5
2
-
1
9
8
3
 
(
p
e
r
c
e
n
ta
g
e
)
11
r o
oc
on
ro r i  cm o• • • •
on o  co <r
<3- m  —< CM
CM
00
O n
CO N  vO S• • • •
O  on r i  m
lT i n  CM
on
O n
on —I t-i. . I
c m  - S ’
m  c o
*
Ch m
>1
I
»—4
>  f"-
I—I ON
m m  —h
•  •  I •
c m  r'-» — I
m  < r
-X
cu o
>h Oi
I
vO 
I-H \ D  
M  ON 
M  —I
m m  o-. . I
—> 00  CM
c o  mo m
m
I
CO
MO
CO
*
CL. CM 
Oh MO 
Cm I 
00 
I—I m  
m  on
f-H o '  on. . I
<3- m  mo
^  m  co
■X
-X
-X O'
o-i m  
s*  I 
&h co  
m
h-1 O'!
<f n£>. . I
MO CO O
< r  m  c o
CM
m
ON
3
3
Ml
<
=tc=
I
ON
•
CO
CM
CO
O
■st
j j
■X 
•X 
■X 
TO 
3  
CO 
r—Hc
I—I
TO CU 
C -C 
CTO 4_) 
i-H
■2 2
TO
C TO 
cO <U 
In
—I In
co 3
4-1  U _ |
CO cu 
co *-• 
O
O ^
CO r-H 
MO 4-1
bß 3
So T3 i —;
•H •<—i
In
o
CO
3
Mi
CO
r-H
CO
4-J
co
CO
O
O
0) c
3 i-H 
CU
u CO 
CO
». u
c TO 
•rH O 0)
•co s  c
3  -rH
CO CM
— 4 »  0 )
E-t "2  TO
s
cO
-  3
s o  h n _ t
C WJ-g 
•H C 
•TO 3  
y H “  0)
OJ SO M 
ca c  o  
cO 
3
•  O  
So
O
3
bß
bß
3
O
MO
CM
CO
■H
o
In
OJ
E
E
O
•  a
r U3
bO -
bO
C
• rH
bO CO 
C  In 
CO iJ  
3  C/O 
bß
O „
°  COc
TH
MO
U
COc 
o
Tl r  *M 
% 3  SC 
5  co cu
2  ‘H  S-i
3
„  ÜH
TJ 03 
T 1 MO0-1 £h 
in
CO
(U .
S>H 4-1c
CU cu
>  4-1
•rH Cfl 
C*H -rH
co
I 3
O
Oh CJ
So
So
r-H 
■X n) 
■x Mi 
•H 
4-1
• —
M 3  
CU
M Ca;
%  0)
3  x i
£  u  
-  §  
So
MO CO
3
TO -C
cu
TO 03 
- 3  OJ 
<4 03
Ml
•X 3
th bß 
3
r i «  urH .H ~
CO -r-) 3a . oj co 
- h X  
•J CM -T3
3  C3 3
E 3  
CO CO 
bo 3
TO 3  O
3  3  3  
3  tH tH 
*“3 >
O 
u
CL
3
3
Ü
3
•H
>
o
In
a
3
•H
x
i-H
3
CM
3
•rH
hJ
o
4-1
bO
3
i-H
TO
In
O
a
a
3
—H
3
MO
3
3
TO
3
rH
CJ
3
1 - 4
3
3
In
3
•H
3  OJ
1-H - CO
3u t H __
O -“
3  M
*  ^  5  c
r ^  -H
bO
•5  B  
Z L  37^ 3
V ,  C/3
3
3  C
£  ^  H
3  >rH 
*-• 0) 
O  X 3
0) £  
w  j  ^  
•H
3  . 
In -H
bO • 
3  T-i
3
t H
In
4 -1
3
3
TO
3
M
<4n
O
So
TO
3
Ml
C/3
3 i-H
3 J  U
CM
C
So
MOa,
3
In
bO
O
3
O
O
4 J
bO
3
• rH
TO
In
o
o
a
3
i - H
3
M O
3
03
mh
O
TO
3
3
Ml
3
3
•H
c  53  O
• rH
t o  U
C S
un
O
3
E
3
r-4
M O
O
In
On
3
MO
4-1
CM
o
So
TO
3
4_ )
C/3
3 3
4—1 3
CL 3
t H
In
C-
E
O
U
3
3
In
3
3 X
? !  
3 35
•H
X  3  
3  
'' 3
3
r
' r "> —I
a •§
30
" 3 
tJ O 
3  X  
M3 N 
bO ^h 
C 3  
•H Cb
O '
M3
3
r-H
i-H
3
>
3
Ml
o
3
3
In
3
3  
-  TO 
3 3
M3
3 
•H 
•1—1 
3  
3  
So
•H 
Ml
3  
3  
3
3  
3
^ 3  3  “  c  3  
“ MO
4 -1  N  
i-H
4 -1  3
C 73  *H 
c  3
4_i b£ 
In
3  -H CL r-H 
3  -H
O Tl
3
_ 3
O -3  N
O
<r
coco
ON
^ —4 4 f—•
3  <4n 
-I 3  
CL T3 
O
On - -
bC O  
3
£  <H
z  o
- CO
r—! M
o  co 
bO in
bO
3
O
sJ3 
O.
3  i- H  4-1  
In 3  3  
bOZ O 
O In 
3  „ Exh
bß 3
3
3
4 -1
3
O
t H
T3
3
MO In =Xs
TO
i-H
mo:
H
r —H 
3  
3  
•H 3  
bß O  
•H
S-« .
o  -
3
r X  
•H E-H
X
b ß  ,C t3  ^
3  
3  
3  
3  
3  
Sh
TO 
3  
3
3  
3
__ . 3
3  3  MO 
3  3  3  0  
MO 3  3  -H
ri S4 m
NO
00
ON
3
TO
3
bß
3
3
3
rJ
TO
3
3
O
3
T
3
3
4 -J
o
z
3
a
in
3
o
c/o
12
socialist organization. They stressed material rewards rather than ideological discipline 
to foster a work ethic. The ‘radicals’, following Mao's thought, took the opposite tack. 
Their Maoist solutions involved: accelerating the pace of collectivization and
‘com m unization’; abandoning central control of production; downgrading material 
incentives; raising the rate of saving and investment; making use of local resources 
including coal, iron ore and surplus labour; and last, but not least, placing great 
emphasis on zeal and commitment to communist values as an essential prerequisite for 
industrialization under socialism. The ultimate stress in Maoist thought was placed on 
the masses and the belief tha t  development was the task not of a technological elite but 
the entire population.
M ao’s line was adopted and the ‘Three Flag Policy’ introduced: collectivization, 
the Great Leap Forward, and establishment of the People's Commune. Accordingly, 
small-scale industry in the countryside was expanded and local self-sufficiency was 
strongly advocated. In December 1958, the Party  claimed tha t  375 million tonnes of 
grain was produced - more than double the output achieved in 1957. Gross industrial 
ou tpu t had supposedly increased by 67 per cent.
The upsurge; however, was short-lived. Although the Great Leap Forward 
proceeded, it was bedevilled by administrative confusion. Indeed, the misuse of 
resources (including manpower) became increasingly serious. Subsequently, economic 
and organizational retrenchment had to be ordered. There was a great deal of 
uncertainty and hesitation throughout 1959. The Second Five Year Plan (1958-62) was 
abandoned in 1959 and doubts concerning M ao’s economic policy were revived.
The term ination of the Great Leap Forward in 1960 coincided with the withdrawal 
of Soviet aid and expertise, and a series of natural disasters. The result was devastating. 
In particular, the deterioration in food supply was most serious, as China went through 
her ‘Three Bitter Years’ between 1959 and 1961.
The sudden withdrawal of Soviet aid and technicians had profound repercussions 
on C hina’s international relations. From 1960 onward, ‘self-reliance’ became one of 
C hina’s prime slogans. Beijing’s leaders tried to reduce all foreign influence in China, 
especially th a t  of the other major powers (communist and non-communist). Adopting a 
do-it-yourself, bootstrap  approach to development, China only imported what was 
considered absolutely necessary, such as food grain.
Urban policy also underwent drastic changes during this period. As the attention 
of Maoists was centred on the masses, the emphasis w'as shifted from urban-based 
industrial development to the rural sector (Kwok, 1981; Ma, 1981). The keynote of the 
Great Leap Forward was the introduction and expansion of small-scale industry in the
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countryside via the People's Commune. Indeed, the Commune became characteristic of 
the Chinese approach to industrialization and, by implication, to urbanization. It was 
hoped tha t  by 'p lan ting ' industries in rural areas, a spatially balanced and decentralized 
development would eventuate (Ma, 1981; Wertheim, 1977; Buck, 1981).
Correspondingly, the growth of existing large cities was contained. As asserted bv 
Chen Yun in 1959, and echoed by Mao Zedong, ‘more a ttention should be given to the 
key problem of balanced industrial distribution over regions where there are more 
medium and small townships and mineral resources’ (Cao, 1985). The eventual merging 
of cities with the countryside was planned (Kwok, 1981). This new course of 
development, however, only brought about a limited degree of industrial decentralization 
of manpower. In terms of industrial output, the established urban centres remained 
dominant (Schenk, 1977; Ip and Wu, 1980).
Urban population continued to grow from 99.5 million in 1957 to 130.7 million in 
1960, despite measures to curb rural-urban migration (e.g. population registration, 
rationing of basic commodities in the cities and repatriating recently-arrived peasants) 
and controls over long-distance travel. In view of the unresolved urban problems and 
outright economic failures, it was clear tha t  there was an urgent need for changes in 
development policy. The ‘Great Leap' finally gave way to the approach outlined by the 
pragm atists .
R eco v ery  and M o d e r a te  C o n stru c tio n  1961-65
The great depression spanning 1959 to 1961 prompted the Chinese leadership to 
reconsider its economic policies. The utter  failure of the Great Leap Forward led to the 
Maoist school of thought being pushed into the background. Instead, the ‘p ragm atis t’ 
school came to the forefront. It undertook a major revision of economic policies which 
set precedents for some of the policy changes in the post-Mao years.
Under the new policy, agriculture was declared to be ‘the foundation* and industry 
‘the leading factor’. Simultaneously, central control was reasserted, and ‘moderation 
and ‘proportion1 were the watchwords (Howe, 1978). Emphasis was also given to the 
production of consumer goods, the market mechanism, the importance of profits, the 
necessity of material incentives, and the leadership of intellectuals and technologists.
The new policy led to a reallocation of priorities. In particular, a much greater 
emphasis was placed on industries relating to agricultural development. Thus, new 
investment was directed towards the so-called ‘five small industries’: agricultural
machinery, chemical fertilizers, cement, coal, and iron and steel. A number of small 
hydroelectric power sta tions were also developed. The People s Communes wrere
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reorganized. There was more planning and a revival of the incentive system. The policy 
of ‘sanzi yibao’ weis implemented, involving the reinstatem ent of private plots, 
self-management of loss and gain, free markets, and a responsibility system. Thus, 
agricultural production was gradually restored to the 1957 output level.
By 1964 economic readjustment had been completed. The economy was in a 
reasonable state  as the outpu t of major sectors had recovered or exceeded their previous 
peaks. In December 1964, Zhou Enlai reported at the Third National People's Congress 
th a t  the economy had recovered. He urged th a t  trade be expanded and foreign 
technology studied. The pursuit of the ‘Four M odernizations’ - in industry, agriculture, 
defence, science and technology - was then proposed for the first time. In 1965, the 
improvement in C hina’s economic position continued. Self-sufficiency in oil was 
achieved, and debts to the Soviet Union were finally cleared.
During this period, the dispersal of the ‘five small industries’ to small cities and 
commune centres had accelerated. Rural industrialization, coupled with the flourish of 
commercial activities organized by the communes, led to an increase in the size and 
function of small towns (Kwok, 1981). The introduction of agricultural activities to the 
cities, however, never became significant. Although the oil fields of Daqing were created 
to demonstrate ‘urban-rural convergence', agricultural activities in the cities subsided, 
and urban communes were abandoned (Buck. 1981; Kwok, 1981). While the  industrial, 
commercial and administrative functions of large cities remained, new resource 
development occurred in the remote and uninhabited areas of Qinghai and Xinjiang.
Meanwhile, rural-urban migration had declined because of severe government 
restrictions, the emphasis on agricultural development, the restoration of agricultural 
production to 1957 outpu t levels, and the relaxation of rural policies. Further, recent 
rural migrants were sent back to their home villages. Thus, there was an absolute 
decline in the urban population between 1960 and 1966 of 29 million (Table 1.1). The 
decrease may have been exaggerated, however, as there was a change in the definition of 
urban population in 1964.“
Zhou Enlai’s emphasis on trade expansion and the study of foreign technology 
stemmed from the realization that China was paying a high cost for its self-reliance 
policy. In the 1960s, the policy not only implied an import substitution and import 
minimization strategy, but also involved some isolation of Chinese science, technology 
and industry from the rest of the world. It also meant th a t  China was cutting itself off
2. Between 1949 and 1963, urban population included the total population dwelling in cities 
and towns. Between 1964 and 1981, it only included the non-agricultural population residing in 
the urban areas, that is, excluding the de facto urbanites who held rural registration. Since 1982, 
the previous definition has been re-adopted (Chan and Xu, 1985).
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from the world's capital markets and access to even short- or medium-term commercial 
loans. China's strong links with the Third World were confined to political and 
ideological connections. In these instances, China was the donor rather than the 
recipient. Zhou’s advocacy signified C hina’s renewed intention to boost economic 
activities through absorbing foreign technology. The importance of the coastal cities 
would undoubtedly have been revitalized. Unfortunately, the ‘Great Proletarian 
Cultural M ovement’ stifled the modernization program before its inception.
T h e G reat P r o le ta r ia n  C u ltu ra l R ev o lu tio n  1966-69
The ‘Liuist’ approach to economic development worried Mao Zedong and created 
further polarization among the leaders. Mao believed th a t  the retreat from the ‘Leap’ 
had led to corruption, selfish anti-socialist economic behaviour, and the strengthening of 
his enemies in the bureaucracy. Above all, Mao feared tha t  too much stress was being 
put on material incentives in farming. Inevitably, this was leading to the ‘growth of 
capitalist tendencies in the countryside’ and thus undermining the base of the whole 
economic, social and political system.
By mid-1966, the revival of the economy finally allowed Mao to launch a campaign 
against his opponents and the sta te  administrative appara tus  without risking disastrous 
economic consequences. Hence, Howe (1978) has argued tha t  Mao's Cultural Revolution 
was not launched to remedy economic problems but was primarily a political struggle. 
Nevertheless, economic issues were raised and the ‘economic crimes' of the pragmatists 
condemned.
In 1969, the Ninth Party  Congress formally brought the Cultural Revolution to an 
end. Its a fterm ath , however, may have lasted until as late as 1976. The Cultural 
Revolution had two major consequences: it interrupted industrial ou tput in late 1966
and 1967, and it halted the tentative revival of foreign trade. The decline in industrial 
ou tpu t affected export deliveries which, combined with the general xenophobia of the 
time, prevented any expansion of foreign trade.
As M ao’s motive in inducing the Cultural Revolution was to stop the trend 
towards capitalist operations in the countryside, it was not surprising th a t  the 
agricultural sector was affected by the movement. Prices for farm goods were pegged, 
incentive systems designed to encourage individual effort within production teams were 
abandoned and private plots, which played a crucial role in the recovery of agriculture 
after the ‘Great Leap', were attacked.
Urban planning was completely disrupted as it was regarded as a product of 
‘revisionism’, and guilty of ‘productionism’ and ‘welfarism' (Xu, 1984a; Cao, 1985).
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Hence, the trends of the early sixties - restraining the growth of big cities and developing 
medium- and small-scale cities - were continued to minimize urban-rural differences. 
Although small urban places received no special trea tm ent, their development had been 
favoured since the effect of the Cultural Revolution was less strongly felt in the small 
cities. Nevertheless, this period witnessed the highest level of urban-rural migration 
because of the large-scale campaign of kXiaxiang’ (i.e. sending people to the countryside) 
(Buck, 1981). Another notable feature was the shift in priorities from national 
reconstruction to the Third Front (an area away from the coast and the land frontiers) 
due to defence reasons. Capital investment committed to this region reached an all-time 
high of 53 per cent during this period (Leung, 1986).
Two additional side-effects of the Cultural Revolution included the severe 
disruption of advanced education and training and the decline in the effectiveness of the 
planning system due to recurring waves of political factionalism. In a bid to rescue the 
country from the resultant calamities, Zhou Enlai was once more placed in the forefront 
of national affairs. His policy on this occasion was, however, much restrained by 
underlying political conflicts.
M o d e r a te  S oc ia list C o n str u c tio n  1970-76
In the early 1970s, agricultural ou tput was deteriorating despite the emphasis of 
economic development on the rural sector. Population growth, however, was escalating 
due to the relaxation of controls introduced during the Cultural Revolution. Meanwhile, 
established industries, such as transport, iron and steel, and coal, were in need of modern 
technology. Thus, without a program of modernization, the entire industrial sector was 
in jeopardy. Investment was not only lacking in the industrial sector but also in 
agriculture. Also, the remarkable growth of China’s oil industry called for a 
complementary petrochemical sector. The capital-intensive plants were, however, 
beyond C hina’s capacity to produce from its own limited resources within the short 
time-span required.
Accordingly, Zhou’s main program for the economy included a sharp a ttack  on 
population grow'th and a revival of the policy of improving large-scale plants from 
abroad. This program was underlined by a more outward a tt i tude  to international 
relations (which led to renewed links with the United States and full diplomatic relations 
with Japan  in 1972). The objectives of the Four Modernizations of 1964 were 
re-established. Positive policies for training and rewarding manpower initiated a revival 
of the universities that had been closed during the Cultural Revolution.
These proposals were formally approved at the National People’s Congress in 
January  1975. At the time, however, it was obvious that there was a powerful faction
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opposing Zhou's strategy. The conflict affected the acceptance of these plans at every 
level. Opposition to the plans was reflected in a campaign to 'criticize Lin (Lin Biao) 
and Confucious’. After Zhou's death in January 1976, this opposition faction fostered 
the second fall of Deng Xiaoping. The continuation of Zhou's policy had to await the 
death of Mao in September 1976, the subsequent downfall of the ‘Gang of Four’ in 
October 1976 and restoration of Deng to leadership in the summer of 1977.
As economic development was still concentrated on the rural sector, a ttention was 
focused on stimulating the growth of smaller urban places. Emphasis was also shifted 
from the Daqing model, where industry and agriculture were spatially integrated, to the 
Zhengzhou example, where urban industry assisted rural agricultural development. 
Consequently, there was a considerable expansion of production and population in 
medium-sized cities, while larger cities stagnated (Buck, 1981). Nevertheless, the overall 
growth in urban population was 11 million (Table 1.1).
The more outward-looking policy advocated by Zhou, especially the large-scale 
import program, had re-directed the focus of urban development to the coastal belt. As 
a result, the share of total capital investment in the coastal region increased from 32 per 
cent during the Third Five Year Plan (1966-70) to 43 per cent in the Fourth Five Year 
Plan (1971-75) (Table 1.2). This ten tative revival, however, was undermined by a series 
of political upheavals. It was only after the recommencement of Deng's leadership in 
1977 tha t  coastal cities were stressed in official policies.
This brief account of economic and urban development of communist China, 
therefore, has illustrated th a t  the dependence on foreign capital and foreign technology 
to modernize the country has a precedent in the early years of the communist regime, 
when China relied heavily on the Soviet Union in the 1950s. The sudden withdrawal of 
Soviet aid in 1960, including technological expertise, led to the ‘closed door' policy of 
‘self-reliance’ and ‘self-sufficiency’. The desire to re-establish connections with the 
outside world germinated among the ‘p ragm atis ts’ in the mid-sixties but was aborted by 
the Cultural Revolution. After the Cultural Revolution, there was an urgent need for 
externally-induced modernization and, consequently, the pragmatic advocates of 
re-establishing foreign economic relations gradually re-gained strength in the 
mid-seventies. Similarly, the emphasis on urban development had undergone some 
drastic changes. In the initial years, large cities had received the main attention. 
During the First Five Year Plan, large-scale construction of new key point cities took 
place in the interior - the bases for heavy industries. Nevertheless, as doubts concerning 
the appropriateness of the Soviet model were raised a t  the end of the Plan, a tten tion  
began to shift to small and medium townships. Although such an emphasis has 
continued since the ‘Great Leap', industries in these smaller settlements were redirected
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to serve agriculture in the sixties and seventies. The cities were, therefore, not only 
■productive’, but simultaneously able to support the rural sector. Although the growth 
of big cities has been controlled since the sixties, the function of cities as industrial, 
commercial and administrative bases has remained. The proposal to develop foreign 
economic relations led to a brief revival in the importance of the coastal cities during the 
mid-sixties and early seventies. The full opening of the coastal belt, however, had to 
await the demolition of the influence of the 'radicals' in the Chinese leadership after the 
death of Mao in 1976.
E C O N O M IC  A N D  U R B A N  R E FO R M S SIN C E 1977
In 1977, Deng Xiaoping returned to the leadership of the Chinese Communist 
Party . The subsequent December 1978 Third Plenary Session of the Chinese 
Communist P a r ty ’s Eleventh Central Committee started a major relaunching of a 
large-scale modernization program. Indeed, Party  Chairman Hua Guofeng reaffirmed 
the goal of turning China into a world economic leader by the year 2000. Deng’s own 
vision is to improve the s tandard  of living and raise the gross national income to 
US$1,000 per capita by the end of the century. The prosecution of these twin objectives 
led to much needed institutional and structural changes within China and in the 
coun try ’s foreign policy. Thus China embarked on a series of reforms which included: 
re-establishment of its connections with the world economy: the exhibition of a more 
relaxed a tt i tude  towards capitalist economic policies; and the shift in the focus of urban 
development to large cities, particularly those in the coastal belt. The creation of the 
Special Economic Zones was a direct outcome of these reforms. After summarizing the 
general changes, attention is, therefore, focused on foreign economic policies, domestic 
economic policies and coastal urban development.
R ashness (1977-79) and R eadjustm ent (1979-)
Following the P a r ty ’s Eleventh Central Committee in 1978, China quickly 
reformed its foreign economic policies to facilitate a rapid expansion of international 
trade, the acquisition of foreign investment and technology, and a shift to a positive 
a t t i tude  towards foreign aid and loans. Simultaneously, domestic economic reforms took 
place. These included a decentralization of economic management, changes in the wage 
system to enhance work incentives, and the formation of a new agricultural policy to 
increase productivity. As well, related legal and educational reforms were implemented. 
Specifically, greater emphases were placed on stimulating market forces, improving 
technical expertise and generating economic interdependence (i.e. local specialization in 
preference to self-sufficiency). These new measures have encouraged large city
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development, particularly within the coastal belt, and stimulated the growth of small 
towns - an outcome of rapid industrialization and commercialization of the rural sector. 
Although these reforms have produced better economic results within China, the policy 
has fallen short of the country’s revised but still ambitious modernization goals. Owing 
to inadequate assessment and insufficient awareness of the dangers involved in the 
pursuit of ‘high speed and gigantic construction’, China overextended its foreign 
purchasing comm itm ents and ability to manage imported technology (Davis, 1979).
A reassessment of China’s ten-year economic plan (1976-85) in December 1978 and 
February 1979, therefore, debated and adjusted the goals of modernization in the light of 
the coun try ’s capacity to repay foreign loans. Consequently, the Second Plenary Session 
of the Fifth National People’s Congress, held in June 1979, ordered a sweeping cut-back 
in capital construction projects and in investment in the steel industry. Instead, the 
national economic plan shifted its focus to enhancing agricultural development and light 
industry. The rationale for the shift was based on the country 's desire to satisfy the 
needs of ordinary people through an increase in agricultural and light industrial 
production (Financial Review , 3 June 1981).
In his report to the Fifth National People’s Congress in 1981 - the first year of the 
Sixth Five Year Plan (1981-85) - Prime Minister Zhao Ziyang reaffirmed the policy of 
economic readjustm ent and the retrenchment and the redirection of the plans first 
announced in 1979. Zhao anticipated th a t  during this period of readjustment (1981-85), 
rapid growth would be impossible and the investment component of the national income 
would be reduced. Nevertheless, the ‘open door’ policy towards foreign investment has 
continued - a strategy worthy of more detailed examination.
F o r e ig n  E c o n o m ic  P o l ic ie s
The renewed modernization program incorporated Deng's desire, first evident in 
the early sixties, of importing ‘truly advanced’ technology for inducing rapid economic 
development in the country (O ’Leary, 1980). The large-scale import of equipment and 
plant, however, has necessitated a corresponding revision of the country’s willingness to 
draw on foreign exchange. Thus, a positive a tt i tude  has been extended towards foreign 
credit, and liberal trade policies and foreign investment regulations have been developed. 
As the trade and investment policies are central to the creation of Special Economic 
Zones, their main features are discussed in more detail.
F o r e ig n  t r a d e  p o licy .  Since the renewed pursuit of modernization in 1977, an 
innovative and more aggressive approach to world trade has been adopted, involving 
more flexible and pragmatic policies. In 1981, Zhao stressed in the Fifth National 
People’s Congress tha t  “in economic work, we must abandon once and for all the idea of
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’self-sufficiency (R enm in  Ribao. 14 December 1981). Nevertheless, as emphasized bv
Donnithorne (1981), this does not mean tha t  China is pursuing a policy of export-led 
growth. In essence, she is still practising a policy of import-substitution.*
China has also become more selective in its range of imports since the emphasis on 
production has shifted from heavy industry towards light industry and agriculture. 
Accordingly, greater preference has been given to light industrial equipment and 
agricultural technology.
Consistent with these changes China has abandoned its ‘take-it-or-leave-it’ 
approach to international trade by paying greater attention to exports. Not only 
factories and bases for manufacturing products solely for overseas use are to be 
established, Special Economic Zones have been developed. This process has been 
facilitated by allowing some enterprises and local authorities to retain a share of foreign 
exchange earned from exports of goods, for the explicit purpose of enabling them to 
import new technology direct from overseas. In this way, China hopes to pay for its 
imports of foreign technology and equipment through export receipts.
F oreign  In v e s tm e n t. The encouragement of foreign investment by post-Mao 
leaders is unprecedented. This change has involved the development of a variety of 
forms of obtaining, using and repaying foreign capital. These measures include joint 
ventures (minimum foreign equity 25 per cent), production sharing ventures involving 
risk capital (e.g. joint China-Japan offshore oil development in the Bohai Gulf), 
'production-buy-back' or compensation trade schemes (i.e. payment for the import of 
machinery and the cost of processing is made from the produce of the machinery), and 
barter  arrangements. All of these schemes are designed to acquire foreign technology at 
the lowest possible cost and with minimum recourse to scarce foreign exchange reserves. 
Hence, the greater reliance on foreign technology to modernize the country has not only 
required increased export receipts, but a diversification of financial arrangements to 
induce foreign capital. Internally, China has also introduced reforms to enhance 
productivity and efficiency.
D o m e stic  E con om ic  P o lic ie s
Domestic economic reforms have reflected the Chinese government’s new 
adherence to methods of remuneration based on performance and incentives, particularly 
for industrial and agricultural workers. Although some of these new measures were
3. According to Bucknall (1981:7), the current trade policy is still consistent with long-term 
‘self-reliance’. China is prepared to borrow from overseas, expand trade, and accept foreign in­
vestment on its soil in the short-term to achieve its long-term objectives.
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implemented during the Recovery and Moderate Construction Period (1961-65), the 
present reforms have been of a more comprehensive nature. As these reforms have not 
been fully digested, there is still room for experiments directed at fine-tuning the new 
labour policies and agricultural reforms.
L abour p o lic ies . The basic aim of the new labour policies introduced since 1978 
has been to replace both the politics-first and hierarchy-oriented industrial enterprises 
with a new type of firm which is rational, efficient and production-oriented (Shirk, 
1981). The experimental measures taken are the examination system used for labour 
recruitment and job allocation, wage distribution according to technical skills and work 
performance, and the new point systems and piecework rates and quotas devised to 
determine wages and bonuses, including a trial ‘enterprise-fund’ to provide a special 
year-end bonus to encourage efficiency and production. Also greater a tten tion  has been 
given to labour discipline (Shirk, 1981; Davis, 1979). According to Shirk (1981), these 
new measures have created difficulties. Initially, the meritocratic norm, ‘to each 
according to his work’ was difficult to translate into concrete rewards for all types of 
workers; the fairness of different criteria often being disputed particularly as managers 
handed out bonuses to enhance their own popularity rather than  productivity. Also, 
piecework-type bonuses have reinforced the economic and sta tus  discrepancy between 
production workers and support workers. In addition, the new efficiency-oriented 
policies have put the technical cadres, skilled and younger production workers at an 
advantage and other political-administrative cadres, unskilled, older and support 
workers at a disadvantage (Shirk, 1981). Although productivity has been raised and 
living standards improved through the reforms, the Government is still experimenting 
with new labour policies, particularly as the new methods have engendered 
socio-economic stratification. Agricultural reforms, however, have been implemented 
more smoothly.
A g r icu ltu ra l P o lic ie s . The agricultural reforms have also been aimed a t  raising 
productivity and efficiency. Much atten tion  has been directed to raising State 
procurement prices for agricultural products and reducing the prices of agricultural 
inputs, such as fertilizers, farm machinery and insecticides. The government hopes that 
these price reforms will provide an incentive to increase food production, raise peasant 
and commune incomes, and generate increased rural demand for consumer goods (Davis, 
1979; Howe, 1982).
Other measures include: enlargement of private farming possibilities; permission
for sideline occupations; encouragement, depending on local conditions, of widespread 
diversification into other foodstuff, non-foodstuff and forestry development; and finally 
the right of peasants to sell what they produce, including grain, at village markets.
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These measures have been bolstered by the introduction of the production responsibility 
system (which seeks to motivate farmers by rewarding them for completing specific 
tasks). This system has been matched by th a t  of ‘full responsibility to the household’ 
(‘baogan d a o h u \  i.e all decisions devoted to farmers). Accompanying these measures 
has been the development of agricultural collective enterprises to integrate production 
with food processing, packaging, transport and marketing. These enterprises are 
designed to assist the distribution of processed and perishable foodstuffs to the urban 
m arket, to increase productivity and to raise agricultural growth rates. On the whole, 
the agricultural reforms have emphasized productivity, monetary incentives, efficient 
management, specialization of crop planting and diversification of rural activities, 
particularly in the better-endowed areas (Davis, 1979; Howe, 1982; Crook, 1985). Thus, 
both the post-1978 labour and agricultural reforms have triggered a swing from the 
dom inant Maoist non-material and egalitarian incentives to the capitalist material and 
performance incentives. The pursuit of higher efficiency, however, has produced 
socio-economic differences with the mass of the population - a phenomenon most evident 
when comparing the situation of coastal residents with those of the interior.
C o a sta l U rb an  D ev e lo p m e n t
Since the late 1970s, two divergent views on the current focus of China 's  urban 
development policies have emerged. One school argued tha t  the avoidance of
over-concentration in big cities should be continued, and small cities and towns 
developed to expand commune and brigade-run enterprises and absorb surplus labour 
released by agricultural mechanization. The other school has argued tha t ,  in the long 
run, urbanization in China should encourage both the development of integrated, 
modern industrial cities of all sizes and towns based on commune and brigade-run 
enterprises. The present emphasis, however, is placed on the construction of big and 
medium-sized cities. The reasons for this policy were threefold: small cities are unable 
to provide a full range of urban functions; the development of smaller cities and towns 
was dependent on further metropolitan development; and past strategies of encouraging 
smaller cities and towns to develop in isolation has been riven with failure (Beijing  
R eview , 17 March, 1980). Indeed, overseas scholars (e.g. Ip and Wu, 1980; Leung, 1986) 
have also discerned tha t  the returns of capital investment in interior cities in China have 
been inefficient. Although the interior received a larger proportion of capital 
investment, the gross value of industrial output and the volume of revenue generated 
was less than returns in the coastal region (cf. Table 1.2 and Table 1.3). Given that 
economic efficiency was to be the overriding goal, the shift back to the 'core' or coastal
area was inevitable.
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Table 1.2 shows th a t  the coastal area has been given development priority by the 
government since the mid-1970s. In 1979, its share of total capital investment reached 
an all-time high of 48 per cent. As noted by Leung (1986), the reorientation towards the 
coast has been based primarily on considerations of economic efficiency. Further, the 
shift in emphasis to foreign investment, technology and economic relations has 
highlighted the importance of the coastal belt. Not only were four Special Economic 
Zones created on the southeast coast in 1980 but fourteen other coastal urban centres 
and Hainan Island were declared as open cities in May 1984 (Fig. 1.1). Premier Zhao’s 
rationale was tha t  C hina’s economic reforms would multiply and spread from the Special 
Economic Zones, via the economically developed coastal cities to the interior. The Zones 
and coastal cities were intended to boost the ‘open door’ policy by enhancing foreign 
economic relations through the absorbed foreign capital, technology, m anagement skills 
and economic exchange and inducing the long-run economic development of smaller 
cities in the interior.
Hence, the ultimate aim of the socialist modernization has been directed at 
satisfying the needs of the masses. Foreign technology has been considered crucial for 
rapid modernization. Large-scale imports of foreign plant and equipment, however, have 
necessitated an expansion of exports and capital imports (by allowing foreign 
investment) to improve the coun try ’s access to foreign exchange. Domestically, the 
major channels of achieving modernization have been the gradual adoption of the 
performance-oriented labour policy and a new agricultural policy, stressing monetary 
incentives, efficient management, specialization in farming and diversification of rural 
activities. These new measures have created social and economic disparities among the 
workers and farmers. Nevertheless, the outward-looking measures have shifted the focus 
of urban development from the interior to the coast. This re-emphasis on coastal cities 
is regarded as economically more efficient for generating capital returns, geographically 
more conducive for widening and deepening foreign economic relations, and strategically 
more capable of inducing development of the smaller urban settlements. It was against 
this economic and urban background tha t  the special economic zones policy was 
formulated. Given the pioneering role of the Zones in the modernization campaign, we 
need to investigate their emergence, general objectives and roles before discussing the 
Shenzhen Special Economic Zone in particular.
SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES: EMERGENCE,
OBJECTIVES AND ROLES
The above review has demonstrated tha t  China's current quest for rapid economic 
development through the means of foreign technology and investment is but a 
reincarnation of past policies. Although the special economic zone policy appears to be a
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new move, its characteristics can be uncovered among China’s past development policies. 
China 's  development history, therefore, has to be distilled to provide an outline of the 
emergence of the Zones, the establishment of their overall objectives and the creation of 
the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone in particular.
E m erg en ce
The creation of Special Economic Zones was an immediate outcome of the 
post-1978 economic and urban policies, but the concept of ‘special economic zone’ can be 
traced to the earlier and less sophisticated notion of ‘export commodity production 
base’. The original concept was advanced by Zhou Enlai in 1960 and established as an 
outward-looking policy in 1971-72 (The C hina  B usiness Review , March-April 1980:29).
The export bases were designed to be under firm central control. Local Foreign 
Trade Bureaus and sub-branches of Natonal Foreign Trade Corporations were 
established to actively intervene in agricultural and industrial production within the 
bases in a concerted effort to stim ulate exports. Unified purchase contracts were 
designed to commit factories and communes to engaging in exports - an activity tha t  
had, at times, only been in term ittently  profitable.
In 1973, C hina’s first ‘unified export commodity production base’ was established 
in Foshan prefecture, opposite Hong Kong and bordering Macao in the West River 
district of Guangdong Province. Foshan has been the most successful of the sixteen 
bases established by the Export Commodity Production Bureau of the Ministry of 
Foreign Trade. The value of goods supplied to the state for export by Foshan's thirteen 
counties and municipalities has enjoyed an average annual growth of almost 27 per cent 
over the last seven years and topped Rmb 700 million in 1979 (The C hina B u sin ess  
R eview , March-April 1980:29-30).
Upon the establishment of the ‘open door’ policy in 1978, China began to consider 
setting up joint ventures with foreign companies as a means of ‘capturing’ foreign capital 
and acquiring advanced technology for development. Initially, it looked first to Foshan 
and the adjoining peninsula of Macao for land where foreign investors could be 
perm itted to establish their factories. The first joint venture, the Xiangzhou Textile, 
was located in Zhuhai, a county adjoining Macao. Since then, export-oriented activites 
have blossomed in Zhuhai.
In 1979, it became apparent tha t  China intended to advance one step further and 
set up zones designed and developed especially to meet the needs of its modernization 
policy: to import foreign technology, to earn foreign exchange, to a t t rac t  foreign capital 
and to acquire efficient production policies. Hence. Shekou, situated within the county
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of Baoan (Shenzhen), was originally designated by the State Council as an ‘Industrial 
Zone' on 30 January  1979.
In March 1979, the administration of Zhuhai and Baoan County was restructured 
by the Guangdong provincial government. The two areas were transformed into 
municipalities under the direct control of Guangdong Provincial Government - an 
essential step in minimizing bureaucratic proceedings and increasing the power of 
decision-makers (e.g. the Shenzhen Import Office may approve foreign investment with 
up to Rmb 2 million foreign equity). This new administrative arrangement also enabled 
larger and more direct budgetary allocations for infrastructure development. The 
Shenzhen Capital Construction Committee was formed to plan industrial improvements 
in Shenzhen and to outline measures for using capital, technology, equipment, and raw 
materials th a t  could be drawn from Hong Kong.
A few months later, in a S tate Council directive of July 1979, Guangdong and 
Fujian Provinces were authorized to take extraordinary measures to develop foreign 
trade and investment: these included the establishment of special export zones similar 
to export processing zones in other countries. In August of the same year, Shantou 
Municipality (within the Province of Guangdong), one of C hina’s early foreign trade 
ports, was declared a ‘trade and investment zone’. In September 1979, Vice-Premier Gu 
Mu declared th a t  Special Economic Zones were to be established in Shenzhen and 
Zhuhai where compatriots from Hong Kong and Macao, or foreign investors, could 
participate in joint ventures or run various enterprises independently. In December 
1979. the Guangdong Provincial People’s Congress passed a draft of regulations on 
Special Economic Zones which was passed by the State Council with some amendments 
in August 1980 (Appendix I). By then, the Special Economic Zones in China were 
officially declared. The Guangdong Provincial Administrative Committee in Charge of 
the Zones was set up to exercise the power of unified management over all Zones on 
behalf of the Guangdong Provincial People’s Government.
Four Special Economic Zones were announced. Three of them have been situated 
along the southeast coast of Guangdong Province: Shenzhen (327.5 sq km) adjoining 
Hong Kong; Zhuhai (6.8 sq km), close to Macao; and Shantou (1.6 sq km). The 
remaining one has been located a t  Xiamen (2.5 sq km) in Fukien (see Fig. 1.2). These 
areas had been operating on an unofficial basis for more than a year before regulations 
were formally proclaimed in August 1980 - the Shenzhen Zone being the first to undergo 
full-scale development. Functionally, these Zones can be defined as
special management areas demarcated for the purposes of: practising more 
liberal and flexible policies and measures; a ttrac ting  foreign capital with more 
concentrated efforts; using various methods to advance economic co-operation
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with the capitals of foreign businessmen, overseas Chinese and compatriots 
from Hong Kong and Macao; and experimenting on all aspects of socialist 
construction (Sun , 1982:21).
W hat the above definition fails to incorporate is the concessionary nature of the Zones. 
As stated in the Regulations, preferential trea tm ent, similar to those of other export 
processing zones, was granted to overseas investors. This feature marks the major 
departure  of this strategy from the previous conservative policy towards foreign capital, 
and hence characterizes the ‘boldness’ of the zones policy. In view of this unprecedented 
concession, the objectives of the Zones need to be examined carefully.
O b jectiv es  o f  the Zones
Special Economic Zones are not being developed for solving the employment 
problem, nor should they go solely after increases in output. Rather, they were 
areas demarcated for a ttrac ting  enterprises of high technological and knowledge 
content through the offer of preferential treatm ent. They are to serve as 
windows of advanced production, technology and management methods of the 
world (Zhao Zivang, Shenzhen  Special Zone H erald , 14 November 1983).
Premier Zhao has succinctly outlined the Zone's objectives, and their relative 
importance. Their major functions are to import technology and to serve as platforms 
for understanding and testing either capitalist or new hybrid economic policies. Another 
major objective, which was not included by the above quotation but has been 
emphasized elsewhere (e.g. Zhang, 1982; Sun, 1982; Liu, 1985), is to act as 
‘showgrounds’ displaying post-Mao liberal economic policies. Its fundamental objective 
of inducing overseas technology through widened and deepened foreign economic 
relations deserves primary attention.
F o re ig n  econ om ic  o b je c tiv es . As the Zones are destined to import high 
technology from overseas, to tap  external capital sources and to manufacture goods for 
export, their hitherto economic roles parallel current foreign economic policies, except 
for the acquisition of credit. While the use of the Zones as ‘express locomotives’ to 
propel China towards modernization is recent, the desire to develop the country rapidly 
was manifested as early as 1954. The delays in modernization accentuated the desire to 
modernize because the technological gap between China and the rest of the world had 
widened markedly over time. Although the creation of the Special Economic Zones 
seems to be a product of the present leadership, the reasons for their inception can be 
traced to the past failure of the government to keep pace with technological innovations. 
Thus, in view of the long-delayed modernization, the undertaking of a bold step is 
necessary. Thus, the present leadership regards the Zones as a powerful means of raising 
technological and economic levels of China to international standard  - the dream being
29
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th a t  the country will become a world economic leader by the year 2000. In view of this 
grand objective and the huge population of China, the aim of creating employment 
seemed insignificant (Wang, 1981). Although increased employment opportunities were 
a by-product of the establishment of the Special Economic Zones, in C hina’s case, 
increased employment was clearly recognized as a means to an end (access to 
capital-intensive facilities, know-how and world markets) rather than an end in itself. In 
contras t,  the laboratory function of the Zones aimed at improving domestic economic 
policies by transplanting appropriate  foreign economic strategies received much 
atten tion .
A  test-g ro u n d . The experimental nature of the Special Economic Zones is 
certainly significant to the planned trajectory of Chinese modernization. The Special 
Economic Zones provide venues where the pulse of the international economy can be felt. 
All new measures of foreign investment are practised and concentrated in these 
localities. The foreign investors are also allowed the maximum freedom to run their 
business in a non-communist wray. They can for example adopt their own wage policy. 
By closely working with overseas investors on their own ground, it is hoped the Chinese 
can observe, learn . and test foreign management skills and labour policies. Further, it is 
envisaged th a t  the favourable results from these laboratories will gradually filter to 
other areas of the country. In other words, these Zones are pacesetters for the socialist 
modernization of China. They have also been given a ‘showground’ function to 
dem onstrate  the openness of the present leadership to capitalist measures.
A  sh ow grou n d . The establishment of a market economy in the Zones 
demonstrates to the world th a t  China is determined to participate actively in the 
international economy. As noted, they stand as testimony to Chinese residing in 
Taiwan and Hong Kong that  capitalist economic practices are tolerated by the present 
communist regime - a gesture towards national unification. In particular, the timely 
creation of the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone at Hong Kong's border has underlined 
the political and economic importance of the Zone - a bridgehead for the future 
incorporation of Hong Kong into the Chinese nation.
The overall function of the Zones, therefore, has been in Deng Xiaoping s words in 
early 1984: “to serve as the wdndows of technology, management, knowledge, and 'open 
door’ policy” (Yearbook o f  C h in a 's  Special Econom ic Zones 1984:102-3). In late 1984, 
Premier Zhao Ziyang summarized the function of the Zones and the fourteen coastal 
cities as hubs for foreign and domestic interchange, like the ‘two sides of a fan' (S h ijie  
J in g ji Daobao, 31 December 1984). Given its size, location and scale of economy, the 
Shenzhen Special Economic Zone has been entrusted with some additional functions; 
these functions need to be examined in greater detail.
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U n iq u e  R oles o f S h en zh en
The uniqueness of Shenzhen lies in its additional urban roles engendered by its 
size, location, and scale of economy. The creation of Shenzhen into a big coastal city 
covering 327.5 sq km was a strategic move designed to achieve modernization. It meets 
specified domestic and foreign objectives through its role as an international city. Since 
1978, its urban roles have been to function as an international city; to serve as a ‘growth 
pole’, and to develop into a ‘productive’ city, tha t  is, a major industrial centre. Its 
function as an international city is primary and, therefore, deserves initial attention.
A n  in tern a tio n a l c ity . Since the inception of the ‘open door’ policy, the coastal 
cities have been regarded as geographically conducive to a ttrac ting  foreign technology 
and investment. In the case of Shenzhen, this externally-oriented function is inherent in 
the character of its export processing zone function. In fact, the choice of Shenzhen was 
primarily based on its geographical location and its connections with overseas Chinese. 
Its close proximity to Hong Kong enables it to use Hong Kong’s infrastructure, 
international transport and communication connections and skilled labour. In turn , 
Shenzhen provides land-starved Hong Kong industrialists with new premises and cheap 
labour. By offering long-term leases, Shenzhen also aimed to capture Hong Kong’s 
surplus capital, based on Shenzhen being the homeland for over 100.000 Chinese in the 
Hong Kong, Macao and overseas Chinese communities (Zhongguo Jingji Tegu 
Shouce:6). Both the proximity to Hong Kong and the ethnic ties were expected to 
facilitate the absorption of foreign technology, management skills and investment. 
Although the Hong Kong capital and technology are not considered as the ultim ate  
targets , the city can well serve as a springboard to international capital. By transferring 
technology and tried and tested management policies to the interior, Shenzhen will be 
expected to play ‘the role of radiation, like the two sides of a fan ’. Hence, the generation 
of the ‘growth pole’ spin-offs are complementary to its role as an international city.
G ro w th  p o le  e ffects . In Zhao Zivang's 1982 report to the Fifth Plenary Session 
of the Fifth National People’s Congress on the Sixth Five Year Plan, he spelt out the 
regional role of the Special Economic Zones. Basically, ‘a number of economic zones 
should be formed in the country, with developed cities as their centres, to organize and 
co-ordinate the economic activities of the entire outlying rural areas as one unit (Cao, 
1985:6). Apart from functioning as a regional centre, the Shenzhen experiment carries a 
greater national significance. As a city endowed as an export processing zone, Shenzhen 
is expected to absorb and filter production technology and management skills, and to 
generate revenue, especially foreign earnings. The major aims of the Shenzhen Zone as a
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growth pole have been to induce development by filtering foreign technological 
know-how and fostering foreign interaction with the domestic area. This ‘window 
function7 was to be mediated through industrial activities.
An industrial city . As commercial cities have been condemned as ‘consumerism' 
since the beginning of the communist rule, industrial activities have become the 
targe tted  economic activity in urban places. Specifically, the export processing zone 
policy has been to lure foreign investment for industrial activities. Hence, Shenzhen’s 
focus on industry cannot be overstated. Although Article Four of the Regulations on 
Special Econom ic Zones in  G uangdong Province s tates tha t  ‘all items of industry, 
agriculture, livestock breeding, fish breeding and poultry farming, tourism, housing and 
construction, research and m anufacturing ... can be established with foreign investment 
or in joint venture with Chinese investm ent’, the subsequent master plans have 
explicitly placed the emphasis on industrial activities. The Shenzhen  Special Econom ic  
Zones M aster O utline Plan and the Shenzhen  O u tline  Social and Econom ic Plan 
released in 1982 stated th a t  Shenzhen would develop into a major advanced 
industrialized city by the year 2000 (A sian  Wall Street Journal. 20 September 1982). 
By focusing on high technology and capital-intensive activities, the Zone should be able 
to a t t ra c t  advanced technology which can be subsequently transferred to the interior - 
the granting of preferential trea tm ent to investors should consolidate this strategy.
The exploration of the events th a t  led to the eventual creation of the Zones has 
dem onstrated  th a t  the move had been gradual rather than abrupt. The concept of 
constructing export bases was initially established in 1960, and subsequently put into 
practice in 1973 when more outward-looking economic policies were implemented. While 
the export bases only aimed a t earning foreign exchange through the export of 
m anufactured goods, the creation of the Shekou Industrial Zone in January 1979, 
featured with the granting of preferential trea tm ent, was targetted  for both overseas 
technology and investment. Thus, the creation of the Shekou Zone, and the four 
subsequent Special Economic Zones, has been a strategy tha t  has encouraged the 
im portation of technology and the absorption of foreign capital and exchange. Also, the 
transfer of technology has included the acquisition of management skills for increasing 
productivity and efficiency. Indeed, the adoption of the zone strategy has been regarded 
by the Chinese leadership as necessary because of the long-delayed modernization and 
the technological disparity between China and the rest of the world. Hence, the overall 
objective of the Zones has been to induce rapid development so tha t  the goals of 
modernization can be realized. Specifically, the unique roles of Shenzhen relate to its 
urban function. Due to its coastal location, its close proximity to Hong Kong and its 
ties with overseas Chinese, Shenzhen was destined to become a big coastal city, capable 
of producing multiplier effects at regional and national levels.
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R E S U M E
By examining past and present development strategies of Communist China, this 
C hapter has a ttem pted  to highlight the full significance of the special economic zone 
policy in the country’s modernization drive. This reliance on foreign capital and 
technology to generate development - the u ltim ate  goal of the zone policy - was an 
unprecedented phenomenon until the early seventies. Hitherto, all efforts had been 
restrained by either international disputes or internal chaos and political factionalism. 
Thus, modernization was much delayed. By 1970, the need to raise the economic and 
technological levels had been recognized by the government.
The emphasis on re-establishing foreign economic relationships, however, did not 
gain m om entum  in the mid-1970s. Even its advocacy was still undermined by political 
power struggles. This ‘yo-yo’ effect has been reflected in the pace and direction of 
urbanization since the 1950s. The pursuit of the Soviet model in the 1950s promoted the 
development of large cities - coastal and interior. Since the 1960s, however, their growth 
has been controlled. Nevertheless, their functions as industrial, commercial and 
adm inistra tive centres have persisted. Although the coastal cities were again briefly 
spotlighted when more outward looking economic policies were adopted in the 
mid-sixties and early seventies, their full revival had to await the inception of the ‘open 
door1 policy in the late 1970s and early 1980s.
The full 'open door’ policy followed the death of Mao Zedong, the removal of the 
leading radicals in 1976, and the rehabilitation of Deng Xiaoping in 1977. By December 
1978, a vigorous modernization program was adopted which featured the large-scale 
im portation of foreign technology and investment, and the employment of material and 
performance-oriented production policies. These measures were expected to boost the 
much delayed economic development. An inevitable fall-out was the emphasis on 
developing the coastal areas because they were more conducive to the realization of 
modernization on economic, geographical and strategic grounds. The location of the 
four Special Economic Zones in the coastal belt was, therefore, a direct consequence of 
the recent direction of economic policy.
The creation of the four coastal Special Economic Zones - a revised version of the 
‘export commodity production base1 concept - was part and parcel of China's ‘open door 
policy: to expand exports and to encourage the import of foreign technology and
associated skills. By offering preferential trea tm ent to foreign investors, the Special 
Economic Zones were the beachheads for external capital and technology. The Shenzhen 
Zone, in particular, was accorded a pivotal role as it was expected to establish the most
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fully-developed economy and well-developed urban area. The viability of this 
development strategy - widely adopted by developing countries - is arguable. Hence, the 
performance of the Shenzhen Zone has to be assessed in the light of the general export 
processing zone debate.
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C H A P T E R  2
E X P O R T  P R O C E S S IN G  ZONES: A C O N T R O V E R SIA L
D E V E L O P M E N T  POLICY
The major concern about Shenzhen Special Economic Zone is whether it has the 
ability to fulfil its delcared objectives of inducing economic and social development 
within China. A similar strategy - the creation of free trade zones and export processing 
zones - has been widely adopted by the developing countries to promote industrialization 
since the mid-1960s. Their success, however, has been varied anc^ controversial (see, for 
example, Fröbel et al., 1977; UNIDO, 1980; Spinanger, 1983; and Wong and Chu, 1984). 
Thus, before assessing the extent to which Shenzhen has fulfilled its stated objectives 
and roles, it is useful to review the performance of other free trade zones and export 
processing zones. Such a review will provide a reference point for assessing the 
achievements of the relatively new Shenzhen Zone.
A very basic question has to be raised at the outset: what are free trade zones or 
export processing zones? Once this m atte r  has been resolved, further questions can be 
raised: where have they been located; what have been their relative rates of growth; and 
what have been their objectives? We are then in a position to tackle the key question: 
how successful have they been in inducing economic and social development within the 
host countries?
In tackling these questions, this Chapter traces the origins and development of free 
trade zone and export processing zone phenomena. It then reviews the main literature 
on the zones to distil the debate pertinent to their viability as an effective development 
strategy. Finally, the main differences between the two opposing schools of thought will 
be summarized. In the final analysis, the ability of the zones to achieve their specific 
long-term objectives - the formation of domestic linkages and the transfer of technology - 
will decide the degree to which they constitute a successful development strategy.
EXPO RT PR O C ESSIN G  ZONES: ORIGIN A N D  DEVELOPM ENT  
Free Trade Zones and Export Processing Zones
The origins of the export processing zones and the Chinese variant, the Special 
Economic Zones, can be traced to the ‘Free P o r ts ’ or ‘Free Trade Zones' which had been
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established on major trade routes since the eighteenth century. These foci of commercial 
activity included Gibraltar  established 1704, Singapore 1819, and Hong Kong 1842 
(Currie. 1983). The idea was rejuvenated after the Second World War when the 
Shannon Industrial Zone was established in Ireland. Following this successful example, a 
policy of setting up a ‘free trade zone’ for industrial use has been adopted by a string of 
developing countries since 1960. This industrial zone is generally designated as an 
‘export processing zone’. The United Nations Industrial Development Organization 
(UNIDO) has defined the export processing zone as:
a relatively small, geographically separated area within a country, the purpose 
of which is to a t t rac t  export-oriented industries, by offering them specially 
favourable investment and trade conditions as compared with the remainder of 
the host country. In particular, the export processing zones provide for the 
importance of goods to be used in the production of exports on a bonded duty 
free basis (UNIDO, 1980:6).
In practice, not all export processing zones are concerned solely with industrial 
activities; many are concerned with commercial and other activities. For example, the 
B ataan  Zone in Indonesia aims to supplement industrial involvement with tourist 
activities. In the recently established Chinese Special Economic Zones, foreign 
participation is invited to all sectors including services and infrastructural construction, 
in addition to industrial activities. The m atte r  of defining an export processing zone is 
further complicated in Singapore and Hong Kong where there are no designated export 
processing zones as such. Nevertheless, both locations offer duty-free import of raw 
materials, and therefore virtually operate as de facto  export processing zones. Not 
surprisingly, the World Export Processing Zone Association (W EPZA) has adopted a 
much wider definition. It states that:
All government authorized areas such as free ports, free trade zones, custom 
free zones, industrial free zones or foreign trade zones, or any other type of zone 
as the council may from time to time decide to include (Article One of the 
Sta tu tes  o f  the World Export Processing Zone Association).
This catholic definition is adopted in this study to include all zones of the 
aforementioned nature and they will be generally termed as export processing zones, 
except the Chinese Special Economic Zones.
G eographical D istr ib u tion , G row th and O bjective
Since the early 1960s, the number of countries offering zone facilities has increased 
rapidly. There are now at least seventy-three separate facilities in thirty-six developing 
countries and territories (Table 2.1). More are in the process of development (Currie, 
1983). As shown in Figure 2.1, these zones are scattered throughout the world and 
found in countries which differ in size and types of economy.
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In 1983, the most important concentration in terms of employment creation was in 
Asia. Currie (1983) has noted tha t  these Asian zones were located in twelve different 
countries and territories and account for 63 per cent of total zonal employment. The 
Caribbean and Central America ranked second in importance as they had 27 per cent of 
to ta l estimated employment in export processing zones. In comparison, the zones in the 
M editerranean, the Middle east, Africa, South America and the Indian Ocean region 
were relatively insignificant in 1983.
Export processing zones became economically significant in the mid-1960s. Prior 
to 1966, only Hong Kong offered facilities similar to an export processing zone. Between 
1966 and 1969, however, industrial estates offering duty-free concessions were 
established in eight countries. Simultaneously, Singapore shifted its policy from import 
substitu tion  to export-oriented industrialization to follow Hong Kong’s example. A 
further twenty-three zones were constructed in ten countries or territories between 1970 
and 1974 - eight of these new zones were in ‘virgin’ territories. Between 1975 and 1979, 
twenty-one more zones came into operation, including eleven countries or territories 
which had previously not had this facility. The trend has continued into the 1980s with 
the construction of fifteen zone facilities in nine countries between 1980 and 1983 - a 
figure which included the Special Economic Zones in China (Currie, 1983). Thus, there 
has been a mushrooming of export processing zones since the 1970s, signifying a 
widening interest among developing countries in establishing export processing zone 
facilities as an integral part of their development strategies.
The expected contribution of export processing zones to national economy can be 
deduced from the reasons given for establishing export processing zones as expounded by 
the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) - an organization 
responsible for the promotion of the zones and assistance in their planning and 
construction:
The creation of an Industrial Free Zone is commonly considered by a
combination of several reasons, such as:
(a) a part of an overall industrial development program of the country or of a 
certain region of the country;
(b) a measure for solving the employment problem by the creation of new 
labour opportunities;
(c) stimulation of development of export oriented industries, to increase 
export volume and foreign exchange receipts;
(d) acquirement of modern industrial techniques from abroad through which 
the level-up of the domestic industrial s tandard  may be achieved;
(e) encouragement of new industrial investments from domestic, as well as 
foreign capital markets;
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(f) means of a concentrated and rational development of infrastructure with 
the industrial free zone acting as an industrial pole (UNIDO, 1971 as 
quoted in Frobel et al. (1977:366)).
The ability of the zones to fulfil these objectives, however, is highly controversial. 
This is not merely due to the varying performance of individual zones, but also to the 
different criteria and theoretical principles used to assess them. The mounting 
importance of the zones to Third World development has led to the emergence of a large 
number of studies examining the phenomenon. Divergent views have emerged. It is, 
therefore, necessary to examine the literature and distil the different lines of argument.
THE EXPORT PRO CESSING  ZONE DEBATE  
An Overview
In terms of content, the literature can be divided into two broad categories: 
general studies which describe or examine the characteristics of a particular zone or 
zones; and studies which concentrate on a specific topic within a particular zone or 
zones. Invariably, the first category considers types of industries, number of workers 
employed, level of wages paid and their contribution to the local economies in Asian 
countries such as Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, Taiwan, Korea and India (see, 
for example, AMPO, 1977; Fröbel et al., 1977; Vittal, 1977a; Chee, 1980; UNIDO, 1980; 
Castro, 1982). The second category of in-depth studies has focused on particular topics 
such as labour relations (e.g. Edgren, 1982; Odhnoff, 1982), cost-benefit analysis of a 
particular zone (W arr, 1983a, 1983b, 1986; Vittal, 1977a, 1977b) and transnational 
corporations in the export processing zones of developing countries (Samuelsson, 1982).
The methodologies used, however, cut across these broad distinctions. Indeed, in 
terms of method, two classes can be identified: empirical studies prepared by various
United Nations organizations and neo-classical economists, and analyses by neo- 
Marxists. In essence, the United Nations papers are comprehensive macro studies 
examining export processing zones at either global or regional levels. Their general aim 
is to offer advice to countries which are running or are contemplating the establishment 
of export processing zones. Basically, their thrust is to discuss the significant experience 
of ex tan t zones in the light of their contributions to export, employment and industrial 
development. There are also papers which deal with one particular aspect of the export 
processing zone phenomenon in depth such as their connections with transnational 
corporations (Samuelsson 1982; Currie, 1983), and the zones' implications for trade and 
industrialization (UNCTAD, 1983).
Studies underpinned by neo-classical economic theory are less descriptive and 
usually confined to either a specific country or topic. These cover most of the Asian
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countries but very few studies have been conducted on other developing countries. The 
most common theme of these studies is to examine the contribution or relationship of 
export processing zones to particular aspects of economic development in the host 
countries. These aspects include the credibility of the zones as an agency for export 
promotion (Vittal, 1977b), industrialization (Chia, 1982; Insight, 1976; Wong and Chu, 
1984), employment and industrial growth (Ramanayake, 1982; Datta-Chaudhri, 1982). 
Other themes are assessments of the overall socio-economic advantages and 
disadvantages of export processing zones (Castro, 1982) and labour relations (Edgren, 
1982).
Marxist economic analyses of export processing zones are inherent in the study of 
Free Trade Zones and Industr ia liza tion  o f  Asia  which was published by AM PO - the 
Japan-Asia Quarterly Review distributed by the Pacific-Asia Resources Centre, a 
left-wing organization. This particular issue comprised three parts: a general
analysis which relates the zone phenomenon to the ‘mystique" of export-oriented 
industrialization: the situation of zones or para-zones (e.g. the Asahan project in 
Indonesia) in a number of Asian countries, namely, South Korea, Taiwan, the 
Philippines, Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia; and the strategies for Asian regionalism 
together with inter-zonal operation of Japan 's  electronics firms. Another contribution 
on the zones has been written from a Marxist perspective by Fröbel, Heinrichs and 
K reye(1977), 77*eiVet*; In ternational D ivision o f  Labour based on da ta  embracing 103 
countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America. In this study, the export processing zones 
and world market-oriented factories are selected by the authors as one of the three case 
studies to provide empirical evidence of the new international division of labour. These 
case studies a t tem p t to answer the question of whether the aims of development policy 
are being attained via global market-oriented industrialization.
In essence, these two classes reflect a continuum of differing opinions - from right 
to left of the political spectrum. The majority of the United Nations papers and the 
neo-classical economic studies, though critical of the zones’ ability to induce industrial 
development, are in basic agreement tha t  the zones are, or possess the potential to be, 
take-off points for the industrialization of developing countries. In contrast, the
neo-Marxist studies conclude tha t  the aims of development policy are not realized by the 
export processing zone strategy. Contrary to accepted beliefs, the zones actually foster 
dependent and uneven development of the developing countries, and worsen the 
situation of structured unemployment in the industrialized countries. These two schools 
of thought constitute the core of the export processing zone debate and warrant detailed 
a ttention.
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E x p o rt P r o cess in g  Zone as a V ia b le  D ev e lo p m e n t S tr a te g y
Although all adherents of this line of argument acknowledge th a t  the export 
processing zones promote local activities, they differ on the extent and nature  of the 
zones' contributions to the host economy. The most positive stance has been expressed 
by Vittal (1977a, 1977b), Currie (1979) and Chee (1980). Despite the recognition of the 
problems confronting the zones, such as administrative bottlenecks, housing problems 
and incentive issues, both Vittal and Chee have argued tha t  the zones can increase 
exports, promote transfers of technology, expand employment, a t t r a c t  foreign 
investment and make fuller use of the land. Presuming th a t  the zones constitu te  an 
effective development strategy, Currie’s report provides information and advice to 
improve their operational efficiency. The works of W arr (1983a, 1983b), based on
cost-benefit analyses, also concluded th a t  the zone operations in Indonesia and Korea 
had been beneficial in economic terms.
Less favourable opinion is expressed by Spinanger (1983). Having examined the 
performance of the zones in Singapore, Taiwan, Malaysia and the Philippines, he 
suggested tha t  export processing zones represented an efficient industrialization policy 
only where ‘the entrepreneurial spirit does not have to be kindled and social a tt itudes  
don’t stand in the way of modern production process es ’ (Spinanger, 1983:31). In 
addition, Samuelsson’s analysis (1982) of the investment behaviour of transnational 
corporations in the export processing zones concluded th a t  the zones could be regarded 
as only one kind of im portant investment effort to enhance industrialization. He argued 
th a t  ‘investment in the export processing zones became of interest principally to 
transnational corporations in industries where the production process could be 
fragmented so tha t  full use could be made of the comparative advantage of developing 
countries, based on the access to unskilled labour’ (Samuelsson, 1982:12). Indeed, 
transnational corporations have never concentrated in industries dependent on the use of 
low skilled labour alone. As export processing zones rely heavily on transnational 
corporation investment, an industrial development strategy based solely on this 
investment would be imprudent.
A similar opinion was expressed in a recent paper by Warr (1986). !• 
Having examined ehe economics of offshore manufacturing in export
processing zones, Warr remarked th a t  their contribution to employment and foreign 
exchange was positive though limited. In contrast, the transfer of technology, expected 
to materialize through the domestic linkages between the firms within and outside the 
zones through commercial contacts, has not occurred. Hence, Warr maintained tha t  
export processing zones were definitely not ‘engines of development’, although they 
provided an efficient and productive means of absorbing surplus labour for countries in 
the early stages of development. Similarly, Wong and Chu (1984:5), in their study on
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the effectiveness of the zones as generators of economic development in Asian countries, 
sta ted  th a t  *... considering the magnitude of problems involved in the industrialization 
and economic transformation of these nations, the role played by the export processing 
zones can best be described as m oderate '. Also, their achievements of the more specific 
objectives, such as employment generation, foreign exchange earnings and export 
growth, have been quite limited. In discussing the significance of export processing 
zones to economic development, Sanchez (1983) concluded tha t  they could be looked 
upon as a useful adjunct to other industrial and export development policies. The zones 
could assist in creating jobs, expanding industrial capacity, a ttrac ting  foreign investors 
and increasing foreign exchange earnings. Nevertheless, technological transfer and the 
formation of domestic linkages, apa rt  from some exceptional cases, have been minimal. 
In the same vein, an UNCTAD paper (1983) remarks th a t  the upgrading of labour skill, 
technological capabilities and the establishment of domestic linkages should be regarded 
as desirable externalities only. Nevertheless, the authors are still hopeful of the zones’ 
ability to produce these desirable results and therefore propose ways of improving the 
export content and their catalytic function. Although recognizing the shortcomings of 
the zones in the developing countries, a study prepared by UNIDO (1980) furnishes 
similar recommendations to augment their effectiveness in promoting national 
development. These include upgrading the skill levels of the zones’ labour force, 
improving the zones’ integration with the host economy, and adopting more 
outward-looking policies nationally.
Collectively, the findings of the above studies have ranged from full support for the 
zone strategy (Vittal, 1977a, 1977b; Chee, 1980; Currie, 1983; W arr, 1983a, 1983b), 
through conditional acceptance of the zones as an efficient means of promoting 
development (Spinanger, 1983), to the recognition of the zones’ partial contribution to 
development (Samuelsson. 1982; W arr, 1986; Wong and Chu, 1984; Sanchez, 1983; and 
UNCTAD, 1983). The differences have stemmed primarily from the differences in the 
nature  of the studies. Favourable stances have invariably been based on the study of a 
single country (e.g. Chee, 1980; Warr, 1983a, 1983b; Vittal, 1977b). The more 
circumspect standpoints have been derived from in-depth examinations. As the latter  
stance dominates this school of thought, the features and the impacts of the zones 
described and identified by these studies should be detailed to illustrate the basic 
arguments. The comprehensive UNIDO paper is used as a marker for this purpose.
T h e U N I D O  S tu d y .  According to the UNIDO (1980) paper, the zones offer an 
elaborate package of incentives which remove the administrative and physical obstacles 
to redeployment of industrial activities within a host country. In practice, these 
incentives usually include tax concessions, provision of utilities and infrastructural
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services and factory space at subsidized rates, duty free import and export of goods, and 
provision of labour at subsidized rates and conditions. Most zones are reliant on foreign 
investment and linked with transnational corporations. The industrial s tructure of the 
zones is concentrated in relatively few industries - the two most prominent being textiles 
and garments and electronic products. While the garments industry uses a relatively 
labour-intensive, low level technology, the electronics industry - producing both 
intermediate components and final consumer goods - combines high technology with 
unskilled labour-intensive processes (e.g. assembly line jobs). Heavy industry and ‘high 
technology’ activities are expected to enjoy further development because Singapore, 
Korea, Sri Lanka and Pakistan have actively discouraged further investment in low 
technology industries, such as textiles and clothing. The predominance of the 
labour-intensive types of industrial activities in the zones has, however, necessitated an 
overwhelming recruitment of young and unskilled female workers between the ages of 
sixteen and twenty-five. These workers usually come from surrounding rural
communities or are migrant workers from adjacent countries. Their social conditions, 
involving wages, social security and other social services are generally found to be better 
than in local firms outside the zones. Within the zones, greater a ttention is given to 
factory building standards, working conditions, waste disposal control and social 
infrastructure needs such as housing, clinics, schools and recreation facilities. The 
general impact of the zones on the host countries, however, varies widely.
The impacts of the zones on the host countries discerned by UNIDO can be 
divided into two categories - the short-term and the long-term effects. The short-term 
effects are net increments of capital investment, improved balance of payments, and 
some social and regional consequences - such as employment and changed social 
conditions. The UNIDO study has suggested th a t  a spectrum of net increment in capital 
investment exists between the less and more advanced of the developing countries. For 
the least developed countries, the inflow of foreign capital associated with the zones is 
likely to be a total net increment. In fact, the zones may have retained domestic capital 
which would otherwise have been expatriated. In the case of the newly-industrialized 
countries, however, the net increment is likely to be low because they are already 
preferred locations for the capital of foreign investors. Based on the appraisal of four 
countries, the financial return of the host governments’ investment in the zones - about 
15 per cent - is more favourable than the rates of return available for alternative 
investments within the countries. Similarly, the zones exert a positive impact on the 
balance of external payments of the host countries. Nevertheless, the net contribution is 
greatly reduced by the relatively high proportion of imports of raw materials and 
intermediate goods. Further, if investment incentives are unnecessarily generous, the 
direct return to host governments will be reduced. Considerable employment
opportunities were also created. On close investigation, however, the temporary, 
female-biased employment may lead to social disruption and costs.* In contrast, the 
social conditions within the zones are greatly improved, oustripping standards in 
non-zonal areas. Hence, the short-term impacts are mostly positive, except for the social 
cost incurred by the temporary employees who are predominantly female. Less 
developed countries benefit more from the zone operation in the short term. The 
long-term effects, however, are found to be less favourable.
The anticipated long-term impacts include the formation of linkages with the 
domestic economy, transfer of technology, drainage of human resources from the 
surrounding region, and decentralization of industries from established centres. Owing 
to the to ta l export-orientation of the zones, forward linkages with the host economy are 
precluded. Although backward linkages are possible, they have been restricted because
cy
of the predilection of investors to import raw materials and intermediate products. 
Available evidence, however, indicates th a t  backward linkages - though initially very 
limited - can increase, as instanced by experiences in South Korea and Ireland. 
Basically, the integration of zones with the host country has occurred through the 
purchase of infrastructural facilities and employment of labour. Then multiplier effects 
can flow from the expanded income of the labour force and the resultant purchase of 
consumption goods. If this demand is directed towards imported consumer goods, 
however, the effect on local industry will obviously be limited.
Likewise, technological transfer is very restricted. The limitation is primarily due 
to the dominance of assembly line production in the zones, a lack of local research and 
development, the concentration of research and development in transnational 
corporations (a key factor strengthening external control over industrial activities with 
the zones), and the enclave-like character of the zones. The UNIDO study has also 
highlighted tha t  even if complex, modern technology is used in the zones, the host 
country has not automatically gained access to it. Much of the technology operating in 
the zones, however, has been found to be inappropriate for the specific developmental 
needs of the domestic economy.
1. The social disruption and costs involved are: firstly, the costs of taking care of dismissed
workers who are uprooted from the traditional setting but receive no significant skill training in 
the few years of employment; secondly, conflicts may arise in the traditional local communities 
regarding the desirability and necessity of factory jobs, particularly the employment of women; 
thirdly, the sexual imbalance leads to difficulties in finding suitable marriage partners and a high 
proportion of unwedded mothers; and finally, a sense of hostility may be created among the male 
workers or unemployed male workers towards female workers.
2. Such a trend has resulted from tax concessions for imported materials and goods, the close 
affiliation of investors with foreign companies, the preoccupation of zones with intermediate 
products, and the relative youthfulness of domestic manufacturing companies.
48
While the transfer of technology through the zones has been found to be minimal, 
they have a ttrac ted  a disproportionate number of young workers. The migration of 
workers from surrounding areas has adversely affected the future development potential 
of these regions. Although the zones may be used as a strategy for regional 
development, the a ttraction of industries from established centres, as has occurred in the 
Bataan Zone in the Philippines, may have adverse consequences on their success. By 
locating the zone in a ‘backward’ area, not only is the cost of site construction inflated, 
but the prerequisite conditions for industrialization are not met - features tha t  diminish 
the attractiveness of zones to potential investors. Thus, the long-term gains have been 
limited. Indeed, some of the effects have been negative.
The UNIDO paper concluded, therefore, tha t  the benefits generated from the zones 
have been employment creation, and the inflow of foreign exchange earnings (either 
through direct foreign investment or an improved balance of payments). The zone 
strategy also represented a cost-efficient method of demonstrating the firm commitment 
by the host countries to collaborate with foreign investors. Although the sex-biased and 
unstable employment character of the zones may have incurred social costs, zone 
workers have enjoyed a better s tandard  of living. The host countries have also been able 
to generate profits from their investment in the zones. Conversely, the potential cost 
borne by the host countries, as contended by UNIDO, has been their seduction from 
alternative, but cheaper, policies of increasing foreign investment in manufacturing, 
particularly in export-oriented industries. In addition, the zone strategy has distracted 
the government’s a tten tion  from broader economic policy questions including industry 
and education policies, general physical and administrative infrastructure, and the 
nature of incentives tha t  would a t t rac t  foreign investors. Finally, UNIDO argued tha t  
the zones should not be regarded as the only means for generating development, though 
experience to date  is too limited to provide a definite answer. Nevertheless, UNIDO 
thought that this ultimate goal was atta inable  in the long-term, and thus offered several 
recommendations.
In the main, the Organization recommended the upgrading of the skills of the 
labour force through better education, the development of a more integrated production 
process, and the adoption of a more outward-looking economic policy. The rationale for 
raising the skill and education levels of the labour force was tha t  the investing 
companies would be more likely to stay and introduce high technological activities. The 
provision of ‘to ta l product sub-contracting’ required: the provision of explicit assistance 
to local suppliers, through the imposition of tariffs on key imports or a minimum local 
contract scheme; and strengthening the ability of local suppliers to meet the zones’ 
demands. Further, the enclave nature of the zones should be reduced by creating
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industrial estates around the periphery of the zones. The host government should review 
the existence of additional services, materials and goods which could be commercially 
supplied to companies operating in the zone. Judging from the performance of 
individual zones located in different developing countries, UNIDO recommended tha t  the 
adoption of more outward-looking policies favouring manufactured exports was essential 
to the success of the zones.0 If the zones are to be a forerunner of general 
industrialization, the country - not just the zones - has to be equipped with comparable 
physical and administrative infrastructures. The ability of the zones to satisfy these 
objectives has been challenged by the neo-Marxist school underpinned by the theories of 
uneven and dependent development.
T h e E xp ort P r o c ess in g  Zone as an  
In stru m en t o f  U n d e rd ev e lo p m en t
In essence, Marxist-oriented studies have regarded export processing zones as part 
of an export-oriented strategy formulated by international organizations within the 
world capitalist economy to integrate Asia into its orbit of production. Indeed, Frobel 
and others (1977:14) have stated that:
for the first time in the history of [thej 500-year-old world economy, the 
profitable production of manufacturers for the world market has finally become 
possible to a significant and increasing extent, not only in the industrialized 
countries, but also now in the developing countries. Furthermore, production 
is being increasingly subdivided into fragments which can be assigned to 
whichever part of the world can provide the most profitable combination of 
capital and labour.
As such, export-oriented industrialization is primarily a strategy to implant competitive 
industrial components into Third World countries for the benefit of transnational 
corporations rather than an altruistic effort to industrialize these economies. According 
to the Marxist-oriented school, the policy of export processing zones - a concentrated 
expression of the export-oriented industrialization - has been actively promoted by 
dictatorial regimes and enthusiastically encouraged by the businessmen, bureaucrats and 
economists of capitalist countries. Scrutinizing the definitions of zonal imports and 
exports, and foreign exchange earnings, Frobel and others have argued th a t  export 
processing zones have constituted a strategy th a t  further enhanced the centre-peripheral 
relationship rather than promoting the indigenous development of peripheral countries. 
Hence, Frobel and others propose th a t  export processing zones should be understood in
3. If a country is to maximize the use of its capital and labour, it should adopt policies which 
include: low or moderate tariff protection; a realistic or undervalued exchange rate; a favourable 
attitude to foreign investment and participation; access to financial and capital market; and a 
revision of incentives.
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the current stage of integration of Third World countries by internationalized capital 
based in the big cities.
No proper a ttem pt has been made, however, by the Marxist-oriented papers 
published by AM PO to uncover the structure and process of production wdthin the zones 
to obtain empirical evidence to bolster their theoretical arguments. Nevertheless, the 
case study of free production sites embodied in the study by Fröbel and others has 
a ttem pted  to answer the question of whether the aims of export-oriented industrializa­
tion have been attained. This question is tackled by examining the features and impacts 
of the export processing zones: the structure of production (investment policy and
industrial structure); structure  of employment; overall working conditions; the outcome 
of employment conditions; technological transfers; balance of payments; relative social 
earnings; and the repatriation of profits to foreign corporations and institutions. Thus, 
in order to understand the features and impact of the zones ascertained by this school, 
we have to detail the findings of Fröbel and others (1977).
F r ö b e l  a n d  o th e r s .  Fröbel and others’ analysis of the basic features of the 
export processing zones was similar to tha t  undertaken by UNIDO. The exceptions are 
greater stress on the favourable terms of investment incentives (e.g. an unlimited period 
of tax exemption and subsidized inputs and services); the absence of a significant trend 
towards the technologically-advanced production process (even in the newly- 
industrialized countries); and the ‘super-exploitation' of the workers. Working 
conditions, in particular, were highlighted by Fröbel and others to point out tha t  wages 
were often insufficient to cover the basic costs of living. Workers also suffered from long 
working hours, shift work, few holidays, social insecurity, insufficient pensions, the 
absence of unemployment benefit, and inadequate provisions for safety at work. Indeed, 
working conditions were much worse than those of the industrialized countries. The 
‘super-exploitation’ of the workers, however, was maintained by various instruments, 
particularly political suppressions of trade unionism.
Contrary to UNIDO’s opinion, Fröbel and others contended th a t  all zonal impacts 
on the socio-economic development of the host economy were negative. In the 
short-term  impacts, Fröbel and others argued tha t  investment in the construction of an 
export processing zone did not necessarily a t t rac t  a compensatory overseas capital 
inflow. The authors also claimed tha t  the zones had no marked positive effects on the 
balance of payments in peripheral capitalist countries. As wages were low, prices were 
subsidized, and profit taxes were often exempted, they argued th a t  the sources of foreign 
currency receipts were limited. Further, the sale of domestic materials was counteracted 
by duty exemption and investors’ transnational organizations. Fröbel and others also 
contended tha t  the exports derived from the zones were not the ‘real’ products of the
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host country because domestic materials were not used and all profits were repatriated. 
Instead, there were debilitating currency outflows incurred from the construction of the 
zones, the supply of industrial inputs at subsidized rates, and the offer of subsidies to 
investors for financing the capital outlay. Thus, the inflow of foreign currency was, at 
best, equivalent to the necessary foreign currency expenditure. According to Fröbel and 
others, the positive differences were unlikely to generate overall improvements in the 
standard  of living within developing countries. Nevertheless, there was little 
disagreement between UNIDO and Fröbel and others on the adverse effects. The latter, 
however, paid little attention to the social conditions within the zones (apart from those 
relating to working conditions). They simply sta ted  that:
the selection of sites is often made in complete disregard for existing economic 
structures or the ecological effects of industrial production at the new sites. In 
many cases it involves the forced displacement of the rural population from 
areas in agricultural use (p.376).
Hence, the short-term effects as contended by Fröbel and others, were deemed to be 
either negative or negligible. Similarly, the long-term effects were found to be 
undesirable.
There was also little dispute between UNIDO and Fröbel and associates on the 
limited formation of forward and backward linkages between the zones and the host 
economy. UNIDO, however, argued that backward linkages could expand as the zone 
m atured, whereas Fröbel and others make no such projection. Although both schools of 
thought acknowledged tha t  very limited technological transfer was taking place in the 
zones, UNIDO maintained th a t  the transfer was possible, while Fröbel and others 
completely ruled out such a possibility. In contrast, both UNIDO and Fröbel and others 
adm itted  the adverse effects of zones on the surrounding area generated by the pull of 
skilled labour into the zones. Thus, Fröbel and others identified no positive long-term 
impacts of the zones on the host economy. Hence, they drew the conclusion tha t  there 
was no evidence to indicate th a t  export processing zones could solve the industrialization 
problems confronting the developing countries, even if the zonal development was 
accelerated. Indeed, the high expenditure incurred for the running of the zones had to be 
derived from the surplus generated by other sectors. In view of considerable profits 
enjoyed by foreign investors and low or even negative benefits received by the host 
economies, Fröbel and others argued tha t  the operation of the zones intensified the trend 
towards uneven and dependent development and widened the disparity between the 
material living conditions of the inhabitants of the advanced capitalist and peripheral 
capitalist economies. Moreover, the workers in the latter were permanently condemned 
to be members of the industrial reserve army.
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The arguments inherent in the two schools of thought, therefore, have been 
detailed and illustrated by reference to the works of UNIDO and Fröbel and others. 
Given their different political stances, the interpretation of the empirical da ta  has been 
diverse. The acid test of the validity of the two paradigms, however, lies in the extent 
to which the concrete situation in individual zones conforms to the features and impacts 
depicted by each school.
R ESUM E
This Chapter has traced the origin and development of export processing zones, 
and has detailed the polarized views on their performance. As noted, the export 
processing zones were demarcated to offer favourable investment and trade conditions to 
foreign investors to encourage the development of export-oriented industries. Since the 
1970s, there has been a burgeoning interest among developing countries in establishing 
these zones as an integral part of their industrialization strategy. Among the various 
specific objectives, the zones were commissioned to induce economic development in the 
host countries. The ability of these zones to achieve this objective has been assessed 
according to different criteria and diverse theoretical bases. A debate on the 
performance of the zones, therefore, has evolved. The different argum ents of the 
neo-classical economist and Marxist-oriented analysts are summarized in Table 2.2. 
Although there are marked similarities in their basic positions, they differ over the 
extent of sophisticated production a ttrac ted  to the zones and the quality of working 
conditions within the zones.
The Marxist-oriented school has discerned either negative or negligible positive 
effects of the zones on the domestic economy. By comparing the working conditions in 
the zones with those in the developed countries, the Marxist-oriented school has 
regarded workers in the zones as being ‘super-exploited’. Hence, this school has 
concluded tha t  the zones would not induce industrialization but would intensify the 
uneven and dependent development of the developing countries.
The school drawing inspiration from neo-classic economic theories, in contrast, has 
- identified some positive effects - net increments of capital investment, profitable returns 
on investment, increases in foreign exchange earnings and improved social conditions. 
Despite some undesirable impacts - the social costs and disruption engendered by the 
unstable and sex-biased employment - the neo-classical economic school has maintained 
th a t  the zones have been able to induce industrial development in the host countries 
where high skill levels in the workforce have been present, the production process in the 
zones is closely integrated with the domestic economy, and the host government has 
adopted an outward-looking policy. Ultimate success, however, will hinge on the
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a tta inm en t  of long-term objectives. In particular, the general guidelines furnished by 
UNIDO need to be tested in specific host countries. Although these suggestions have 
been generated from the experience of the more matured zones in Singapore, Taiwan and 
Korea, their applicability may not be universal, particularly in socialist economies such 
as China. Indeed, there is now a continuing debate in China about the viability of the 
export processing zone strategy as a means of inducing economic development, 
particularly over the wisdom of setting up new zones. This controversy is discussed in 
the next chapter.
P A R T  II
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C H A P T E R  3
THE SPECIAL EC O N O M IC  ZONE D E B A T E
Since the emergence of the special economic zone concept in 1979. vigorous debates 
have been taking place within the Chinese leadership on the nature, pa th  of 
development, performance and impact of the Zones. The major focus of these polemics 
has been the appropriateness of the para-export processing zone policy for the socialist 
economy of China. * The Zones have also become grist for the mill of China watchers. 
Initially, mention of the Special Economic Zones only appeared in newspaper reports and 
journalistic articles. Gradually, as the Chinese Government persisted with the policy of 
creating and developing the Zones, and phenomenal progress was shown by Shenzhen, 
the most advanced of the Zones, they have a ttrac ted  the a ttention of both local“ and 
foreign social scientists. Coinciding with the Chinese Government's more relaxed 
a tt i tude  to research activities, there has been an exponential growth in academic 
literature  on the Zones, and Shenzhen in particular. A major concern of these studies 
has been the projection and evaluation of the Zones’ ability to accelerate the pace of 
socialist modernization in China. Divergent opinions have been expressed and debates 
have arisen. It is therefore necessary to devote a short chapter to review the debates, 
and their contribution to the understanding of the Zones, before the analysis of this 
study is presented.
The burgeoning literature on the Zones raises the inevitable question: what is the 
content of this academic material? The subsequent questions are: what are the
divergent views on the special economic zone policy; what are their major differences; 
and how have they derived their arguments? When these questions are answered, we 
can proceed to tackle the final question: in what ways can the present study further the 
assessment of the performance of the Shenzhen Zone?
In considering these questions, this C hapter provides an overview of the special 
economic zone literature which is followed by a review of the zone debate. Finally, the 
analytical structure  of the present study is presented. The thrust of the argum ent is
1. The debates are detailed in: Rung (1985:199-201); and The N in e ties , August 1985:49-58.
2. Some of the local studies, for example, Yuan (1979), Sun (1980, 1982) and Yu (1983), are 
prepared to support respective arguments within the leadership.
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th a t  the performance of the Shenzhen Zone needs to be evaluated and explained in the 
light of the general export processing zone experience: filling this gap is the prime 
purpose of this thesis.
A N  O V E R V IE W  OF T H E  L IT E R A T U R E 3 4
Conveniently, the academic literature of the Zones, and Shenzhen in particular, 
can be distilled into three strands:*1
• preliminary studies;
• strategic and theoretical studies;
•  topical studies.
P r e lim in a ry  s tu d ie s , in essence, provide an introduction to the Special 
Economic Zones. A part from the usual catalogue of information on their inception, 
history, plans, progress and problems, a recurrent theme permeating all studies is a 
discussion of how the ‘social laboratories’ of the Zones are functioning (or not) (Table 
3.1). Hence, some of these studies (Zheng Zhuyuan,5 1981; Wong Kwan Yiu, 1982; 
Zhang Rongfeng, 1983) comprised the first participants of the special economic zone 
polemic.
Studies covered by the str a te g ic  and th e o re tic a l stran d  have emphasized 
prescription. They have produced a flurry of recommendations to guide the policy on 
Special Economic Zones. Although empirical evidence has not been neglected in these 
studies, their main thrust has been derived from theoretical considerations. They can be 
further divided into: (a) general studies covering planning policies and development
problems; and (b) specific discussions involving public finance, sectoral studies, economic 
relations and social topics (Tables 3.2 and 3.3). Due to the prescriptive nature of these 
papers, they are not pertinent to the zone debate.
The most voluminous group of studies on Shenzhen have comprised empirical 
analyses of particular issues - th e  to p ica l s tu d ies . They can be divided into those 
examining economic issues and those studying social problems. As shown in Table 3.4 
the material on economic issues covers a wide spectrum of topics. They range from
3. As the cut-off date for this study is 1984, only the literature published before and in 1984 is 
reviewed here. Later works pertinent to the Special Economic Zones will, however, be included in 
the section discussing the debate.
4. A critical evaluation of each bracket of the studies is contained in Appendix II.
5. In order to avoid confusion over translated names, the author's full name is given when his 
article is first cited, as in the case of Chinese writings. Names are translated by pinyin, unless the 
author’s own translation has appeared in other works.
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T ab le  3-2: Content Analysis of Strategic and
Theoretical Studies - General Studies
Topic Author Date
1. Development Problems Wong Kwan Yiu (1981, 1982)
GRCSEZ (1982b)
Zeng Muye (1982)
He Jiasheng (1984a)
a) Economic Structure GRCSEZ (1982b)
GRCSEZ (1982c)
b) Legislation Wang Zhiyuan (1981)
Wang Zhiyuan (1982)
GRCSEZ (1982d)
Chu Kim Yu (1983b)
2. Strategic Planning Sit Fung Suen (1981)
Yam Zexian (1982)
Zheng Weiming (1982)
Kwok Yin Wang (1983)
Lam Kin Che (1983a)
contributions on the nature of the economy and management of Special Economic Zones 
in the aspects of economic, legal and administrative structure, through planning and 
development policies and economic activities to external and internal relations and the 
Zones as a development strategy.
The social studies have canvassed all key features of the social conditions of the 
Special Economic Zones ranging from population through general living conditions 
(including social services) and labour policy to ‘spiritual civilization'6 (Table 3.5). This 
group of studies includes the major contributors to the zone debate. (They are: 
Chossudovsky, 1982; He Jiasheng, 1984a; Sit Fung Suen, 1981; Sun Ru, 1980, 1982; 
Yuan Shibang, 1979.)
Each set of studies on the Special Economic Zones has made a distinctive 
contribution to understanding the phenomenon. Preliminary studies have provided 
detailed accounts of the formation of the Zones and their likely pattern  of development. 
Strategic and theoretical studies have shed light on the controversies underlying policy
6. Spiritual civilization, ‘jingshen wenmeng’. refers to the non-material well-being of the masses. 
This ranges from nourishment for the mind through social etiquette to cultural activities.
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T ab le  3-3: Content Analysis of Strategic and
Theoretical Studies - Specific Studies
Topic A u t h o r Date
1. Public F i n a n c e
a) T a x a t i o n G R C S E Z (1982h)
b) L a n d  Use Fees G R C S E Z ( I 9 8 2 f )
c) C u r r e n c y T a n g  Huai (1981)
Y u a n  S hibang (1981)
G R C S E Z (1982g)
Z h a n g  Y u a n y u a n (1983)
Ch u  K i m  Yu (1983c)
L i n  H o n g q i a n  Si L i u  R u n h u a (1984)
2. S e c toral S t udies
a) A g r i c u l t u r e Z h e n g  T i a n x i a n g  Si Wei Q i n g q u a n (1981)
Lei Qiang (1981)
b) I n d u s t r y Wu Y o n g m i n g  Si Ni Zh a o q i u (1981)
W o n g  Kwan Yiu (1983a)
c) T o u r i s m G R C S E Z (1982k)
W a n g  Y a nyu (1984)
3. Econo m i c  R e l a t i o n s Li n  Bi n  e t a l . (1982)
L i a o  Y a n  e t a l . (1981)
Sun Zo ngwei (1983)
4. Social T o p i c s Z h a n g  Ked o n g (1981a)
G R C S E Z (1 9 8 2 i )
W a n g  Z h e n g x i a n (1981)
L a m  K in Che (1983)
H s u  S h eng I (1983)
G R C S E Z (19821)
formation. Topical studies have provided im portan t insights on economic issues and 
social problems within the Zones.
As noted, the feasibility of the Zones as a development strategy has been the 
subject m atte r  of a considerable number of studies. Coupled with works published at 
later dates, they are the substance of the special economic zone debate. Two dom inant 
lines of argum ent have emerged: the Zones as a feasible development strategy, and the 
Zones as an unsuccessful development policy. Before delineating the argument of those 
opposed to the Zones, the proponent opinions will be canvassed.
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Table 3-4: Content Analysis of Topical Studies - Economic Issues
Topic Author Date
1. Nature of Economy GRCSEZ (1982a)
He Jiasheng (1984b)
Yu Guangyuan (1983)
2. Management
a) General Wong Kwan Yiu k Chu Kim Yu (1983)
b) Economic Structure Chu Kim Yu (1983e)
He Jiasheng (1984c)
c) Legal Structure Jiang Zhenliang (1983)
d) Administrative Structure Chu Kim Yu (1983a)
3. Planning and Development Chu Kim Yu (1983d)
Problems Lain Kin Che (1983b)
Wong Kwan Yiu (1983b)
Wong Kwan Yiu (1983c)
Yeh Gar On (1983)
4. Economic Activities Chen Qinfeng (1984)
Hu Youqing (1984b)
Lee Fong Mo Kwan (1983a)
Lee Fong Mo Kwan (1983b)
Lee Fong Mo Kwan (1983c)
Wang Yanyu (1984)
Zhang Changcai (1984)
Zhang Changcai k Hu Youqing (1984)
5. External and Internal Relations
a) Relations with Hong Kong Chen Kwan Yiu (1983)
Liu Pui King (1982)
b) Relations with China Hu Youqing (1984a)
6. Development Strategies Chossudovsky, M. (1982)
He Jiasheng (1984b)
Sit Fung Suen (1981)
Sun Ru (1980)
Sun Ru (1982)
Yuan Shibang (1979)
Chen Zhaobin (1984)
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T able 3-5: Content Analysis of Topical Studies - Social Issues
Topic Author Date
1. Population Ng Yen Talc (1983a)
- Zheng Tianxiang e t a l . (1981)
2. Living Conditions Chiu Lai Har (1983)
Ng Yen Tak (1983b)
3. Labour Policy Chen Suhui (1984)
Luo Fuqun (1981)
Wu Chung Tong (1982)
Zhang Youming (1981)
4. Spiritual Civilization Li Foyan e t a l . (1984)
TH E ZONES AS A FEA SIBLE D E V E L O P M E N T  ST R A T E G Y
A continuum of views has been demonstrated by the advocates of the special 
economic zone policy. The most supportive stance has been provided by the works of 
Yuan Shibang (1979), Sun Ru (1980, 1982), Wong (ed.) (1982), Chu Kim Yu and Wong 
Kwan Yiu (eds.) (1985), He Jiasheng (1984), Chen Zhaobin (1984), and Liu Runhua 
(1985). Both Yuan and Sun have a ttem pted  to justify the policy, drawing precedents 
from Lenin’s Concession Area Program introduced under the New Economic Policy in 
the Soviet Union during the period 1921-1929. They have argued tha t  as capitalist and 
socialist economies co-exist in the present world, economic relations between the two are 
bound to occur. Moreover, the less developed socialist countries should and could make 
use of the material wealth, advanced technology and scientific management ol the 
capitalist economies to enhance their development. They have also emphasized that the 
special economic zone policy would not result in any loss of sovereignty as the Zones 
w'ould be administered by Chinese laws and regulations. Rather, these Zones would 
ultimately provide the basis for breaking away from the control and suppression 
exercised by imperialist countries. Hence, the long-term gains of the Zones would cover 
any short-term  loss or costs incurred (basically realized in the share of surplus value 
with the capitalist investors). In particular, Yuan has traced the causes of the 
widespread emergence of Special Economic Zones, contending tha t  their appearance was 
not coincidental but was a corollary of both the search for profitable production by the
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capitalist countries and transnational companies and the willingness of the Third World 
countries to pay certain economic prices for the absorption of foreign investment and 
technology. By drawing on the example of Bataan  Zone in the Philippines, Yuan 
Shibang (1979:9) concluded tha t  ‘after years of practice, many countries have proved 
th a t  free trade zones and export processing zones are an effective economic and trading 
strategy to enhance economic development’. The determinants of success, as 
summarized, were meticulous infrastructural and economic planning based on careful 
research, and a deliberate effort to a t t rac t  foreign investment and technology. This 
theoretical argument has been substantia ted  by more recent empirical research.
In the wide-ranging descriptive study of the Shenzhen Zone and its encompassing 
Municipality (covering economic activities, economic relations and social conditions), 
Wong and others (1982:106) have optimistically remarked tha t  ‘the Shenzhen Special 
Economic Zone seems quite adequate in fulfilling the primary objectives of introducing 
modern technologies and allowing the Chinese leaders to observe and to understand how 
the economic systems under capitalistic management works’. In the concluding chapter 
of the sequel to the above study, Wong and Chu (1985:217), having examined the 
western and Chinese concepts of modernization, remarked that:
the programme of Special Economic Zones is only five years old. Within such a 
short period of time, these Zones have been modernizing very quickly. Judging 
by the fact tha t  many of their innovative m easures' are being adopted by other 
places outside of the Special Economic Zones, it is fair to say th a t  they have 
contributed to the process of the modernization of China.
Such a favourable stance has been echoed by Sun (1982) and He (1984a).
The more recent empirical analysis of the Zones by Sun (1982) and He (1984a) 
have argued - supported by statistical evidence - th a t  the objectives of absorbing foreign 
capital, foreign exchange, foreign technology, m anagement skills and technicians have 
been realized in Shenzhen. In particular, Sun has pointed out th a t  the Shenzhen Zone 
has not only stimulated and improved enterprise management but has also initiated 
bureaucratic reforms. Also, He (1984a) has delineated how the zonal policy has 
developed industry and agriculture, increased revenues, expanded the resources of the 
local regions, and provided jobs in construction and retailing. As both Sun and He have 
not assessed the costs incurred by the Zone, their case as yet, is unwarranted. In
7. The measures being taken up by other areas include: the tender system in construction work; 
introduction of contract labourers and the home-purchase scheme; and others which were regarded 
as good examples, although it was difficult to assess whether they had influenced the decision of 
the Central Government (for instance, the separation of commercial functions from the state and 
government departments, the enactment of laws and increasing emphasis on the role of legal 
systems, and the democratic election of factory managers).
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contrast, both Chen Zhaobin's (1984) and Liu Runhua's study (1985) have 
acknowledged and discussed the shortfalls of the Zone.
In assessing the achievements of the Shenzhen Zone, Chen pointed out tha t ,  given 
a high degree of autonomy, the Zone had a ttem pted  to administer the economy with 
economic methods and had diversified the means of a ttrac ting  development capital. 
Further, it had broken the convention of ‘eating from the big po t’ or from the ‘iron 
bowl’ (i.e. indiscriminate and permanent employment), and had concentrated on 
infrastructural construction, thereby providing a favourable investment environment. 
Although the Zone had not yet achieved its u ltim ate  goals and was experiencing 
‘teething problems’, Chen maintained tha t  the Zones would be able to make an ample 
contribution to the socialist economy of China.
In response to M .H.T. Chan's challenge to the acclaimed achievements of 
Shenzhen (see next section), a more pragmatic study was undertaken by Liu. The latter 
admits tha t  by 1983, the Zone had not achieved the ‘three predominances’ (sange 
weizhu): production and construction capital provided by foreign sources, forms of
foreign investment dominated by joint-ventures; co-operative production arrangements 
and sole proprietorships: and a reliance on exporting the products manufactured. If the 
conditions were viewed, however, in a dynamic framework, it w*as obvious th a t  foreign 
investment had expanded more than elevenfold and investment originating from 
joint-ventures, co-operative production arrangements and sole proprietorships had 
increased more than twentyfold between 1979 and 1983. He further argued th a t  the 
Zone’s trade deficit would decrease as local production grew and the boundary fence 
segregating the zonal and non-zonal area was utilized.
Judging from this progress, Liu contended th a t  the Zone was striving towards its 
u ltim ate goals. At the time, Shenzhen was still in its formative stage, and since the 
Zone was not completely separated from the domestic area, it could not have been fully 
open to the external economy.
A more moderate a t t i tude  towards the achievements of the Zones, and Shenzhen in 
particular, is exemplified by the studies of Zheng (1981), Sit (1981), Zhang (1983), 
Falkenheim (1985) and Kung Kai-sing (1985). Although all are supportive of the zone 
strategy, they are hesitant to foster an entirely positive conclusion about the 
achievement and potential of the Zones. Zheng’s s tudy, for instance, has left the Zone’s 
future open-ended, after pinpointing the differences between the Zone’s economic 
systems and th a t  prevailing in other parts of China.
Based on the experience of other Asian export processing zones, both Sit (1981) 
and Zhang’s (1983) studies a ttem pted  to project the possible economic effects and the
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likely future developments of the Special Economic Zones. By comparing the Chinese 
Zones* investment environment with tha t  of other Zones, Sit pointed out tha t  the 
Chinese Zones possessed both strengths and weaknesses. Recognizing that the
performance and the assessment methods of export processing zones have been 
controversial, he remarked th a t  the future of the Chinese Zones remained inconclusive. 
More specifically, Zhang (1983) has argued tha t  the main contribution of the Zones will 
be found in increasing national income through direct channels and serving as a 
test-ground for economic reforms. Forecasts on the future development of the Zones by 
Zhang are based on an examination of the investment environment of the Zones, an 
exploration of potential linkages and the possibilities of establishing backward linkages 
with the rest of China. This appraisal led Zhang to a number of conclusions: tha t  the 
Zones have failed to use their assets; tha t  among other economic sectors, tourism and 
light industry possess relatively better markets; and tha t  backward linkages will be 
difficult to establish. Hence, he viewed the future of the Zones with apprehension. 
While the studies of Sit and Zhang are projections based on the Zones’ investment 
environment, those of Falkenheim (1985) and Kung (1985) are assessments of the 
economic performance of the Zones.
By comparing the initial investment and growth objectives of zone planners to 
actual performance, Falkenheim (1985) discerned tha t  although there have been 
increases in industrial ou tput, local Financial revenue, employment, wages and 
commercial activities, development problems have arisen. The problems have included 
the predominance of construction output value in total industrial ou tpu t,  the dominance 
of assembly and processing industries, the preponderance of Hong Kong capital in 
foreign investment, the lagging export performance, and the unclear beneficiary of the 
domestic linkages being forged. These problems affected technological transfer and 
export expansion - two main goals of the special economic zone strategy. Weighing up 
the achievements and problems of the Zones. Falkenheim (1985) found it difficult to 
draw a definite conclusion on the achievements of the Zones. Nevertheless, he 
maintained tha t  fin further opening the coast to foreign investment, the Chinese are 
sidestepping signs of growing problems in such crucial areas as exports, foreign exchange 
and technological transfer, problems not likely to be ameliorated by extending the scope 
of the policy’. Further, by rapidly opening the coastal area, the Chinese are unleashing 
new competitive pressures which might threaten the overall objectives of the Zones.
In contrast, Kung (1985) adopts a more relaxed a tti tude  towards the achievements 
of the Zones. On the basis tha t  ‘insufficient time has elapsed to allow any structural 
break to occur’, and ‘until the dynamics of Shenzhen development takes on a more stable 
path , it remains futile to criticise i t ’, he dismissed C han’s (1985) criticism that Shenzhen
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has failed to fulfil its objective as an industrialization zone which exports its 
m anufactures, a ttrac ts  foreign capital sufficiently, and makes concomitant technological 
progress. At this juncture, Kung argued tha t  the ‘demonstration effect’ of the 
‘entrepreneurial dynamic’ of Shenzhen, and its capacity to generate economic 
development in an integrated way, have certainly been of some merit. While such 
‘wait-and-see’ or defensive a tt i tudes  have been adopted by the protagonists of the Zones, 
the opposing school has regarded the Zones as a costly and inefficient development 
policy which failed to induce national growth.
THE SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES AS AN  
U N SU C C ESSFUL DEVELOPM ENT POLICY
The key articles in this line of argum ent are the studies of Chossudovsky (1982) 
and Chan (1985a, 1985b, 1985c, I985d). While the former writer was only able to give a 
preliminary assessment of the Zones in relation to C hina’s trade and foreign investment, 
the la tte r  based his studies on substantial empirical evidence. According to 
Chossudovsky’s argument, the special economic zone policy has merely established 
extraterritorial rights for foreigners similar to those set up after the Opium War 
(1839-42). At best, the Zones have encouraged ‘overflow’ of small scale manufacturing 
firms from Hong Kong. Subsequently, the Zones are likely to have a backwash effect on 
the economic development of the interior as the enclaves have prevented the generation 
of forward and backward linkages. Even the much anticipated transfer of technology 
has not materialized. Economic crimes engendered in the Zones have also strained 
C hina’s balance of payments. As Chossudovsky’s claims have not been supported by 
empirical evidence, his negative s ta tem ents remained unsubstantiated. In contrast, 
C h an ’s studies provide ample evidence.
In his two studies (1985a, 1985b) on the economic progress of Shenzhen, Chan 
dem onstrated  tha t  the Zone had not achieved its goals by mid-1984. The following were 
his main criticisms: the Zone’s industrial growth had relied on a large am ount of
investment in infrastructure; industrial growth had mainly been derived from 
construction output; the transaction value of retailing had been greater than industrial 
output;  the proportion of foreign investment had been smaller than that of domestic 
investment in to ta l development capital, and in the industrial sector; and the fact that 
only one-twelfth of the total industrial products and half of the manufacturing products 
had been exported. As the value of imports had been enormous and large-scale entrepot 
trade  had been carried out, Chan demonstrated that the main engine of Shenzhen s 
development was entrepot trade, with the domestic economy as the main market. These 
findings led Chan to conclude tha t  the achievement of Shenzhen was due to the 
manipulation of the Zone’s ‘free p o r t ’ s ta tus  by foreign and domestic investors. He
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further argued tha t  notwithstanding the injection of a large am ount of internal 
investment, the Zone had not achieved the ‘three predominances’. Hence, if the Zone 
was to contribute to the opening of the coastal cities, it provided lessons of failure, and 
not ways to success. Looking ahead, he maintained tha t  since the Zone had failed in the 
past, there was no guarantee tha t  it would succeed in the future. Finally, he proposed 
tha t  in view of the country 's  scarce capital, cities such as Shanghai, instead of Shenzhen, 
should be chosen to develop industries of a high technological content.
In another two studies (1985c, 1985d), Chan analysed the sources of Shenzhen’s 
development capital in conjunction with its economic development. In both cases, he 
argued tha t ,  contrary to the claims of the Shenzhen government, the Zone had not been 
Financed primarily by foreign capital. At best, foreign investment constituted the 
medium for a ttrac ting  domestic investment. Although half of the M unicipality’s 
industrial ou tput originated from foreign-related Firms, this does not imply Shenzhen has 
achieved external orientation. The reasons were: the fact tha t  less than  half of the 
products from foreign-related Firms were exported; the predominance of imports over 
exports; and the dominant sponsoring of the Zone’s development by domestic capital, 
manpower, technology and market. Hence, he concluded tha t  the claims of success by 
the Shenzhen government were unconvincing. In the article included in Shenzhen  Pouxi 
(1985c), he further posed the question of whether it is economically justiFiable to use a 
huge sum of domestic capital and provide preferential terms to foreign investors if the 
Zones could not achieve an export-led economy. More moderately, he concluded in the 
article contained in the A sia n  Journal o f  Public A d m in is tra tio n  (I985d) tha t  despite 
the failure of Shenzhen to stand as a national model of local economic development 
funded by foreign capital, Shenzhen’s experience and the factors behind its rapid 
economic growth could still be useful for the reference of other local economies in China. 
Nevertheless, he pointed out tha t  when Shenzhen’s special s ta tus  in C hina’s planned 
economy has been diluted by nation-wide economic reforms, Shenzhen might not remain 
successful.
RESUM E
Thus, the major difference between the two lines of argum ent lies in the 
in terpreta tion of da ta  which have been mainly sketchy and piecemeal by 1984. While 
the extreme protagonists employed crude da ta  to support their all-positive stance, both 
the moderate proponents and opponents have illustrated tha t  the goals of the Zones 
have not been achieved. Nevertheless, the proponents argued tha t  some initial 
achievements have been derived. The ultimate performance of the Zones has yet to be 
proved by their future development. This time factor is, however, lacking in the
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argum ent put forward by the opposition. As the immediate performance of the Zones 
did not justify the large inflow of capital and human resources, they were regarded as 
economically inefficient, and hence a failure. On the whole, the interpretation of da ta  by 
both schools has concentrated on the objectives, features and progress of the Zones per 
se, excepting Kung’s explanation of Shenzhen's flourishing commercial activities from a 
national context. Although Yuan, Sit and Zhang have based their projection of the 
Zones' future on the experience of the export processing zones, only comparisons of 
objectives and investment environments have been made.
A W ay A head
There are many ways tha t  the Special Economic Zones can be studied and the 
zone debate furthered. The most urgent task, however, is to evaluate the structure and 
performance of the Zones and particularly Shenzhen in the context of the export 
processing zone development. Already the Shenzhen Zone has been operating for five 
years: its structure  and development trend have been gradually formulated. An 
appraisal of its development in the light of the experiences and performance of other 
Zones, especially the findings summarized by the two opposing schools, will foster a 
more insightful and balanced view. Morever, as the social conditions of the export 
processing zones and the well-being of the workers have been a central issue of some 
major studies (e.g. Fröbel et al., 1977: AMPO, 1977; UNIDO, 1980), the oft-neglected 
social well-being of Shenzhen’s population will have to be considered. After all, the 
ultimate goal of China’s socialist modernization is to raise the living standard  of the 
common masses. The timely publication of the Shenzhen Special Econom ic Zone 
Yearbook in 1985 diminishes the major da ta  problems and enables a more comprehensive 
empirical study of the Zone to be made.
Hence, focusing on economic structure and performance, the analysis chapters of 
this study will firstly assess the economic development of Shenzhen with reference to its 
planning and directives (Chapter 4). Subsequently, by examining the Zone's population 
structure , the economic well-being of its residents and the provision of social goods, the 
general well-being of Shenzhen’s population will be ascertained (Chapter 5). Finally, the 
economic and social performance of Shenzhen will be evaluated in the context of the 
export processing zone debate detailed in Chapter 2 and, in turn , its contribution to 
C hina’s modernization will be assessed in the light of its entrusted roles in the coun try ’s 
economic and urban development as discerned in Chapter 1 (Chapter 6).
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C H A P T E R  4
SH ENZH EN: THE E CO NO M IC D IM E N S IO N
Government intervention has been param ount in fashioning the economic 
geography of Shenzhen. Although more a tten tion  has been given to m arket forces, the 
fundamental characteristic of a socialist economy - the dominance of the s ta te  - has 
remained unaltered. The effect of these initiatives on the location of economic activities 
could be catalogued in the familiar terms of agriculture, extractive industries, 
manufacturing and construction, transport and communications, finance, insurance and 
real estate, trade and services. Rather than  follow tha t  time-worn path , attention is 
focused on the degree to which government economic directives have been realized.
As the intention of the Chinese Government has been to create Shenzhen as an 
industrialized city and an externally-oriented economy, it is pertinent to consider the 
extent to which these overall goals have been hitherto achieved. In undertaking this 
interim assessment, a basic question is raised: what have been the Chinese
Governm ent’s economic directives for the Zone? In evaluating the extent to which these 
aims have been achieved, a series of other questions are posed: what is the industrial
s truc ture  of Shenzhen; where are the industries located; how have the industrial and 
non-industrial sectors fulfilled the planning targets; what is the importance of industry 
in the overall economy of Shenzhen; and finally, how significant has the contribution of 
foreign investment been to the development of Shenzhen?
An effective way of tackling this bundle of questions is to examine the Zone's 
directives, s tructure  and performance. Since government initiatives are of paramount 
importance in China, directives are considered ahead of structure and performance. We 
are then in a position to assess the economic development of Shenzhen. These 
investigations will dem onstrate  tha t  the Zone has been successful in developing industry 
as the main sector, but the technological level of production has been low. Likewise, its 
external-orientation has been rudimentary.
G O VERNM ENT DIRECTIVES
The Chinese G overnm ent’s economic directives (i.e. conduct) can be distilled from 
an examination of its regulations and ordinances. Of particular importance are the 
regulations governing preferential trea tm ent for firms willing to establish their activities
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in Shenzhen. Also significant are the two development plans drafted by the Shenzhen 
authority . W ith this information it is possible to highlight the specific economic aims 
behind the establishment of Shenzhen, outline the development plans and specify the 
nature  of the incentives offered to investors.
S p ecific  E co n o m ic  A im s
The Chinese Governm ent’s aims in creating Shenzhen were broadly defined in the 
initial regulations published in 1980. These Regulations on Special Econom ic Zones 
(see Appendix I) stipulated that: (a) foreign investment was to be encouraged and (b)
the Zone was to ‘house’ activities ranging from agriculture through tourism, housing and 
construction, and research, to manufacturing. Although the preference was for activities 
with a high technological content, other trades of common interest to investors and the 
Chinese side were permitted (Article 4).
In 1981, the S tate Council announced ten measures to facilitate the Zone’s 
operation. These measures emphasized the importance of practical planning principles, 
and confirmed tha t  foreigners would receive preferential treatm ent in taxation, customs 
procedures and enterprise management. They further outlined the Zone’s broad 
financial policy, and urged its authorities to seek capital actively both from national and 
foreign sources. To a tt rac t  investment, they suggested that special legislation should be 
passed to give the Special Economic Zones autonomous power, particularly over trade 
m atters . In turn, the Special Economic Zones’ management should function efficiently 
and effectively. These new measures, however, did not sharpen the direction of 
development. They merely re-emphasized the comprehensive economic nature  of the 
Zone and reiterated tha t  the investment environment for foreigners would be improved 
(Ta K ung Po, 19 August 1981).
The announcement of more concrete aims had to await publication of the two 
twenty-year draft plans in September 1982 - the Shenzhen  O utline Social and Econom ic  
Plan and the Shenzhen  Special Econom ic Zone M aster O utline Plan (The A sian  Wall 
Street Journa l, 20 September 1982; C hina D a ily , 22 September 1982; Yeh, 1983; Lam, 
1983). Coming two years after the Zone had commenced, these Plans sta ted  tha t  
Shenzhen would develop into a major industrialized city by the year 2000. In particular, 
the Plans highlighted tha t  Shenzhen’s economy would be focused on the development of 
high technology and capital-intensive activities. Products from these industries would 
have to be competitive in world markets. The main source of capital to underpin these 
activities was to be sought overseas. Between 1980 and 2000 it was expected tha t  
foreign capital would account for 58 per cent of the investment in the Zone. A total of 
US$7.2 billion (HKS56.7 billion) in foreign investment was projected (The A sian  Wall
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Street Journal. 20 September 1982). The remaining 42 per cent of investment would be 
generated from the Zone’s own resources, state-owmed enterprises, and Chinese bank 
loans. Thus, the original intention was th a t  Shenzhen should have an externally- 
oriented economy both in its source of capital and the destination of its products.
In 1984, the announcement of the Seventh Five Year Plan (1986-1990) confirmed 
the past direction of development. Nevertheless, it added trade and commerce to the list 
of approved economic activities. The Plan also specified th a t  the Zone should develop 
into an entrepot capable of handling both national and international commerce 
(Shenzhen  Special Zone D aily , 6 August 1984). Indeed, this new emphasis represented 
the governm ent’s recognition of the unanticipated rapid development in the commercial 
sector.
Between 1980 and 1984, therefore, the Zone’s economic aims have been defined in 
broad terms, specified in more concrete terms, and then diversified. In turn, these aims 
have been translated into physical plans to guide the location of economic activities - the 
physical hardware for production, exchange, circulation and consumption.
S p a t ia l  S tru ctu re
According to the land use plans, the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone is to be 
concentrated in a lowland belt stretching from the mouth of the Pearl River to Dapeng 
Bay. The Zone is subdivided into three planning regions: Western, Central and
Eastern. As shown in the land use plan (Fig. 4.1), the Central Region, due to its 
proximity to Hong Kong, will be the major focus for residential development. 
Conversely, the Eastern Region will centre on tourism, fisheries and agriculture, whereas 
the Western Region aims for comprehensive development.
The three planning regions are subdivided into eighteen districts (Fig. 4.2). The 
Western Region contains six districts: Shekou, Shahe, Houhai, Xili Reservoir, Chiwan, 
and Nantou (including B aoan’s County Town). The Central Region is the largest, 
consisting of three sections which are further divided into nine districts. Four of them 
are situated in the Western Section: Futian , Chegongmiao, Xiangmihu and the
Agronomic Institute. While the Central Section only contains Shangbu, the Eastern 
Section consists of Luohu, Shenzhen Old Town, the Reservoir District and Liantang. In 
the Eastern Region, there are only three isolated districts: Shatoujiao, Yantian, and
Dameisha-Xiaomeisha.
As reflected in Table 4.1, each planning district has been designed to be 
self-contained with the emphasis on either industry, commerce or housing. Shangbu. 
Shahe and Liantang have been planned as areas of light industry. Shekou and Chiwan
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have been designated as heavy industrial areas. A fruit-growing area and fish-breeding 
base have been planned for Yantian in the Eastern Region. Four districts -
Dameisha-Xiaomeisha, the Reservoir District, Xiangmihu and Xili Reservoir have been 
assigned for tourist development. Commercial and residential districts will be 
concentrated in Shatoujiao, Luohu and Shenzhen Old Town. The Reservoir District and 
Shangbu have also been set aside as areas for housing foreigners. Mixed development 
has been scheduled for Futian New Town and Chegongmiao in the Central Region; 
similar provision has been made for Houhai and Nantou in the Western Region.
E conom ic P lann ing
Basically, economic planning in Shenzhen has concentrated on target-setting. 
Economic targets have been set for 1985, 1990 and 2000. Most a tten tion  has been 
directed to the targets for industry and agriculture. As shown in Table 4.2, the 
combined output of these leading sectors is expected to increase 157 times from 77 
million yuan to 12.1 billion yuan between 1980 and 2000 - an annual growth rate of 29 
per cent. Agricultural ou tput, however, is only anticipated to quadruple by the year 
2000 - an annual growth rate of 7 per cent. In contrast, industrial production is 
expected to increase 235 times - an average annual growth rate of 31 per cent. As a 
result of these differential growth rates, industry’s proportion in the total ou tpu t of the 
two leading sectors will increase from 66 per cent in 1980 to 99 per cent in 2000.
Additional information has been provided on industrial ou tput because it is 
intended to be the prime engine of development. As shown in Table 4.3, Shenzhen is 
expected to achieve an annual industrial growth rate of 88 per cent between 1981 and 
1985. The growth rate will taper from this initial surge. It is anticipated tha t  the figure 
will be reduced to 25 per cent between 1986 and 1990, and 13 per cent between 1990 and 
2000. Reflecting these rates, some 200 industrial enterprises will be in operation by 1985 
and will employ about 50,000 workers. By the year 2000, it is estimated th a t  the 
number of enterprises will have increased to 1.500 units and the workforce will have 
expanded to over 200.000 (Chu, 1983d; The A sian  Wall Street Journa l, 20 September 
1982).
The planning of non-industrial activities has not been detailed. Nevertheless, the 
emphasis within agriculture will be on the export of cash crops. By the year 2000, the 
vegetable growing area will have expanded from 3,470 ha in 1980 to 10.000 ha; a further 
2000 ha will have been developed for horticulture. A boom in tourism has also been 
forecast. Between 1985 and 2000, the number of international hotels will have increased 
from ten to fifty units - a figure based on a 10 per cent annual increment in tourists  from 
the base year figure of 100,000 in 1981.
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T ab le  4-2: Targets for Industrial and Agricultural O utput, 1980-2000
(Money amounts in Rmb 1,000)
Year In d u stry  
Rmb Per c e n t
A g r ic u ltu r e  
Rmb Per c e n t
T o ta l
Rmb Per cen t
1980 5 1 ,0 0 0  66 2 6 ,0 0 0 3 4 .0 7 7 ,0 0 0 1 0 0 .0
1985 1 2 0 ,0 0 0  94 8 0 ,0 0 0 6 . 0 1 2 8 ,0 0 0 1 0 0 .0
1990 3 , 6 0 0 ,0 0 0  98 9 0 ,0 0 0 2 . 5 3 , 6 9 0 ,0 0 0 1 0 0 .0
2000 1 2 , 0 0 0 ,0 0 0  99 1 0 0 ,0 0 0 1 .0 1 2 , 1 0 0 ,0 0 0 1 0 0 .0
Source: Based on Lau (1982a).
T ab le  4-3: Planned Annual Industrial Growth Rates in
Shenzhen Special Economic Zone
Year* Annual Growth Rate
Per c e n t
1 9 8 1 -1 9 8 5 8 8 .0
1 9 8 6 -1 9 9 0 2 5 .0
1 9 9 0 -2 0 0 0 1 3 .0
1 9 8 1 -2 0 0 0 3 1 .0
Source: A sia n  Wall Street Journa l, 20 September 1982.
Accompanying economic forecasts have suggested tha t  the Shenzhen Economic 
Zone will derive a net annual revenue of between HKS5.000 and HKS7.000 per worker 
engaged in a foreign firm (i.e. based on land use fees, labour charges and profit tax). 
Tourism  is expected to net HKS50 per individual with an annual increment of 10 per 
cent. A yield of HKS420 per sq m will be derived from restaurants and hotels whereas 
property development will produce HK$1,250 per sq m (Zheng, 1982). Many key 
elements of economic planning, such as resource allocation, capital accumulation and 
credit systems, have not been considered. Indeed, economic planning in Shenzhen, as 
observed by Lau (1982a), has been little more than target setting.
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P r e feren tia l T rea tm en t
As the elaboration of economic plans and specification of the desired location of 
economic activities would not have been sufficient to a tt rac t  foreign investment, 
a tten tion  has to be focused on the incentives offered to overseas firms. By January  1985, 
eleven regulations had been promulgated for Shenzhen.1 (Further regulations detailing 
legal arrangements are in the process of being drafted.) As such, these regulations have 
constituted a major component of the Chinese Governm ent’s economic directives.
Paralleling incentives offered by other export processing zones, Shenzhen has 
waived taxes on imports of raw materials and exports of finished products (Table 4.4). 
Firms a ttrac ted  to the Zone do not have to pay any local taxes (the period of exemption 
is apparently  unlimited). Profit taxes are either exempted or reduced in the initial years 
of operation. Also foreign investors have been able to take advantage of discounts on 
raw materials and goods purchased within China. The regulations stipulating that 
semi-finished and finished products have to be exported have been relaxed to permit a 
proportion of these products to be sold on the domestic market (exact extent to be 
negotiated). Unlike most other zones, no maximum investment limits have been 
established. Both sole proprietorships and joint ventures with Chinese partners have 
been welcomed. Nevertheless, capital transfers are prohibited during the term  of the 
jo in t venture. Upon termination of contract or dissolution of the venture, the transfer 
rights are further limited by the overriding power of the Chinese partners, and 
repatria tion of capital is only possible if the joint enterprise has sufficient available 
foreign exchange (Chai, 1986).
Land use fees have been varied to encourage foreign-based industrial development.
1. The regulations promulgated are: Regulations on Special Economic Zones in  Guangdong
Province (26 August 1980); In te r im  Provisions o f  the Special Economic Zones in  Guangdong  
Provinct for  the Control o f  Personnel E n ter ing  and Leaving C hina  (l November 1981); In ter im  
Provisions for  the R eg is tra tion  and A d m in is tra t io n  o f  Enterprises in  the Special Economic  
Zones in  Guangdong Province (24 December 1981); In te r im  Provisions for  Labour and Wage 
M anagem ent in  Enterpr ises  in  Special Economic Zones in  Guangdong Province  (24 December 
1981); In te r im  Provisions o f  the Shenzhen  Special Economic Zone for L and  M anagem ent  (24 
December 1981); Provisions o f  the S h en zh en  Special Economic Zones for the M anagem ent o f  
C om m erc ia l H ousing  (15 November 1983)*; Provisions o f  the Shenzhen  Special Economic  
Zones for  Form ula ting  Economic Agreement with Foreign Investors  (7 February 1984)*; 
In te r im  Proxrisions o f  the Shenzhen  Special Economic Zone for Technology Im portation  (8 
February 1984)*; Rules for the Im p lem en ta tion  o f  the In te r im  Provisions fo r  the Registration  
and A d m in is tra t io n  o f  Enterprises  in  the Special Economic Zones in  Guangdong Province (9 
February 1984)*; Prom sions o f  the Shenzhen  Special Economic Zone and Fourteen Coastal 
cities for the Reduction and E xem p tio n  o f  Enterprise  Income Tax and In d us tr ia l  and C om ­
mercial U nif ica tion  Tax (20 November 1984)*; In te r im  Provisions o f  the Shenzhen  Special 
Econom ic Zone for  the A d m in is tra t io n  o f  State F inancial Enterprises o f  N o n -B a n k  Nature  
(12 December 1984)*.
* Author’s own translation from the Chinese version.
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Table 4-4: Major Tax Exemption in Shenzhen, 1983
Items Taxation
Machinery, equipment, spare parts, 
raw and semi-processed materials, 
means of transportation and other 
capital goods required for 
production
Exempted from import tax
Articles for daily use Reduced or exempted, depending on 
individual situation
Enterprise profit
a) General 15 per cent
b) Industrial, transport,
agricultural and forestry, 
enterprises which will operate 
for ten years or more
Exempted for the initial two years, 
and reduced by half for the subsequent 
three years (counting from the first 
profitable year)
c) Service industries with an 
investment of US$5 million or 
more
Exempted for the first year, and reduced 
by half for the following two years 
(counting from the first profitable 
year)
d) Enterprise established before 
26 August 1981
Exempted for the initial three years, 
and reduced by half for the subsequent 
two years. Further reduction is 
n e g o t i a b l e .
e) Enterprises with an investment 
of US$5 million or more, or 
involving high technology, or 
requiring a longer capital 
turnover period
Reduced by 20-50 per cent, or exempted 
for one to three years
f) Reinvestment for a period of 
five years or more
Exempted or reduced for the re-invested 
portion
Export of products Exempted from export tax
Note: No preferential treatment is granted for individual income.
Sources: Regulations on Special Economic Zones in G uangdong Province; Zhongguo 
Jingji Tequ Shouce: 123-6; Shenzhen Special Zone Herald, 24 January 1983; 
Shenzhen Special Zone Daily, 20 November 1984; Yearbook of China’s Special 
Economic Zones 1983:105.
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Under this scale of fees, outlined in Table 4.5, industrial land has been afforded the 
lowest rate. The highest rates have been for commercial land followed by tourism and 
commercial residential buildings. Clearly, these rates have been determined in such a 
way th a t  they were lower than those prevailing in Hong Kong. Conversely, they have 
been at rates higher than those current in China.
T a b le  4-5: Land Use Fees December, 1981
Land Use* Rate**
Rmb per annum per square metre
Lease
Years
Industrial 10 - 30 30
Commercial 70 - 200 20
Commercial, residential 
buildings
30 - 60 50
Educational, scientific, 
technological, medical 
and health
Preferential treatment
Tourist 60 - 100 30
Crop planting, animal
husbandry and aquaculture
Negotiable
Notes: * Projects either involving exceedingly advanced technology, or which are
non-profit making may be exempted from paying land use fees. ** The rates 
shall be subject to adjustm ent once every three years, s tarting  from 1 January  
1981, and the extent of adjustment shall not exceed 30%.
Source: B usiness  D irectory o f  C hina Special Econom ic Zones and Southeast Asia  
(2):229-34.
Further incentives were introduced in January  1983 to encourage higher forms of 
co-operation (i.e. jo in t venture) and the utilization of the less popular areas of the Zone 
(see Table 4.6). Accordingly, the popular areas of Luohu District and Shekou Industrial 
Zone were only afforded a 30 per cent reduction in land use fees. The less favoured 
districts of Shangbu, Shuihu and Shatoujiao received a 40 per cent reduction. All other 
districts, except those assigned for massive development, received a reduction of 50 per 
cent.
Spatial differentiation was sharpened in July 1984 when the authority classified
so
T ab le  4-6: Reductions in Land Use Fees, 1983
District Reduction 
Per cent
Luohu District 30.0
Shekou Industrial Zone 30.0
Shangbu 40.0
Shuihu 40.0
Shaotoujiao 40.0
All other districts except those 
for massive development
designated 50.0
Undeveloped land (slopes, hills, swamp area) Full reduction for one 
to five years
Source: Shenzhen  Special Zone H erald , 24 January 1983.
the districts into different grades and further reduced the land use fees respectively. 
Luohu, Shangbu and Shatoujiao were classified as first-grade areas, while Shekou and 
Shahe were designated as second grade. All other districts were classified as third grade. 
The rates of reduction on each land type, however, were not specified. In order to 
a t t ra c t  high technology projects and encourage donations for non-profit making 
undertakings from overseas Chinese and residents of Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan, 
further incentives were granted to pertinent investors. They are given full reduction in 
land use fees for the initial five years of operation and half reduction for the subsequent 
years. Projects with exceedingly advanced technological content would receive a total 
reduction (Shenzhen  Special Zone D a ily , 1 July 1984).
Another incentive has been permission to use expatria te  managers - a departure 
from the general practice in China. Under this regulation, firms can either recruit 
managers from Hong Kong and Macao or from overseas. Simplified entry and exit 
procedures for these expatriates has been guaranteed. Workers may be hired through 
the Zone’s Labour Service Company or directly by the enterprises themselves. In either 
case, workers are hired on a contractual basis and employees can also be penalized or 
dismissed according to the regulations and rules of the individual enterprise. Wages 
may be specified according to either time-based rates or piece work (In ves tm en t G uide, 
February 1984).
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As a portion of investment was to be derived from within China, commensurate 
incentives have also been extended to domestic investors. The most notable term of 
preferential trea tm ent is the relaxation of control on the consumption of products within 
China. Although the quota  has not been specified, it has been announced th a t  further 
relaxation will be given to products which are essentially manufactured from domestic 
raw materials (i.e. more than  70 per cent). Products assigned for domestic consumption 
will not be taxed at all. Similarly, imports of advanced equipment, spare parts  and raw 
materials for production have been declared tax-free. Nevertheless, enterprises 
sponsored by domestic investors will be subject to the same income tax regulations 
applicable to Shenzhen-based enterprises. In the case of a joint venture between 
domestic investors and Shenzhen-based firms, the profits tha t  the domestic investors 
receive in foreign currency will be 20 per cent more than their Shenzhen counterpart. 
Further, they have been granted a 30 per cent reduction in land use fees, and one to 
three years’ exemption if undeveloped land is used. For profitable enterprises th a t  will 
operate for a minimum of three years, their staffs, together with their urban family 
members, are perm itted to migrate to Shenzhen (Shenzhen Special Zone H erald , 16 
May 1983).
These incentives have emphasized th a t  the Chinese Government has intended to 
use both foreign and domestic capital as the means of developing Shenzhen into an 
international industrial and commercial centre. Greater stress, however, has been given 
to foreign investment as reflected in the concessions on enterprise management and sole 
proprietorships. Perhaps the most tantalizing bait, given the size of China’s domestic 
market, has been the possibility of selling to local customers. Although no plans have 
been announced for the commercial sector, it should not be ignored in assessing the 
potential for overseas investment. The extent to which the Chinese Government has 
been successful in fulfilling its targets is considered by first examining the economic 
s tructure  of the Zone.
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE
Contrary  to the planning directives, the real estate and commercial sectors, ra ther  
than  the industrial sector, have become the prime components of Shenzhen’s economy 
during the Zone’s initial years of operation. Nevertheless, the present account of 
Shenzhen's economic structure  is focused on its industries because they have been 
targetted  as the prime engine of Shenzhen's economic development. Hence, a tten tion  is 
centred on: (a) the types of industries, gauged in terms of their output value and 
employment; (b) their capital intensity; and (c) their changing locations." A case study
2. Incomplete data prevents further explanation of the Zone’s industrial structure (e.g. number 
of enterprises and employment in each industrial category).
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of electronics - the dominant industry - is used to go beyond the raw, at times 
inadequate, statistics on the types and capital intensity of industries. Similarly, detailed 
analyses of the Shangbu, Shahe and Shekou Industrial Districts are used to flesh out the 
meagre information on Shenzhen's industrial agglomeration. Hopefully, this strategy 
will provide part of the necessary substance for determining the degree to which 
government directives have been fulfilled in the Zone.
T ypes o f Industry
Prior to the informal establishment of the Special Economic Zone in 1979, the 
industrial base of Shenzhen was very weak. In 1978, there were only 216 industrial 
enterprises in the whole municipality: they were engaged in producing simple
agricultural equipment and petty commodity goods (e.g. sugar, tobacco, and fertilizers). 
Industrial ou tput amounted to Rmb 615,400,000, and the workforce totalled 6,550 
(Zhou, 1984: Hu 1984b). Following the informal adoption of the Special Economic Zone 
policy in 1979, and its formal implementation in 1980, the industrial sector in Shenzhen 
expanded rapidly. By the end of 1984, the number of industrial enterprises had 
increased to 609 (Shenzhen  Special Econom ic Zone Yearbook 1985:389). Light industry 
had become the major emphasis of development. Its ou tpu t had increased from Rmb
57.560.000 in 1978 to Rmb 257,120,000 in 1982,3 Rmb 443,890.000 in 1983, and Rmb
1.150.180.000 in 1984, accounting for 86 per cent, 77 per cent and 78 per cent of total 
industrial ou tput respectively in each year (Hu, 1984b; Shenzhen Special Economic  
Zone Yearbook 1985:587).
Table 4.7 illustrates the supremacy of the electronics industry in the 
M unicipality’s industrial structure in 1983 and 1984. As most industries concentrated in 
the zonal area, the trend can also be applied to the Zone. The electronics output was 
responsible for more than 45 per cent of the to ta l industrial output and its significance 
had risen sharply by 15 per cent within these two years. The second largest industry, 
textiles, only accounted for around 9 per cent in both years, and the third, food, 5 to 8 
per cent of output. In 1983, other industries were, in descending order of value, 
chemicals, building materials, leather, sewing, metal, stationery, forestry and electrical 
goods. As electronics is so dominant it is worthy of more detailed attention.
E le c t ro n ic s .  As shown in Table 4.8, the electronics industry accounted for 48 per 
cent of total industrial production between 1981 and 1984. Its share of total output 
expanded from 45 per cent in 1983 to 60 per cent in 1984, and the absolute value of 
production almost tripled, reaching an all-time high of Rmb 1,036,000,000. Also, the
3. All industrial ou tpu t value is adjusted to the 1980 constant value.
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T ab le  4-7: Industrial Outputs* of Shenzhen Municipality
by Sector, 1983 and 1984
Industry Rmb
1983
(1000)
1984
Per
1983
cent
1984
Electronics 327,000 1,035,910 45.4 60.0
Textiles 68,204 157,970 9.5 9.2
Food 58,778 89,630 8.2 5.2
Chemicals 48,834 60,740 6.8 3.5
Building materials 34,622 71,670 4.8 4.2
Leather 19,142 34,580 2.7 2.0
Sewing 18,977 21,470 2.6 1.2
Metal 16,011 35,000 2.2 2.0
Stationery 13,460 85,200 1.9 4.9
Forestry 8,602 19,250 1.2 1.1
Electrical 5,100 720 0.7 0.0
Miscellaneous 101,970** 113,940** 14.1 6.6
Total 720,700 1,726,080 100.0 100.0
Notes: * All values adjusted to the 1980 constant price. Hu (1984) quoted the 1983
figures as zonal outputs , but the Yearbook published them as municipal value. 
Since the Yearbook is the official source, the la t te r ’s param eter is adopted. 
These figures differ from those contained in the Yearbook because the outputs 
of the non-electronic machinery and the paper-making sectors are included.
Sources: Based on Hu (1984b: 196-7); Shenzhen  Special Econom ic Zone Yearbook 
1985:588-9.
number of electronics enterprises in the Municipality has increased from forty-one in 
1983 to 160 in 1984, and more than three-quarters of the enterprises were located within 
the Zone (Shenzhen  Special Zone D a ily , 30 June 1985; Shenzhen  Special Econom ic  
Zone Yearbook 1985:391). The dominance of the industry can be reflected in 
employment as well. The number of workers employed in the electronics industry 
expanded from 4,000 in 1981 to 5,400 in 1983. Then the industry really ’took-off as it
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T ab le  4-8: O utpu t Values of the Electronics Industry
in Shenzhen M unicipality, 1981-1984
Year Rmb
(1,000)
Total Industrial Output 
Per cent
1981 122,000 50.4
1982 128,000 35.6
1983 326,000 45.4
1984 1,036,000 60.0
Total 1,612,000 Average 48.0
Note: All values are adjusted to the 1980 constant price.
Source: Based on Shenzhen  Special Zone D aily, 30 January  1985, Hu (1984:194); 
Shenzhen  Special Econom ic Zone Yearbook 1985:588.
employed 15,000 in 1984 - tw o-thirds of Shenzhen’s to tal employm ent (Shenzhen  Special 
Zone D a ily , 30 January  1985; Yearbook o f  C h in a ’s Special Econom ic Zones 1983:164).
T ab le  4-9: Technological Level of Industrial Production
in Shenzhen M unicipality, 1983-1984
Year Technology-Intensive 
Per cent
Equipped with 
Advanced Facilities 
Per cent
Labour-Intensive 
Per cent
1983 3 41 56
1984 5 45 50
Source: Based on Shenzhen  Special Zone D aily , 8 May 1985; Liu and Liang (eds.), 
1985:80.
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C ap ita l  I n te n s ity
Unfortunately, there are no detailed da ta  on the capital intensity of different types 
of industry in Shenzhen. However, an informal source, the Vice Mayor of Shenzhen 
Municipality (Zhou Xiwu), has s tated in the Shenzhen  Special Zone D aily  (8 May 1985) 
th a t  labour-intensive industry has decreased from 56 per cent in 1983 to 50 per cent in 
1984 (Table 4.9). Correspondingly, industrial enterprises equipped with advanced 
technological equipment rose slightly from 41 per cent in 1983 to 45 per cent in 1984. 
Likewise, industrial production using ‘advanced technology’ increased from 3 per cent in 
1983 to 5 per cent in 1984.
The technological levels of imported equipment have been crudely classified by the 
Vice Mayor, the Shenzhen  Special Econom ic Zone Yearbook 1985 and Liu and Liang 
(eds.) (1985) (see Table 4.10). In particular, the Vice Mayor has highlighted th a t  
advanced equipment exceeded th a t  of mediocre equipment by 9 per cent in 1984. Also, 
‘backward equipm ent’ has dropped significantly - from 16 per cent to 1 per cent between 
1983 and 1984. Thus, Zhou concluded th a t  the technological level of imported 
equipment had been rising. A closer examination of the main industry in the Zone, 
electronics, may further illustrate this situation.
T a b le  4-10: Technological Level of Imported Equipment
in Shenzhen Municipality, 1983-1984
Year Advanced Mediocre Backward
Per cent Per cent Per cent
1983 37 47 16
1984 54 45 1
Source: Based on Shenzhen  Special Zone D a ily , 8 May 1985; Liu and Liang (eds.), 
1985:80; Shenzhen  Special Econom ic Zone Yearbook 1985:389.
E le c t ro n ic s .  By 1984, more than  3,840 sets of equipment and machinery have 
been imported for the electronics industry. These included: the Japanese solar colour
television production line; liquid crystal indicators; and production lines for printed 
circuits, integrated circuits, computer and soldering equipment. The number of 
technical personnel also increased from 400 in 1983 to 800 in 1984. Production of 
electronic products, however, has been concentrated on the assembly of household
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appliances, electronic equipment, colour television sets, stereo equipment, computerized 
telephone systems and micro computers. Production of electronic components and 
devices, such as integrated circuits and quartz resonators, also began to take place, and 
is expected to flourish between 1986 and 1990 (Hu, 1984b: 194-5; Zhongguo J in g ji Tequ 
Shouce: 13; Shenzhen  Special Zone D aily. 30 January  1985, 19 February 1985, 25 June 
1985, 26 June 1985). No direct da ta , however, are given on the technological level of 
electronics production. Nevertheless, it can be inferred from the Vice M ayor’s press 
release tha t  production involved both intensive labour and advanced or mediocre 
equipment. Yet it must be understood tha t  the facilities do not require the on-site 
producers to articulate the technology, but simply to assemble manufactured parts. 
Thus, having specified the general types and capital intensity of industries in Shenzhen, 
we can proceed to examine their location.
T ab le  4-11: Planned Industrial Districts in
Shenzhen Special Economic Zone
Districts Area
square kilometres
Liantang 0.8
Shuibei 0.5
Bagualing 1.0
Shangbu 1.4
Futian 4.8
Chegongmiao 2.0
Shahe 1.0
Nantou 1.5
Houhai 1.0
Shekou 1.0*
Total 15.0
Note: * In July 1984, the Guangdong Provincial Committee passed a proposal for
expanding the size of Shekou to 11 sq km.
Source: Based on Zhongguo Shouce 1984:1-51.
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In d u str ia l  Location
Ten industrial districts are planned in the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (Table 
4.11). Futian is the largest district, occupying an area of 4.8 sq km, Chegongmiao is the 
second largest (2 sq km), while Bagualing, Shahe, Houhai, Shekou, Shangbu and Nantou 
are medium-sized, and Liantang and Shuibei are relatively small.
As illustrated in Figure 4.3, these districts generally spread across the Zone’s 
southern and southwestern regions. Most districts are set up for housing a varied range 
of industries except for Shangbu, which is specifically designed for electronics, Shuibei 
for machinery and hardware, and Liantang for textiles (Zhongguo Shouce: 1-51). Two 
new industrial estates are being contemplated: an industrial district located around
Futian , assigned for teaching, research and production of scientifically-advanced goods; 
and an oil logistics base to be located along Shenzhen Bay which is to be associated with 
planned petro-chemical plants (Econom ic Reporter, 17 September 1984). By 1984, the 
industrial districts of Shangbu, Shahe, and Shekou had been largely completed and put 
into operation. While the construction of Shuibei, Bagualing, and Nantou has been 
proceeding, others are either at a very preliminary stage or in abeyance.
Industries, therefore, had been mainly concentrated in the Industrial Districts of 
Shangbu, Shahe and Shekou. Shangbu acquired the highest concentration of output 
value and number of enterprises. In 1984, the industrial output of Shangbu amounted to 
Rmb 600.000,000 - one third of to ta l municipal industrial output (Shenzhen  Special 
Zone D a ily , 26 June 1985). As illustrated in Figure 4.4, the industrial ou tpu t value of 
Shekou was significantly smaller than  th a t  of Shangbu, amounting to about Rmb 
280,000.000^ (Shenzhen  Special Zone H erald , 14 March 1985). The ou tpu t value of 
Shahe has not been released. However, it could not have been higher than tha t  of 
Shekou since its scale of operation is smaller, as reflected in Figure 4.5.
In terms of number of firms, Figure 4.5 shows tha t  Shangbu acquired the highest 
concentration in 1984. Moreover, these industrial firms were mainly involved with 
electronics production. In contrast, Shahe possessed a much smaller number of firms but 
its industrial structure  was more diversified, handling a wider variety of light industries 
including electronics. Conversely, Shekou possessed a wider manufacturing base, and a 
more even distribution of industrial types as well (including heavy and light industries). 
It seems tha t  the Luohu Adm inistrative District placed a major emphasis on the
4. The original figure was given in Hong Kong dollars. Conversions are based on the exchange 
rate of Rmb 35.1 to HK$100, which was prescribed on 31 December 1984.
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building material industry.^ However, since the original da ta  were incomplete both in 
terms of number of enterprises and nature of industrial production, the representation 
could, in some respects, be misleading.
A finer breakdown of the firms is provided in Table 4.12. Shangbu had two-thirds 
of the 191 industrial firms in 1984. Thirty-four were located in Shekou, while only 
fifteen were established in Shahe. Eighty firms in Shangbu (i.e. 62 per cent) were 
electronics enterprises. Although forty-one firms cannot be identified, the dominance of 
the electronics industry is irrefutable. Similarly, electronics was the largest industry in 
Shahe, even though it accounted for only one-fifth of its firms. Shekou also had its 
highest number of enterprises in electronics, but this was closely followed by the building 
materials, and chemical and pharmaceutical industries. As these firms are coupled with 
other industries, such as furniture, food and beverages, machinery and metals, transport, 
and electrical goods, the industrial s tructure  of Shekou can be described as 
heterogeneous. D ata  on the Luohu Administrative District is incomplete. Nonetheless, 
it is clear th a t  it has not been assigned as an industrial base. In essence, it is a 
commercial and service-trade centre. Consequently, the case studies are restricted to 
Shangbu, Shahe and Shekou, particularly the la tte r  as it has been spotlighted as a model 
district because of its high speed of construction, prominent industrial sector, high 
proportion of manufactured exports and the dominance of foreign-related enterprises.
S h a n g b u  I n d u s t r i a l  D i s t r i c t .  Shangbu Industrial District is situated to the 
west of Shenzhen Old Town (Fig. 4.3). Bounded by Shangbu Road on the east, Futian 
Road on the west, Xinhu Road on the north, and Shennan Road Central on the south, 
the District occupies an area of 1.1 sq km (Fig. 4.6). In 1981, it was planned tha t  the 
District would be developed into a processing area for electronics and light industrial 
products (Wong (ed.), 1982). By early 1985, over one hundred blocks of standardized 
factories had been built. More than thirty  jo in t ventures, underpinned by investment 
from the United States, Holland. Japan , the Philippines and Hong Kong, had been 
established. The number of domestic enterprises, however, had grown more quickly. 
One hundred industrial firms had been set up by early 1985 under the sponsorship of 
various industrial bureaux in the Central Government (such as the Aeronautics 
Industrial Bureau and the Electronics Industrial Bureau) and pertinent institutions or 
enterprises from different provinces and municipalities. The District had become one of 
the most im portant industrial bases bv far in Shenzhen. Although electronics had been 
the pacesetter, textiles, furniture and printing had also experienced rapid growth.
5. The Luohu Administration District includes the planning districts of Shenzhen Old Town, 
Luohu District and Reservoir District.
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Table 4-12: Industrial Distribution by Number of Enterprises
in Shenzhen Special Economic Zone, 1984
Industry
Luohu
Administrative
District**
Location
Shangbu Shahe
Industrial Industrial 
District District
Shekou
Industrial
Zone
Total
Electronics 0 80 3 6 89
Garment and
accessories 2 2 1 2 7
Furniture 0 1 2 2 5
Food a nd beverages 1 0 0 2 3
Miscellaneous 
light industry 1 1 5 2 9
Chemical and 
pharmaceutical 1 1 1 4 7
Transport 0 1 2 2 5
Electrical 1 0 0 3 4
M a chinery and metal 2 0 1 2 5
Building materials 4 3 0 5 12
Unidentifiable* 0 41 0 4 45
Total 12*** 130 15 34+ 191++
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Notes: * This is due to either the non-specification by the name of the company as in
the case of Shekou enterprises, or no further breakdown of industrial types, as 
in the case of Shangbu enterprises. ** Inconsistency in the sub-categorization 
of location is inevitable, as the da ta  are so classified by the original source. *** 
Underestimation could be substantial, but no further d a ta  are available.
~ This number of industrial enterprises, compiled from the list of enterprises 
given by the Zhongguo J in g ji Tequ Shouce , is higher than tha t  of twenty-five 
enterprises quoted by the Econom ic Reporter (9 July 1984). The inconsistency 
could possibly be due to the inclusion of operating, or near-operating enterprises 
by the Zhongguo J in g ji Tequ Shouce. However, since the number of industrial 
products has increased from around fifty in July 1984 to over one hundred in 
March 1985 (Econom ic Reporter, 9 July 1984; Shenzhen  Special Zone D a ily , 
14 March 1985), and the number of operating industrial enterprises has 
increased to forty by July 1985, the number of operating industrial enterprises 
a t  the end of 1984 could have increased to around thirty . Indeed, the later 
publication of the Shenzhen  Special Econom ic Zone Yearbook confirmed the 
total of thirty-six. -f +  Since only the main industrial centres are included, this 
total is lower than the overall number of industrial enterprises in the Zone. At 
these were 238 foreign-related and ‘neilian’ enterprises at the end of 1984, this 
table includes 80 per cent of the main industrial enterprises (Shenzhen  Special 
Econom ic Zone Yearbook 1985:389).
Sources: Based on Zhongguo J in g ji Tequ Shouce 13:171-7; B u sin ess  Directory o f  C hina  
Special Econom ic Zones and Southeast A sia  (2):3-184; Shenzhen  Special Zone 
H erald , 16 May 1983, 24 April 1985; Wen Wei Po, 30 December 1984; 
Shenzhen  Special Econom ic Zone Yearbook 1985:102, 389.
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Export of double-knitted garments, textile equipment, mattresses and sofas occurred. In 
early 1985. about thirty  enterprises exported more than 50 per cent of their production 
(Shenzhen  Special Zone D a ily , 25 June 1985, 28 June 1985).
The high concentration of electronics factories in Shangbu has earned it the 
nickname ‘electronics tow n’ (see Fig. 4.6). In early 1985, about 80 electronics 
enterprises were operating in the District (Table 4.12). Although the District had been 
mainly engaged in the assembly of electronic appliances in the past, it was reported tha t  
by June 1985, thirty  enterprises had been set up to produce electronic components and 
devices. Three hundred types of components, including integrated circuits and quartz 
resonators were produced in the District. Besides supplying local factories, some of these 
products were exported. In June 1985, it was declared th a t  the electronics industry in 
Shangbu no longer needed to rely on imported components and devices - they would be 
produced from within China (Shenzhen  Special Zone D a ily , 26 June 1985). Hence, it 
seems tha t  Shangbu had spearheaded the development of the electronics industry in the 
Zone. However, the prime force of development had been from within China itself: 
domestic investments, internal markets, and local resources.
S h ah e In d u str ia l D is tr ic t . The second district, Shahe, is located fourteen km 
to the west of Shenzhen Old Town, and fourteen km to the north-east of Shekou (Fig. 
4.3), occupying an area of 12.6 sq km. The District is administered by the Shahe 
Overseas Enterprise Company which is directly headed by the Overseas Chinese Office 
in the State Council. The Company set out to a t t rac t  investment from overseas 
Chinese. Nevertheless, investment from Hong Kong, Taiwan and foreign countries have 
been welcomed. Although Shahe was planned as an industrial district - with an 
emphasis on electronics and some noxious industries - commerce, pastoral farming, 
breeding and tourism were also desired as complementary activities (Wong, 1982).
The key strategy of the Company has been to emphasize industry using advanced 
technology. The eight main production lines imported by the Overseas Chinese 
Electronics Enterprises were products of the seventies and eighties. The equipment 
installed by Shenzhen Overseas Chinese Furniture Manufacturing Factory was as 
advanced as anywhere in the world (e.g. the multi-phase drills, seaming machines, spray 
oven-dry equipment and high-voltage cables). It has also been claimed in the popular 
press th a t  all enterprises have been successfully run - a tribute  to efficient management 
and competent leadership (Shenzhen  Special Zone H erald , 16 May 1983).
By 1983, twenty projects had been signed, involving Rmb 117,000,000 foreign 
investment. As shown in Table 4.12, fifteen industrial enterprises were in operation 
during 1984. These included electronics, vehicle repairs, textiles, the manufacture of 
plastic and silk flowers, nylon beds, furniture, air conditioners, hardware, zips,
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spectacles, photographic paper and handbags. Contrary  to established policy, however, 
all but one enterprises were sponsored by investment from Hong Kong. Due to the 
D istr ic t’s connection with overseas Chinese residents, all workers employed were either 
returned overseas Chinese or members of their families (Zhongguo Jingji  Tequ Shouce, 
1984:135-42).
S h ek ou  In d u str ia l Zone. Shekou, the third district under review, was 
announced as an industrial zone by the State Council as early as 30 January 1979, more 
than eighteen months prior to the formal inauguration of the Shenzhen Special Economic 
Zone. Technically, Shekou fell under the jurisdiction of Shenzhen Municipality when the 
Municipal Government was established in 1980. In reality, it has been administered by 
the China M erchant Steam Navigation Company - an organization administered by 
C hina’s Ministry of Communication in Hong Kong. Majoring in shipping activities, the 
Company has also diversified itself into a multifarious corporation handling commercial 
and industrial activities. It has expanded beyond its traditional agency role to supervise 
the massive purchase of secondhand vessels, and represents China in handling its orders 
for new, technically advanced vessels. In Hong Kong, it has: invested in shipyards,
warehouses and repair facilities: developed industries relating to shipping; and supervised 
a number of deals ranging from container leasing to the purchase of an oil rig. Hence, 
the Company has both the qualifications and experience to handle foreign investment. 
Not surprisingly, the Company has been authorized by the State Council to develop 
Shekou with its own capital.
The Zone is located on the east coast of the Pearl River estuary and is embraced 
by Shenzhen Bay - an area with convenient sea and land transport connections (Fig. 
4.3). It is separated from the New Territories of Hong Kong only by Shenzhen Bay. 
Shekou is 30 km from the city centre of Shenzhen, 150 km from Guangzhou by road, 20 
nautical miles from the Central District of Hong Kong, and 80 nautical miles from 
Guangzhou by sea.
Shekou was scheduled to develop into an industrial town with a population of 
20.000. The original intention was tha t  it should concentrate on joint ventures, with 
China acting as one of the partners. The China M erchant Steam Navigation Company 
has received a special m andate  over Shekou from Beijing tha t  joint ventures do not need 
to be approved by Beijing’s China International T rust Investment. Although consumer 
electronics industries would also be targetted , the emphasis was on heavy industry.
As shown in Figure 4.7, the Shekou Industrial Zone is composed of two smaller 
zones: the Fifth Bay Zone and the Sixth Bay Zone, the former destined for heavy
industrial use and the latter  light industry. It wras planned tha t  the shallow bay in the 
Fifth Bay w'ould be reclaimed and tha t  a 600 m seawall would be erected. A pier
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designed to accommodate ships of up to 3.500 dead-weight tons would be built, as sea 
transport  would probably be the main form of access to Shekou in the immediate future. 
Approximately 309,000 sq m of land would be made available for heavy industrial use 
after reclamation. Three enterprises relating to shipping were planned - a container 
factory, a steel factory, and a yacht factory. Non-shipping enterprises in the blueprint 
included an acetylene factory, an oxygen factory, an animal feeding factory (related to 
the chemical industry), a machine factory, and a flour mill. The light industrial 
designated Sixth Bay has an area of around 412,000 sq m. Its enterprises included an ice 
factory, and factory buildings for the electronics industry. At the rear of the Sixth Bay, 
land had been assigned for a paint factory, an aluminium factory, a sewage treatm ent 
plant and a waterworks. Another 412,000 sq m of land for industrial use would be 
added to the Sixth Bay area from further reclamation.
The construction of the Shekou Industrial Zone began with the creation of basic 
infrastructure. ‘The five communications (sea and land transport, water supply, 
electricity and telecommunications) and one levelling’ were completed by the end of 
1980. Subsequently, factories were completed according to the plan. By April 1984, the 
Zone had reached more than eighty agreements with foreign investors from the United 
States, Japan, Britain, Denmark, New Zealand, Hong Kong and Macao. Fifty-one 
projects, twenty-five of which were industrial enterprises, have been put into operation 
(Shenzhen  Special Zone D aily , 11 April 1984). By the end of 1984, the number of 
industrial enterprises in operation had increased to thirty-six (Shenzhen  Special 
Econom ic Zone Yearbook 1985:102).
As indicated in Table 4.12, Shekou possessed a variety of industries. Its light 
industries included the production of electronic goods (such as tape recorders, calculators 
and television sets), garments, cushions, furniture, ornaments, confectionery, animal feed 
stuffs, and electrical household appliances. The heavy industries included quarrying, the 
production of aluminium products, concrete, metal building equipment, other building 
materials, marine paint, oxygen, chemicals, machinery, yachts and steel products. Thus, 
Shekou met its goal of creating a broad and diverse industrial base.
Diversity was not the sole basis of Shekou’s success. Other factors were the high 
speed of construction, its ability to foster industry as the main sector of the economy, its 
ability to export a major proportion of its industrial products, and the dominance of 
foreign-related enterprises. Between 1979 and December 1980, the basic infrastructure 
was completed in Shekou. Its accomplishment included: the completion of a
special-purpose 600-metre dock capable of handling 3000 to 3500-ton (deadweight ton) 
ships and a navigation channel of 3,400 m; a road leading to Guangzhou and Shenzhen; 
a waterworks and water supply system; and the installation of a high-voltage cable, an
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Industrial Land (Plannej) 
Factories (Existing)
Flatted Factories 
Commercial Land 
Residential Area (Workers)
]] Residential Area (Private Development) :/
Administration Area 
Recreation Area 
s j  Original Settlement
Hou Wan
/Van Shan
336 1
I Paint Factory 
^ 2  Aluminium Factory
/ •sf' 3 Sewage Treatment Plant
4 Waterworks
5 Flatted Factory
6 Ice Factory
7 Quarters for Expatriates
8 Construction Headquarters
9 Crystal Garden Villas
10 Micro-Wave Communication Station
II Nanshan Hotel
12 Management Centre
13 Containers Factory
14 Supplies Department
15 Machine Factory
16 Steel Factory
17 Acetylene Factory
18 Oxygen Factory 
Fiour Mill
Animal Feed Factory 
Yacht Factory 
Confectionery
F igu re 4-7: Revised land use zoning plan of Shekou.
(Source: Based on Investor's  Handbook (revised edition), 
China Merchants Shekou Industrial Zone in 
Shenzhen Special Economic Zone, September 1981.)
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electricity transformer station and a micro-wave communication station (Guangdong  
Jingjx Tequ Yaolan 1982:24-5). By 1982, the Zone had achieved a built-up area of 
274,681 sq m, which offered different types of factory space. Such speed has been 
praised by the Chinese authorities. As pointed out by Shijie  J ing ji  Daobao 
(Guangdong Jingji Tequ Yaolan 1982:25-6), the main factor of the Zone’s successful 
creation was the use of public tenders for construction projects. Competition induced by 
public bidding and high incentives offered by the award system raised the quality and 
the speed of construction enabling the completion of one floor area within a week rather 
than  a month.
Another feature of Shekou has been tha t  industry has become the main sector of 
the economy. In 1982, twenty-five out of forty-two agreed projects were industrial, 
constituting 60 per cent of the total number of projects, and 75 per cent of the total 
am ount of investment (Guangdong Jingji Tequ Yaolan 1981:23). By 1983, thirty-nine of 
the seventy-four agreed projects and twenty-five of the fifty-one enterprises were in the 
industrial sector (Table 4.13). The manufacturing sector was also able to a t t rac t  a 
major share of total foreign investment (64 per cent) injected into the Zone (Table 4.13). 
This trend has continued. By 1984, seventy-one of 148 agreed projects had been 
industrial ventures. Hence, the industrial sector has been of pivotal importance to 
Shekou since 1982 (Shenzhen  Special Economic Zone Yearbook 1985:102).
T ab le  4-13: Foreign Investment Committed to Shekou, 1979-1983
Economic
Sector
Amount
HK dollars Per cent 
(1,000)
Committed Project 
Number Per cent
Operating Project 
Number Per cent
Industry 532,200 63.6 39 52.7 25 49.0
Commerce 101,170 12.1 19 25.7 14 27.5
Tourism 18,000 2.2 1 1.4 1 2.0
Transport 32,000 3.8 3 4.1 2 3.9
Building 2,750 0.3 6 8.1 5 9.8
Real estate 150,400 18.0 6 8.1 4 7.8
Total 836,520 100.0 74 100.0 51 100.0
Source: Based on Hu (1984a:147).
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Furthermore, Shekou has been able to export a major portion of its industrial 
products. In 1983, almost 75 per cent of industrial products were exported (Shenzhen  
Special Zone D a ily , 17 September 1984). Similarly, about 70 per cent of manufactured 
goods were exported in early 1985 (Shenzhen  Special Zone D aily , 14 March 1985).
Full asssessment of the significance of foreign investment to Shekou is impeded by 
the absence of da ta  on overall development capital channelled to the Zone. 
Nevertheless, foreign investment occupied a reported 91 per cent of total capital put into 
use (Shenzhen  Special Econom ic Zone Yearbook 1985:102), and a breakdown of the 
forms of investment of existing enterprises sheds some light on this m atter . As 
illustrated in Table 4.14, joint ventures were the major form of investment both in terms 
of investment am ount (54 per cent) and number of committed and operating projects 
(both 51 per cent respectively) between 1979 and 1983. While sole proprietorships and 
co-operative ventures ranked second in terms of investment amounts and number of
. . Aprojects respectively, ‘neilian’0 enterprises were the least significant in all instances. 
This trend has continued. In July 1985, 102 of 192 agreed projects (53 per cent) were 
joint ventures and twenty-seven were sole proprietorships (14 per cent) (Shenzhen  
Special Zone D a ily , 17 July 1985). Thus, joint ventures have been the backbone of 
Shekou’s development. In short, Shekou has been able to meet the main goals set for the 
overall economic development of Shenzhen - the creation of externally-oriented industry 
based on foreign investment.
This ‘unm asking’ of the industrial structure of Shenzhen has shown th a t  its 
industrial development has been based on light industries, especially electronics. 
Although equipment of advanced technology has been imported, the bulk of industrial 
production has been labour-intensive. Industrial development has been concentrated in 
three discrete centres - Shangbu, Shahe and Shekou - each administered by a separate 
organization. Such an arrangement led to marked differences between the centres. 
Shangbu possessed the highest concentration of industry, but both its sources of 
investment and markets were domestic. Conversely, Shahe had strong ties with overseas 
Chinese investment but its scale of industry is small. In marked contrast, Shekou has 
been able to develop a wide, externally-oriented industrial base. Before an overall 
assessment of industrial development of Shenzhen can be undertaken, its economic 
performance has to be examined in more detail.
6. ‘N eil ian’ has been loosely defined as joint economic ventures between zonal and non-zonal 
enterprises and agencies.
101
T ab le  4-14: Forms of Investment in Shekou, 1979-1983
Investment Committed Amount Committed Project Operating Project 
Form HK dollars Per cent Number Per cent Number Per cent
( 1, 000)
Joint venture 453,870 54.3 42 56.8 25 51.0
Cooperative
production
arrangement
152,150 18.2 16 21.6 13 25.5
Sole
proprietorship
206,500 24.7 10 13.5 8 15.7
’Neilian * 
enterprise
24,000 2.9 6 8.1 4 7.8
Total 836,520 100.0 74 100.0 51 100.0
Source: Based on Hu (I984a:147).
E C O N O M IC  P E R F O R M A N C E
The economic performance of Shenzhen needs to be assessed against the overall 
and specific goals tha t  have been set for the Zone. The overall goals are to create 
Shenzhen as an industrialized city based on an externally-oriented economy. As set out 
in the earlier section, various planning targets constitute the specific goals. Accordingly, 
any assessment of economic performance has to examine the performance.of industry in 
the overall economy, the contribution of foreign investments to Shenzhen’s development, 
and finally, the fulfilment of planning targets, particularly those concerning industry and 
the export of manufactured goods.
In d u str ia l P erfo rm a n ce  in the O vera ll E con om y
Having examined the type and location of Shenzhen’s industry, the focus shifts to 
assessing its role in the Zone’s overall economic structure. A useful economic indicator is 
derived from comparing the outpu t (or ‘transactional value’) of each sector.
O u tp u t. Table 4.15 shows tha t  until 1983, retailing and construction were the 
M unicipality’s leading sectors in terms of output. Indeed, the total value of ou tput and 
transactions between 1979 and 1984 highlighted th a t  retailing and construction were the 
main forces of Shenzhen’s economic development. Retailing transactions outstripped the
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value of industrial output by Rmb 1,013,940,000 between 1979 and 1983. By 1984, 
however, industrial output had marginally surpassed retailing transactions and outpaced 
construction by Rmb 314,510.000.
Trading statistics further support the initial commercial inclination of Shenzhen’s 
economy. A total amount of Rmb 1.437.000.000 was involved in trade in 1983, and 
Rmb 3,005,837,000 in 1984. Reflecting high purchasing power of internal markets, and 
the inability of domestic production to meet consumers' demands, the value of imports 
(entrepot and direct) were four times greater than  exports in 1983 and thrice as much in 
1984. As a result, trade deficits of Rmb 961.000,000 and Rmb 1.518,163.000 were 
produced respectively in 1983 and 1984. Indeed, the entrepot trade accounted for 80 per 
cent of to ta l trade in 1983. The externally-oriented economy desired by the Government 
appeared a long way off.
Industrial growth, however, outpaced agriculture. As shown in Table 4.16, 
industrial ou tpu t comprised less than  half of to ta l industrial and agricultural ou tpu t in 
1978 and 1980. Since then, it has outpaced agricultural output - a peak of 90 per cent 
being reached in 1984. Since 1981 - one year after the formal inauguration of the Zone - 
industry has dominated agriculture and the rural nature of Shenzhen has virtually 
disappeared.
E m p lo y m e n t. Another key indicator is the size of the industrial workforce. By 
1984. 50,000 workers had been employed by the manufacturing sector in the Zone, 
comprising 32 per cent of the to ta l zonal employment. Compared with the sizes of the 
workforce in the other two main sectors, commerce and construction, industry 
constituted the largest source of employment since the commerce sector only employed 
35,340 workers (23 per cent) and the construction sector 20.000 labourers (13 per cent) 
(Shenzhen  Special Econom ic Zone Yearbook 1985:313. 389, 422, 606; Liu and Liang 
(eds.), 1985:76). A more sensitive indicator on a longer term basis is, however, the 
proportion of foreign investment committed to manufacturing.
F o re ig n  in v e stm en t. Table  4.17 shows th a t  the industrial sector has received 
the highest amounts of pledged and actual investments (Rmb 6,302,300,000 and 
1.833,970.000 respectively), comprising 38 and 44 per cent of total investment 
comm itted to, and received by, the Zone between 1979 and 1984. As the Zone was in its 
early stage of development, it is not surprising to find that property ranked second with 
14 per cent of total investment and that it had acquired the highest investment 
utilization rate (53 per cent). The commercial and retailing sector only attracted 18 per 
cent of the Zone’s total foreign investment. Hence, by 1984, the Zone has been able to 
channel foreign investment to the industrial sector, which is targetted  as the main 
sector. Thus, the significance of industry in Shenzhen's overall economy has been 
expanding.
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T ab le  4-16: Proportion of Industrial O u tpu t in Total
Industrial Output and Agricultural O utput.  1978-1984
Year Proportion 
Per cent
1978 34.4
1979 -
1980 35.9
1981 65.1
1982 72.0
1983 82.6
1984 90.2
Sources: Based on Hu (1984:197); Shenzhen  Special Zone D a ily , 11 January  1985.
By 1984, industrial output had marginally matched the transactional value of 
retailing, and substantially surpassed the output value of construction and agriculture. 
Further ,  the industrial sector had become the main source of employment by 1984. The 
high proportion of foreign investment committed to manufacturing implies that the 
industrial sector has been the most successful in tapping external capital. Thus, by 
1984, manufacturing had developed as the dominant sector in the Zone. As industrial 
development is most closely related to foreign investment, the latter 's  contribution to 
the Zone’s economic performance has to be considered further.
C o n tr ib u tio n  o f  F o re ig n  In v e stm e n t
In assessing the contribution of foreign investment to Shenzhen’s development, 
a tten tion  is initially concentrated on the different sources of the Zone’s investment and 
then shifted to its characteristics and nature. Capital channelled to Shenzhen has been 
derived from four major sources: (a) foreign investment; (b) domestic investment due to 
;neilian’ (economic integration with the interior) - joint economic ventures between zonal 
and non-zonal enterprises and agencies; (c) direct government investment and funding; 
and (d) bank loans (Table 4.18). Between 1979 and 1983, 95 per cent of total foreign 
investment received by Shenzhen stemmed from Hong Kong. By the end of 1984, 
seventeen countries (or territories), based mainly in Southeast Asia and Europe, had 
invested in Shenzhen” (Shenzhen  Special E conom ic Zone Yearbook 1985:96).
7. These countries comprise Hong Kong, the United States, Japan. Britain, Saudi Arabia, 
Thailand, Singapore, Holland, Australia, Belgium, Germany, Libya, Lebanon, Indonesia, Den­
mark, Switzerland and Norway.
105
T a b le  4-17: Total Foreign Investment by Economic Sectors in
Shenzhen Special Economic Zone. 1979-1984
(Money amounts in HKSl.000)
Utilization of
Economic Sector Pledged Investment Utilized Investment Pledged
Investment
Amount Per cent Amount Per cent Per cent
Industry 6,302,300 38.4 1,833,970 44.3 29.1
Property
development
2,318,810 14.1 1,230,880 29.8 53.0
Conroerce and 
services
2,898,120 17.7 708,000 17.1 24.4
Tourism and 
entertainment
558,240 3.4 185,060 4.5 33.2
Transport and 
teleconmunication
2,513,380 15.3 127,760 3.1 5.1
Agriculture 362,460 2.2 8,560* 0.2 2.4
Others 1,438,160 8.8 43,070 1.1 3.0
Total 6,391,470 100.0 4,137,300 100.0 -
Note: The 1983 figures are unavailable.
Source: Shenzhen  Special Econom ic Zone Yearbook 1985:597-8, 600.
Nevertheless, this figure must not be overstated as 90 per cent of foreign investment was 
still derived from Hong Kong. Although multinational corporations might have invested 
through their subsidiary in the Colony, the majority of Hong Kong investment would 
have been indigenous. Consequently, investment projects valued above HK$10,000,000 
only took up 4.6 per cent of to ta l investment in the Zone (Shenzhen Special Economic  
Zone Yearbook 1985:97). On the whole, by the end of 1984, a pledged amount of 
HKSl6,661,470,000 had been a ttrac ted  from overseas by the Zone and HK$4,137,300,000 
had been used (Shenzhen  Special Econom ic Zone Yearbook 1985:596, 599).
From ‘neilian’ sources, Shenzhen Zone has a ttrac ted  a pledged amount of Rmb
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T ab le  4-18: Sources of Investment in
Shenzhen Special Economic Zone, 1979-1984
Source Investment (Utilized) 
Rmb* Per cent
(1,000)
Foreign 1,472,051 20.2
‘Neilian’ 660,000 9.1
Central Government 64,150 0.9
Shenzhen Government 827,870** 11.4
Bank loams 4,250,000*** 58.4
Total 7,274,017 100.0
Notes: * Conversion is based on the exchange rate of HK$100:Rmb 35.58 on 31
December 1984. ** Total government expenditure on the Zone. *** Municipal 
figure.
Source: Based on Shenzhen  Special Econom ic Zone Yearbook 1985:96-7, 99, 592, 596, 
599, 604; Hu (1984a: 161); Shenzhen Special Zone D aily , 11 July 1984; Wen 
Wei Po, 9 November 1984; Chan (1985b:29).
1,880,000,000^ by 1984 from twenty-four bureaux and departm ents  in the Central 
Government, over twenty provinces, municipalities and autonomous regions, and more 
than  eighty localities, towns and counties (Hu, 1984a; Shenzhen  Special Zone D a ily , 11
8. There is no consistency in statistics on investment. For example. Hu (1984a) and Shenzhen  
Special Zone Daily  (11 July 1984) reported an investment of Rm b 160.000,000, while Chan 
(1985a) and Wen Wei Po (9 November 1984) cited a tenfold figure of Rmb 1,600,000,000. The 
difference is probably due to the difficulties of interpreting ‘neilian’ which is loosely defined as 
‘jo in t economic venture between zonal and non-zonal enterprises and agencies’ by Chinese sources 
such as Shenzhen  Special Zone Herald  (16 May 1983), Shenzhen  Special Zone Daily  (11 July 
1984) and Hu (1984a). Since government investment in the Zone’s infrastructure is often ad­
ministered through the investment schemes of s tate bureaux and departm ents, Chan and Wen  
Wei Po have included part of their investment as ‘neilian’ investment. However, Shenzhen  Spe­
cial Zone Herald, Shenzhen  Special Zone Daily, and Hu (1984a) did not explicitly mention 
infrastructure in their description of joint ventures under ‘neilian’ conditions. Furthermore, the 
la t te r  two sources only reported a to ta l  domestic investment of Rm b 160,000,000 by the end of
1983. Thus, they could not have included internal investment on infrastructural construction. 
T he more recently published Shenzhen  Special Economic Zone Yearbook 1985, however, has 
quoted th a t  an amount of R m b 1,880,000,000 had been invested under ‘neilian’ by the end of
1984. Hence, infrastructural investments have been included. As the Yearbook is the official 
source of information, its definition of parameter and d a ta  are adopted by this study.
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July 1984; Wen Wei Po, 9 November 1984: Chan, 1985a; Shenzhen Special Econom ic  
Zone Yearbook 1985:99). The exact locations of these sources, however, have not been 
released. By 1984, an amount of Rmb 660.000.000 had been used in various sectors of 
the Zone. Investment was normally in the form of jo in t ventures between zonal and 
non-zonal enterprises; foreign investors were also involved.
There has been no direct funding from the Central Government and Guangdong 
Provincial Government. Nevertheless, the S tate  has invested in the Zone’s 
infrastructural development. By 1984, the investment totalled Rmb 64,150,000 
(Shenzhen  Special Econom ic Zone Yearbook 1985:592; Liu. 1985:110). By the same 
date , the Shenzhen Municipal Government had also spent a total am ount of Rmb 
827,870,000 on the Zone (Shenzhen  Special Econom ic Zone Yearbook 1985:604). As 
well, bank loans had constituted a major source of capital for development. By 1984, 
various banks in Shenzhen (e.g. Bank of China, Industry and Commerce Bank, 
Agricultural Bank and Construction Bank) had loaned Rmb 4,250,000,000 to the whole 
M unicipality (Liu and Liang (eds.), 1985:109).
This analysis shows tha t  Shenzhen has not been able to use fully its foreign 
investment sources. As shown in Table 4.18, total development capital had amounted to 
Rmb 7,274,071,000 by 1984. Although the volume of bank loans provided for the Zone 
alone would be smaller than tha t  of the whole Municipality, the difference would be 
insignificant as development had concentrated in the zonal area. Foreign investments, 
among others, only contributed 20 per cent of the total development capital. 
Nevertheless, between the two targetted  sources of capital, i.e. foreign investment and 
"neilian’, the former has almost doubled the latter.
A common complaint against Shenzhen has been that it has been unable to a t t rac t  
sufficient foreign capital to cover its infrastructure, let alone its total development (e.g. 
Chan, 1985a, 1985b). Site development of other export processing zones, however, has 
been the responsibility of the host governments (Sanchez, 1983). The Chinese 
G overnm en t’s derivation of 26 per cent (Rmb 873,200,000) of the Zone’s total 
construction cost (Rmb 3,395,810,000) from foreign investment by 1984 must be 
heralded (Shenzhen  Special Econom ic Zone Yearbook 1985:592-3). A more detailed 
examination of the Zone’s foreign investment is therefore necessary.
In v e s tm e n t am ou n t. Table 4.19 shows th a t  apart from 1984, the number of 
projects funded by foreign capital increased each year. There were, howrever, variations 
in the am ount of investment. At the official inauguration of the Zone in 1980, there was 
an almost ninefold increase in pledged investment. Subsequently, a peak of agreed 
investm ent occurred in 1981 with HK$6.748,400,000 - a reflection of the signing of two 
massive land development contracts, involving a total sum of HK$4,400,000,000.
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Conversely, a trough occurred in 1982 when only HKSl.383.760.000 was injected - a 
drop of 80 per cent. The subsequent rise in 1983 and 1984 was more steady, maintaining 
rates between 63 per cent and 93 per cent. Also, the annual rate  of increase of expended 
foreign investment in the Zone had fluctuated, showing a greater rise during the initial 
two years, a drop in 1982, and slower growth in 1983 and 1984. The am ount of increase 
in 1984, however, almost doubled tha t  of the previous year. By 1984, only 21 per cent 
(HK$3,537,300,000) of the pledged amount of investment (HK$16,661,470,000) had been 
imported, showing a relatively low utilization rate. Summing up, the use of foreign 
capital to the Zone has been increasing, except for 1983 and the higher amount of 
increase in 1984 may signify a take-off in the Zone’s importation of foreign capital. 
Having examined the overall inflow of overseas capital, we can proceed to investigate the 
forms of foreign investment.
T a b le  4-19: Foreign Investment in
Shenzhen Special Economic Zone, 1979-1984
Year Project
Number
Pledged 
Amount 
HK dollars 
(1,000)
Investment 
Growth Rate 
Per Cent
Utilized 
Amount 
HK dollars 
(1,000)
Investment 
Growth Rate 
Per Cent
1979 109 160,920 73,950
1980 142 1,722,890 970.7 209,170 182.9
1981 318 6,748,400 291.7 768,170 267.2
1982 357 1,383,760 -79.5 526,740 -31.4
1983 739 2,266,730 63.8 932,350 77.0
1984 550 4,378,770 93.2 1,626,920 74.5
Total - 16,661,470 - 3,537,300 -
Sources: Based on Shenzhen  Special Zone D a ily , 11 January 1985; Shenzhen  Special 
Econom ic Zone Yearbook 1985:596, 599.
In v e s tm e n t form s. To date, six investment forms have arisen in the Zones. 
They are: (a) joint ventures between Chinese and overseas entities, which involve equity 
investment in the forms of equipment, cash, rights to the use of a site, factory buildings 
and industrial rights, and the distribution of profits in proportion to equity share - both 
parties sharing risks, profits and losses; (b) co-operative production arrangements, in 
which the Chinese partner provides land, natural resources, labour, services, buildings, 
and equipment or facilities, and the foreign partner provides either capital or technology,
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key equipment, and materials. Products, revenue and profits are distributed according 
to the terms of the contract;9 (c) sole proprietorships; (d) compensation trade, in which 
the Chinese partner only provides factory buildings and labour, while the foreign 
investor supplies production equipment, technology and possibly technical and 
supervisory personnel;10 (e) intermediate processing, in which the Chinese partner 
receives a fee for the processing and assembly of parts and components supplied by 
foreign contractors; and (f) intermediate cultivation of seedlings and aquatic  stocks. 
Jo in t ventures, co-operative production arrangements and sole proprietorships are 
regarded as more desirable forms of foreign investments and are the main targets of the 
Zone (Hu, 1984a; Chan, 1985a; Lo, 1986).
Table 4.20 shows th a t  between 1979 and 1984, intermediate processing attracted  
the largest number of projects (1,342), but co-operative production arrangements 
amassed the highest am ount of pledged investment (HKSl 1.637,480.000), accounting for 
70 per cent of the total. Similarly, it occupied the highest proportion of investment 
expended - 45 per cent. Also, the other two targetted forms of investment - joint
ventures and sole proprietorships - took up the second- (23 per cent) and third-largest 
shares (21 per cent) of utilized investment respectively. After noting foreign investment 
has been introduced through the desired channels, we can proceed to examine the 
distribution of overseas capital in various economic sectors.
D i s t r i b u t i o n .  The involvement of foreign investment in the main productive 
activity, manufacturing, needs to be probed. As illustrated by the S ta tem en t o f  Fully 
Foreign-Owned E nterprises in  Four Special Econom ic Zones in C hina , 1979-1983 
(1984 A lm anac o f  C h ina 's  Foreign Econom ic Relations and Trade: 1146-51) (Appendix 
III), twenty out of forty-eight sole proprietorship projects in Shenzhen were 
manufacturing - 42 per cent of the total. However, only 21 per cent of the total agreed 
investment of US$365,500,000 was committed to industrial projects.11
Additional information in Table 4.17, however, shows tha t  the manufacturing 
sector, when all forms of investment are considered, had a ttrac ted  the highest shares of 
both pledged and expended investments (38 and 44 per cent respectively) between 1979 
and 1984. The relatively high utiliziation rate exhibited by the property development
9. This investment form differs from joint ventures in that contributions of the parties may not 
be expressed in monetary terms and, therefore, profits will not be distributed according to the 
equity share, but according to the terms of contract. Further, at the expiry of the contract, all 
equipment rights are transferred to the Chinese partner.
10. The foreign inputs, invested in the form of loans, are paid back in instalments by means of 
the goods produced. Upon the completion of payment, all equipment becomes the property of the 
Chinese partner.
11. The agreed amount of investment of five enterprises, of which one is industrial, is not given.
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T ab le  4-20: Forms of Foreign Investment in
Shenzhen Special Economic Zone, 1979-1984
Forms Project Per Pledged Investment Utilized Investment
Number cent Amount 
HX dollars 
(1,000)
Per cent Amount 
HX dollars 
(l.OOO)
Per cent
Joint venture 308 13.9 2,443,130 14.6 961,090 23.4
Co-operative
production 385 17.4 11,637,480 69.7 1,830,320 44.5
arrangement
Sole proprietorship 51 2.3 2,106,760 12.6 875,610 21.3
Compensation trade 6 0.3 11,390 0.1 9,810 0.2
Intermediate 1342 60.6 330,810 2.0 417,180 10.1
processing
Intermediate 122 5.5 172,960 1.0 17,650 0.4
cultivation
Total 2214 100.0 16,702,530 100.0 4,111,660 100.0
Sources: Hu (1984a: 145); Shenzhen  Special Econom ic Zone Yearbook 1985:596, 599.
sector (53 per cent) reflects the Zone’s preoccupation with construction work in the 
initial years. Indeed, total investment expended by the property development sector 
surpassed tha t  of the industrial sector until 1981, at which time the former had received 
a to ta l am ount of HK$430,540,000. and the latter, HK$418,040,000. At the end of 1982, 
however, the former obtained HK$12,020,000 less than the latter. Hence, we need to 
ascertain the contribution of foreign investment in the industrial sector.
In d u str ia l o u tp u ts . The industrial outputs  of foreign-related firms had 
increased from Rmb 61,550,000 in 1982 to Rmb 823,800 in 1984 - a more than threefold 
increase each year (Table 4.21). Its share in the total industrial output, though 
escalating, was minor in 1982 and 1983. Nevertheless, it expanded to account for more 
than  half of the to ta l ou tput (56 per cent) in 1984. Further, 72 per cent of the products 
which accounted for 99 per cent of the Zones’ export, were sold overseas (Liu and Liang 
(eds.), 1985:144). The contribution of foreign-related firms to employment was, 
however, less successful.
E m p lo y m e n t. Between 1983 and 1984, the numbers of jobs provided by 
foreign-related firms increased from 10,000 to 19,000. but this only accounted for 9 and
I l l
T ab le  4-21: Industrial O utputs  of Foreign-Related Firms in
Shenzhen Special Economic Zone, 1982-1984
Enterprise Type
1982
Rmb
(1,000)
Output
1983
Rmb
(1,000)
1984
Rmh
(1,000)
Zonal Industrial 
1982 1983
Per cent Per cent
Output
1984
Per cent
Joint venture and 
co-operative production 
arrangement
50,220 143,720 481,450 16.8 24.9 32.6
Sole proprietorship 11,330 75,960 342,350 3.8 13.2 23.2
Total 61,550 219,680 823,800 20.6 38.1 55.8
Note: O u tpu t value is adjusted to the 1980 constant price.
Source: Shenzhen  Special Econom ic Zone Yearbook 1985:587-8; Liu (1985:78).
12 per cent of total employment respectively (Shenzhen  Special Econom ic Zone 
Yearbook 1985:606). Thus, the involvement of foreign capital in this regard had been 
relatively minor.
In assessing the Zone’s economic performance, note must be taken of the target 
established for foreign capital laid down by the Shenzhen O utline Social and Econom ic  
Plan. It aimed to derive 58 per cent, th a t  is, HKS56.7 billion, of the Zone’s capital from 
foreign sources by the year 2000. Between 1979 and 1984, the Zone only managed to 
derive 20 per cent of development capital from overseas. As well, the amount of foreign 
investment accrued by the end of 1984 (Rmb 1.472,051,000) only accounted for 7 per 
cent of the total projected amount. Likewise, foreign-related firms only constituted a 
minor source of employment. As noted, the Zone’s achievements had been to cover over 
one-quarter of its infrastructure costs from overseas and to obtain the investment in the 
desired forms of jo in t ventures, co-operative production arrangements and sole 
proprietorships. Also, since 1982, investment has been concentrated in manufacturing - 
the targetted  economic activity of the Zone. The industrial outputs  and products of 
foreign-related firms accounted for major portions of the Zone’s outputs and exports in 
1984. Hence, while the am ount of foreign investment received fell short of the targets, it 
had been used in the desired direction. Thus, having assessed the broader performance 
of the Zone, we will now examine the more specific achievements.
112
F u l f i l m e n t  o f  P l a n n i n g  T a r g e t s
Specific targets have been set for most economic sectors in the Shenzhen  O utline  
Social and Econom ic Plan. These targets serve as convenient criteria for measuring the 
performance of Shenzhen's economy. More detail has been provided on the planning and 
progress of the industrial s tructure because of the projected importance of manufacturing 
to Shenzhen. Correspondingly, this assessment will focus on industry, though brief 
appraisal of the non-industrial sectors, total local earnings and the balance of external 
payments will also be made.
I n d u s t r y .  As indicated in Table 4.22, the industrial sector had averaged an 
annual growth rate of 100 per cent between 1979 and 1984 - 12 per cent above the 
planned target. By 1984, the number of workers in the industrial sector had reached 
50.000, fulfilling the planned target for the following year. Likewise, 374 industrial 
enterprises had been set up within the Zone, thus surpassing the target for 1985 by 174. 
Labour productivity has also been increasing rapidly from Rmb 7,215 per worker a year 
to Rmb 28,000 in 1 984^  - an almost threefold increase between 1979 and 1984 
(Shenzhen  Special Econom ic Zone Yearbook 1985:389). The plan has highlighted tha t  
products from these industries would have to be competitive in world markets. The Vice 
Mayor of the Shenzhen Municipality announced th a t  over one-third of the manufactured 
products in 1984 had generated foreign capital for the Municipality - 14 per cent, 
however, originated from the internal market. In 1984, 20 per cent of the manufactured 
products were sold overseas but 47 per cent were consumed within the Zone, almost 5 
per cent were substituted for imports and 28 per cent were transported to the domestic 
m arket outside the Zone (Shenzhen  Special Zone D aily1 12 May 1985). Thus, a total of 
80 per cent of Shenzhen's industrial products were consumed within China - a fact which 
dem onstrates th a t  the planned external orientation of the Zone's manufacturing 
industries had not been achieved. It needs to be re-emphasized, howrever, tha t  nearly all 
exports were products of foreign-related firms which exported more than  two-thirds of 
their goods.
As a prime aim of the industrial policy was to absorb foreign technology, the 
technological levels of manufacturing production in the Zone have to be investigated. 
Following the classification of the technological level of industrial production and tha t  of 
imported equipment (see Table 4.9 and Table 4.10), Zhou Xiwu, the Vice Mayor of 
Shenzhen Municipality, concluded tha t  industrial production in the Zone has gradually 
turned from being labour-intensive to being capital intensive with high technology 
content (Shenzhen  Special Zone D a ily , 8 May 1985). Such a sta tem ent, however, may
12. The source of information has not specified whether the 1984 value has been deflated.
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be premature. As pointed out by students of export processing zones such as Frobel, 
Heinrichs, Kreye (1977), and Samuelsson (1982), the large-scale of importation of 
modern equipment does not necessarily imply a shift to advanced industrial production. 
Very often, the operation of the equipment or machines in the zones does not involve 
any technology. This seems to be the case for Shenzhen. As illustrated by Table 4.10, 
only 3 per cent of m anufacturing production used advanced technology in 1983, and only 
5 per cent in 1984. In other words, industrial production by 1984 was predominantly 
labour-intensive.
T ab le  4-22: Industrial Performance of Shenzhen, 1979-1984
Items Planned for 
1985
Achieved by 
1984
Performance
Annual growth rate 88% 100% Fulfilled
Employment 50,000 50,000 Fulfilled
Number of enterprises 200 374 Fulfilled
Labour productivity 
per worker per year
- Rmb 28,000 -
Destination Export 20% exported Unfulfilled
Technological level High Low Unfulfilled
A summary of key economic indicators for Shenzhen between 1979 and 1984 shows 
th a t  its industrial performance has been mixed (Table 4.22). Planned targets for the 
growth rates of manufacturing, employment, number of enterprises and possible labour 
productivity have been met. In contrast, the destination of products and technological 
levels have not been fulfilled. Although rapid industrial development has occurred in 
Shenzhen it has not been in the direction desired and designed by planners. In contrast 
to the industrial sector, the performance of the non-industrial sectors - agriculture, 
commerce and tourism - can only be briefly assessed as few statistics are available (real 
estate  is omitted as figures are absent or unreliable).
N o n -in d u str ia l secto rs . The agricultural sector achieved an average growth 
rate  of 16 per cent between 1980 and 1984; this was more than double the planned target 
of 7 per cent (Table 4.23). This was outstripped by the average growth rates for 
commerce and construction which were 72 per cent and 57 per cent respectively. Since
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planned targets for commerce and construction are not published, it is impossible to 
gauge their performance. Relatively, commerce has grown substantially both in terms of 
the retailing network and employment. Commercial outlets had increased from 102 to 
5,050 between 1979 and 1984 (including 1,191 restaurants, hostels and hotels). The 
commercial workforce has increased almost fivefold between 1978 and 1984 - constituting 
a m ajor source of employment (Zhang, 1984; Shenzhen  Special Econom ic Zone 
Yearbook 1985A22).
T ab le  4-23: Annual Growth Rates of Major Economic
Sectors in Shenzhen, 1980-1984
Year Industry 
Per cent
Agriculture 
Per cent
Retailing 
Per cent
1980 114.0 7.0 62.0
1981 88.0 6.0 70.0
1982 49.0 25.0 59.0
1983 99.0 10.0 126.0
1984 150.0 31.0 44.0
Average 100.0 15.8 72.2
Source: See Table 4.15.
In 1983, the tourist sector received 500,000 tourists, of which 140,000 came from 
overseas - an 18 per cent increase over the previous year. As there were 140,000 tourists
i 9 . .
from overseas in 1983, the planned target was exceeded by 19,000, resulting in a  net 
profit of Rmb 4,570 ,000^ (Wang, 1984; Shenzhen  Special Zone D aily , 20 November 
1984). The target was exceeded again in 1984 when 1,500,000 tourists were recorded, 
producing a net profit of Rmb 30,000,000. It is impossible, however, to calculate the net 
profit per individual overseas tourist since profits have not been differentiated for local 
and foreign visitors. Further, the sources of tourists in 1984 have not been classified. If 
to ta l  net profit is divided by the total number of tourists, the net profit per individual 
was around HK$30 in 1983, and around HK$65 in 1984. Although these figures were 
lower than  the anticipated profit rates of HKS60.5 for 1983 and HKS66.6 for 1984, the
13. Calculated from the expected 10 per cent annual increment from the base figure of 100,000 
in 1981.
14. Calculated from the net profit of HK850 per individual with an annual increment of 10 per 
cent from the base year of 1981.
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actual profit generated from overseas tourists would be higher than this average rate. 
The reason is th a t  overseas tourists spend more than local tourists in service charges 
(including rent and food). Hence, it is likely tha t  the actual profit rates generated from 
overseas tourists  in 1983 matched the planned target while the 1984 rate would probably 
have exceeded it. Thus, tourism and other non-industrial sectors have developed 
substantially. In particular, the agricultural sector has exceeded its planned target, the 
commercial sector has become an im portant generator of employment, and the tourist 
sector has a t t rac ted  more people than expected. Conversely, the Zone had been unable 
to generate any net earnings for the country in general and the Zone in particular.
E a r n in g s .  Due to a lack of da ta , a comprehensive assessment of the costs and 
benefits incurred by the Zone is impossible. .Major items of expenditure and income, 
however, can be summarized. The predominant expenditure stemmed from the costs of 
infrastructural construction, which amounted to Rmb 3,600,420.000 for the whole 
Municipality by 1984 (Shenzhen  Special Econom ic Zone Yearbook 1985:313). Although 
this amount is a municipal figure, land development has been concentrated in the Zone. 
While foreign capital funded 26 per cent of the construction costs, internal sources bore 
the remaining costs of Rmb 2,664,310,800 (including investment from the state , 
provincial and state-owned enterprises, bank loans, and the accumulated capital of 
Shenzhen). O ther main expenditures were administrative costs, provision of public 
utilities and outlays for urban maintenance. These amounted to Rmb 77,390,000 by 
1 984^  (Shenzhen  Special Econom ic Zone Yearbook 1985:592, 604). Hence, the total 
expenditure on Shenzhen had grown to Rmb 2,741,700.800 by tha t  year.
The main sources of income to the whole economy included industrial and 
commercial tariffs, and the profits generated by zonal and non-zonal enterprise 
operations. Between 1982 and 1984, a gross income of Rmb 1,201,690,000 was recorded 
by the Shenzhen Government (Shenzhen  Special Econom ic Zone Yearbook 1985:604). It 
has been estimated tha t  ‘neilian' investors gained a profit of Rmb 350,000.000 by 1984 
(.Shenzhen  Special Econom ic Zone Yearbook 1985:100). Assuming th a t  the profitable 
proportion of ‘neilian’ enterprises was the same as the 80 per cent of foreign-related 
enterprises, the gross income of the former would have accrued to Rmb 878,000.00016 by 
1984. Thus, the total income of the Zone would have amounted to Rmb 2.079,690,000 
between 1979 and 1984. Therefore, compared with overall expenditure, an overall deficit 
of Rmb 662,010,800 resulted, implying that the Zone’s operation, even if profits of
15. This was calculated by subtracting the total government expenditure of Shenzhen by its 
spending on infrastructure.
16. This is obtained by applying the profit rate of 80 per cent to the total ‘neilian’ investment 
received by the Zones, plus the amount of profit (Rmb 350,000,000) obtained by the ‘neilian’ 
enterprise.
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domestic investors are accounted for. has not been profitable. Similarly, negative 
payment has resulted in trade.
B a la n ce  o f  ex tern a l p a y m en ts . Trading statistics show tha t  both in the years 
of 1983 and 1984, Shenzhen suffered from huge deficits. The current account deficit was 
US$661,820,000 in 1983. In 1984, it was US$541,680,000 - a reduction of 18 per cent 
(Shenzhen  Special Econom ic Zone Yearbook 1985:439-41). A more penetrating 
understanding of Shenzhen’s trade, however, requires a further breakdown of the 
statistics. On investigation, it was discerned tha t  72 per cent of industrial output by 
foreign-related firms was exported in 1984 (Liu and Liang (eds.), 1985). Further, by 
considering the imports and exports of foreign-related firms alone, it was found tha t  
total exports exceeded imports by US$20,750,000 in 1984 (Shenzhen  Special Econom ic  
Zone Yearbook 1985:439-41). Apart from the limited share apportioned to domestic 
partners, the balance was mostly repatriated because tax holidays of various periods had 
been granted and export taxes were waived. In contrast, the net imports and exports of 
domestic enterprises produced a huge deficit of US$548,000,000 - a reflection of general 
trading differences in 1984. Hence, the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone had been used 
by the domestic enterprises as a gateway for importing foreign raw materials and goods 
th a t  were subsequently manufactured for the internal market. Thus, although the 
original intention was to create Shenzhen as an export-base, what has occurred was the 
reverse of this.
R E S U M E
By exploring the economic geography of the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone, this 
C hapter has assessed the extent to which government directives have been realized; it 
has also considered whether Shenzhen’s shift from an internally-inclined economy to an 
external one has been immediate or gradual. The Chapter, therefore, has shown tha t  the 
economic aims of Shenzhen have been to develop the Zone into a major industrialized 
city by the year 2000, based on higher technology and capital-intensive activities. The 
external orientation of Shenzhen’s economy is patent. Industrial products will become 
competitive in the world market. Foreign investment, in the form of joint ventures, 
co-operative production arrangements and sole proprietorships, will be the major source 
of capital for development. The subsequent discussion of Shenzhen's economic structure 
and performance was, therefore, directed to assess the extent to which industrialization 
goals and external orientation have been achieved by fulfilling various planning targets 
and spatial designs.
The Chapter revealed th a t  Shenzhen’s industrial development has concentrated on 
light industries which accounted for almost 80 per cent of industrial production in 1983.
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In particular, electronics has become the major industry, accounting for two-fifths of 
industrial production between 1981 and 1984. In 1984, electronics accounted for 
two-thirds of the Zone's manufacturing employment. Only 5 per cent of industry was 
production of advanced technology in 1984; other areas were either labour-intensive or 
assembly work th a t  used advanced equipment. The locations of industries concentrated 
in three discrete centres: Shangbu, Shahe and Shekou. Whereas Shangbu was
predom inantly  an electronics industrial estate - the largest centre both in terms of 
industrial ou tpu t and number of enterprises - it was internally-oriented. Shahe was 
characterized by light and electronics industries but Shekou has developed a more 
balanced industrial structure. In addition, Shekou as an autonomous zone was able to 
develop manufacturing as its main economic activity, and export a major proportion of 
its industrial product to overseas markets. Furthermore, enterprises within the Zone 
were mainly foreign-related firms. Thus, Shekou has been regarded as a model of 
success.
As a whole, the industrial performance of Shenzhen has been less successful. 
Although the planned targets for industrial growth rates, employment and number of 
enterprises have been achieved, those regarding the degree of capital intensity, are far 
from being fulfilled. The Zone’s goal of developing industry as the main economic sector 
has been gradually met, however. By 1984, manufacturing output matched the value of 
retailing and surpassed construction, and within the total industrial and agricultural 
ou tp u t,  it achieved a predominant proportion of 90 per cent. Further, by the end of 
1984, the industrial sector has a ttrac ted  nearly half the foreign investment used in the 
Zone. Thus, Shenzhen was able to generate a high rate of industrial growth, but not in 
the direction desired and designed by its planners. Capital-intensive and technologically 
advanced manufacturing fell short of planned targets.
Admittedly, Shenzhen was still a t the early stage of development and has yet to 
develop an externally-oriented economy. After more than  four years of the Zone’s 
operation, it was only able to export 20 per cent of its manufacturing products in 1984 
to earn foreign exchange. Likewise, the import of foreign investment fell below the 
targets. By 1984, the Zone was only able to derive one-Fifth of its development capital 
from foreign investment, which was 38 per cent lower than expected. Further, it had 
managed to derive only 7 per cent of the total amount of foreign capital expected by 
2000. In terms of employment, the contribution of foreign-related enterprises had been 
secondary. Nevertheless, as noted, a major proportion of foreign capital has been 
invested in the industrial sector. The outputs  and exports of foreign-related firms also 
dom inated the manufacturing sector. Thus, foreign investment has been channelled to 
the Zone’s targetted  production activity. The goal of luring foreign investment as the
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major source of development may have been over-ambitious for these initial years of the 
Zone’s development since the construction costs of export processing zones are usually 
borne by the host countries, rather than depending upon foreign investment.
By 1985, China's investment in the Zone had not been profitable as earnings still 
fell short of total expenditure. The emergence of huge trade deficits aggravated the 
situation. The large influx of overseas goods, the high speed of industrialization and the 
local development of light industrial goods also had a profound effect on Shenzhen's 
society. Thus, the assessment of the Zone’s performance in economic terms must be 
considered incomplete without a survey of the changes brought to its social geography. 
Consequently, the changes brought into the life of Shenzhen’s residents have to be 
considered, especially as the ultimate goal of C h ina’s modernization program - and the 
Shenzhen experiment - is to raise the living s tandard  of the masses.
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C H A P T E R  5
SH ENZH EN: THE SOCIAL D IM E N S IO N
The essential task of socialism is to develop the forces of production, create 
ever more social wealth and meet the people's growing material and cultural 
needs (Decision o f  the Central C om m ittee  o f  the C om m un is t  Party o f  China  
on R e fo rm  o f  the Economic Structure, R enm in  Ribao. 21 October 1984).
Marked social changes have been triggered by the opening of Shenzhen to 
large-scale industrialization and external influences. They have ranged from the 
restructuring of social relations and societal values, through the transformation of social 
landscapes and living environments to the transfers of livelihood, and shifts in living 
s tandards  and style. Rather than examine all of these topics, a ttention is focused on 
changes in the ‘well-being' of the Zone’s population, given tha t  the ultimate goal of 
China 's  modernization program is to satisfy the needs of the ordinary people.1 Any 
assessment of the welfare of Shenzhen’s residents necessarily involves an examination of 
their economic prosperity, and their accessibility to social goods. Further, variations 
within the population need to be canvassed.
Since the distribution of economic power and the supply of services have to be 
assessed in relation to demographic and socio-economic characteristics, an assessment is 
initially made of existing population structure. We are then in a position to raise a 
series of critical questions: what are the changes in wage levels; what are the
distributive patterns; what have been the costs of basic living? After these questions 
have been resolved, we can tackle the Final set: what and where are the social services 
provided; how adequate are they; and does everyone have similar access to them? Such 
an investigation provides evidence tha t  while living standards have been improved, 
socio-economic polarization has taken place because of the more stratified income 
s tructure  and the differential access to social services.
1. For analytical purposes, 'well-being' or ‘welfare' refers to the residents’ income level, pur­
chasing power and their accessibility to social goods such as housing, medical facilities, education, 
transport, recreation, and fuel and water supplies.
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PO PU L A T IO N  STRUCTURE
In 1978, Shenzhen possessed a rural and predominantly female and unskilled 
population of 68,166 (Ng, 1983a; Zheng et a l., 1981). As a result of the special economic 
zone policy, however, the population had increased to 338.000 by 1984, of w'hich 147,000 
were temporary residents (Shenzhen  Special Econom ic Zone Yearbook 1985:581-2). 
Simultaneously, qualitative changes occurred. The expanded population was urbanized 
and predominantly male with a higher proportion of the younger and economically 
active age groups. As well, education levels were higher and a wider range of skills was 
available. These marked changes need to be investigated. In addition, the internal 
m igration policy has to be detailed because in-migration has been a major source of 
Shenzhen’s population growth and preferential access to social services has been granted 
to a t t r a c t  particular groups of prospective in-migrants (i.e. professionals and 
technicians). Thus, a ttention is directed to identifying Shenzhen’s population growth 
and its distribution, its demographic and social patterns, and the features of its 
m igration policy.
Growth and Distribution
As shown in Table 5.1, the number of permanent residents in Shenzhen's Special 
Economic Zone had expanded almost threefold between 1978 and 1984 - from 68,000 to
191.000 - achieving an annual growth rate of 19 per cent. The expansion was even more 
phenomenal when the temporary population is taken into account - a fivefold increase at 
an average annual growth rate of 31 per cent between 1978 and 1984. The population 
‘take o f f  commenced in 1980 - the year the Special Economic Zone was officially 
inaugurated. In tha t  year, 13,000 permanent residents“ arrived, in addition to 
thousands of temporary residents (exact figure unpublished).2 3 Rapid growth also 
occurred in 1982 and 1983. with annual increments of more than 30,000 permanent 
residents. The number of temporary residents expanded at a similar pace, increasing by
20.000 in 1983 and 27,000 in 1984. Indeed, the high proportion of temporary residents - 
constitu ting over two-fifths of Shenzhen’s population in 1984 - was a prominent 
demographic feature of the Zone.
The population density in Shenzhen also rose correspondingly. It doubled between 
1978 and 1984 - rising from 208 persons per sq km to 584 persons per sq km (Table 5.2). 
If temporary residents are included, the density was 1,032 persons per sq km in 1984. 
Such a density was one and a half times higher than tha t  of the provincial city of
2. Perm anent residents are those whose places of abode are registered in Shenzhen.
3. Tem porary residents are those whose registered places of abode have not been transferred to 
Shenzhen. They are usually em ployed in the Zone on a contractual basis.
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T a b le  5-1: Population G row th in Shenzhen Special Economic Zone, 1978-1984
(Numbers in 1,000)
Year Total Population Permanent Residents Temporary Residents
Number
(1,000)
Growth
(1,000)
Number
(1,000)
Per
Cent
Growth
(1,000)
Number
(1,000)
Per
Cent
Growth 
(1,000)
1978 68 68 100.0 0 0
1979 - - 71 - 3 - - -
1980 134 - 84 62.7 13 50 37.3 -
1981 - - 98 - 14 - - -
1982 229 - 129 56.3 31 100 43.7 -
1983 285 56 165 57.9 36 120 42.1 20
1984 338 53 191 56.5 26 147 43.5 27
Source: Based on Zheng et al. (1981:23); Zhang et al. (1984:28); Shenzhen  Special 
Econom ic Zone Yearbook 1985:581-2.
Guangzhou (438 persons per sq km) (Zhongguo Shouce 1984:1-42). As the population 
was not spread evenly across the Zone, the key features of its geographical distribution 
need to be described.
T a b le  5-2: Population Density of Shenzhen Special Economic Zone, 1978-1984
Year Permanent Population 
Persons/sq km
Total Population 
Persons/sq km
1978 207.6 207.6
1979 216.5 -
1980 256.8 409.5
1981 300.2 -
1982 392.7 698.0
1983 503.8 870.0
1984 584.4 1032.1
Source: Based on Zheng et al. (1981:23); Zhang et al. (1984:28); Shenzhen Special 
Econom ic Zone Yearbook 1985:581.
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T a b le  5-3: Population Distribution in Shenzhen Special Economic Zone,
1979 and 1984 (permanent residents)
Administrative Area Number Density
District 1980
sq km (1,000)
Shatoujiao 65.0 5
Luohu 74.2 46
Shangbu 68.8 11
Nantou 108.1 17*
Shekou 11.4 4* *
Total 327.5 83***
1984
(1,000)
1980
per sq km
1984
per sq km
7 76.9 107.7
92 619.9 1239.9
60 159.9 872.0
22 157.3 203.5
13+ 350.9 1140.4
194+ + 253.4# 592.4#
Notes: * Includes the population of Chiwan. ** Excludes the population of Chiwan.
*** Differs from Table 5.1 due to rounding. +  As this figure is the size of the 
workforce in Shekou Industrial Zone, it probably underrepresents the District’s 
population size. - f+  This figure differs from that  provided in Table 5.1, but 
Shenzhen  Special Econom ic Zone Yearbook 1985 does not account for the 
difference. #  These two figures differ from those contained in Table 5.2 
because of rounding and unexplained differences in the original sources.
Sources: Shenzhen  Special Econom ic Zone Yearbook 1985:101-11, 306: interview with 
Shenzhen Planning Bureau, April 1982.
As reflected in Table 5.3, the Luohu Administrative District4 had captured the 
largest proportion of the Zone’s permanent population - 55 per cent in 1980 and 48 per 
cent in 1984. It was the most densely populated district, with 620 persons per sq km in 
1980 and 1240 persons per sq km in 1984 - both were more than double the Zone’s 
overall densities in these two years. The Shangbu Administrative District also emerged 
as an im portan t  residential area in 1984, holding a population of 60,000. It was not, 
however, as densely populated as the Shekou Administrative District which, though
4. As there is insufficient locational data, the description of population distribution is only 
possible at the Administrative District level. The jurisdiction of the Administrative Districts are: 
a) Shatoujiao District - Shatoujiao Town, Yantian Harbour District; (b) Luohu District - Luohu 
Town, Huacheng, Shuibei Industrial District, Liantang Industrial District, Shenzhen Reservoir 
District, Sungang Qingshui River Warehouse District, Hongling District; (c) Shangbu District - 
Shangbu Multipurpose District, Futian New Town. Chegongmiao Industrial District, Agronomic 
Research Park, Xiangmihu Tourist District; (d) Nantou District - Nantou Central District, 
Houhai Bay Research and Culture District, Mawan Harbour and Warehouse District, Nantou 
Industrial District, Xili Reservoir District, Shahe Industrial District; (e) Shekou District - Shekou 
Commune, Shekou Industrial District and Chiwan Harbour District (Source: Shenzhen Special
Economic Zone Yearbook 1985:306).
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possessing a smaller population of 13,000, gained a population density of 1140 persons 
per sq km in 1984.
In 1980, therefore, the Zone’s population was concentrated in the eastern section of 
the Central Region, in which the Shenzhen Old Town was located (Fig. 5.1). The 
second largest population conglomeration was found in the Western Region - Nantou - 
which was the pre-1953 county-seat of the previous Baoan County. With the 
commencement of the special economic zone policy in 1980, this pa ttern  began to 
change.
By the end of 1984, Figure 5.2 shows the whole Central Region - consisting of 
Luohu and Shangbu - had become the most populous region. Providing accommodation 
in high-rise living quarters, the Central Region alone housed nearly 80 per cent of the 
Zone’s perm anent population (152,000) and almost the entire temporary population 
(175,000).5 Nantou, and thus the Western Region, had lost its relative importance. 
Invariably, the Eastern Region remained the least populated area.
The patte rn  of population density in 1980, shown in Figure 5.3, reflected the 
pa tte rn  of population distribution - except in the Western Region, where the less 
populated Shekou possessed a density higher than Nantou (compare with Fig. 5.1). 
Indeed, at the onset of the special economic zone policy, the whole Zone - apart from 
Luohu and Shekou - was sparsely populated, holding less than 200 persons per sq km. 
Luohu in the mid-east region, which includes Shenzhen Old Town, was the only area 
with a density higher than th a t  of Guangzhou, the provincial city (438 persons per sq 
km).
By 1984, Shangbu had acquired a much higher population density - increasing 
from 160 to 872 persons per sq km. Hence, the whole Central Region was the most 
densely populated area (Fig. 5.4). Similar to the pattern  in 1980, the Western Region 
was more densely populated than the east, and Shekou continued to possess a relatively 
higher density (1140 persons per sq km), only subordinate to tha t  of Luohu.
Shekou’s second-rank, however, was lost to Shangbu when temporary residents are 
considered (Fig. 5.5). Temporary residents were concentrated in the Central Region 
where faster infrastructural and economic developments were taking place. As a result, 
the Central Region's ‘real’ population density was almost doubled as it increased from 
1,056 persons per sq km to 1,867 persons per sq km. By 1984, therefore, the most
5. The Luohu Administrative District Council quoted 125,000 temporary residents in its dis­
trict, and the Shangbu Administrative District Council 50,000 (Shenzhen Special Economic Zone 
Yearbook 1985:105, 110). In fact, the sum of these two figures exceeds the figure of total tem­
porary residents cited on p.582 of Shenzhen Special Economic Zone Yearbook 1985.
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populous Central Region held a density that was 81 per cent higher than the Zone's 
average. Indeed. Luohu has been the most densely populated area since the Zone was 
established.
This pattern  of development, however, deviated from tha t  stipulated by the 
Shenzhen  Special Econom ic Zone M aster O u tline  R a n  (Shenzhen  Special Economic 
Zone Yearbook 1985:305-6). By the year 2000, Shangbu was expected to have emerged 
as the prime residential centre, housing a population of 365.000. As shown in Figure 5.6, 
Luohu was intended to be the second largest residential district and Nantou the third, 
holding populations of 220,000 and 135.000 respectively. By 1984, the realization of this 
plan was some way off. Although the population of Shangbu had expanded, its size was 
still below tha t  of Luohu. Indeed, the expected large-scale population expansion of 
Shangbu will probably have to await the completion of the development project at 
Futian , which was expected to a t t rac t  a population of 300.000 - 82 per cent of Shangbu’s 
planned population. Although the contract was signed in November 1981, its 
implementation had still not commenced by 1985 (Yearbook o f  C h in a ’s Special 
E conom ic Zones 1983:161).
Figure 5.7 shows tha t  the planned distribution pattern of population density also 
differs from that  exhibited in 1984 (see Fig. 5.5). By the year 2000, the Central Region 
is expected to have the highest population density and Shangbu, instead of Luohu, is 
anticipated to possess a higher density. Further, the population density of the Western 
Region is planned to reach a much higher level (1,249 persons per sq km in Nantou in 
2000; and 4.386 persons per sq km in Shekou in 2000). Moreover, Shekou will possess a 
density higher than tha t  planned for Luohu. In contrast, the Eastern Region will remain 
as the least populated area, with a density of 539 persons per sq km only.
By the year 2000, the Zone will hold a planned population of 805,000 (Shenzhen  
Special Econom ic Zone Yearbook 1985:306). This figure is based on an annual growth 
rate of 12 per cent - an increase of 716,000 between 1980 and 2000. As shown in Table 
5.4, the average natural growth rate between 1979 and 1984, however, was only 14 per 
1000. Hence, the fulfilment of the population target will have to rely on large-scale 
in-migration.
Indeed, in-migration was the predominant source of population growth between 
1979 and 1984 (Table 5.5). Within this period, 93 per cent (114,210) of the Zone's total 
growth (123,400) was generated by in-migration, and only 9,190 (7 per cent) by natural 
growth. Prior to the formal establishment of the Zone in 1980, natural growth was an 
im portan t  contributor to population growth (40 per cent in 1979). Since 1980, however, 
it has become a minor factor. The large influx of selected migrants into the Zone has 
certainly altered the population characteristics. Hence, these demographic changes are 
investigated in more detail.
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Table 5-4: Demographic Vital Rates of Shenzhen Special Economic Zone,
1979-1984*
Year Births
Number
Birth Rate 
per 1,000
Deaths
Number
Death Rate 
per 1,000
Natural Growth Rate 
per 1,000
1979 1524 21.5 360 5.1 16.4
1980 1561 18.6 338 4.0 14.6
1981 2186 22.2 412 4.2 18.0
1982 2460 19.2 412 3.2 16.0
1983 1872 11.3 414 2.5 8.8
1984 1937 10.1 414 2.2 7.9
Average 1923 17.2 392 3.5 13.7
Note: * Instead of adopting the birth and death rates i 
Special Econom ic Zone Yearbook 1985, which were 
au thor compiled these rates based on the number 
population size provided by the Yearbook.
contained in the Shenzhen  
found to be inaccurate, the 
of births and deaths, and
Source: Based on Shenzhen  Special Econom ic Zone Yearbook 1985:581.
Table 5-5: Natural Growth and In-Migration in
Shenzhen Special Economic Zone, 1979-1984
Year Population Growth 
Number
Natural
Number
Growth 
Per cent
In-Migration 
Number Per cent
1979 2,900 1,164 40.1 1,736 59.9
1980 13,200 1,223 9.3 11,977 90.7
1981 14,200 1,774 12.5 12,426 87.5
1982 30,300 2,048 6.8 28,252 93.2
1983 36,400 1,458 4.0 34,942 96.0
1984 26,400 1,523 5.8 24,877 94.2
Total 123,400 9,190 7.4 114,210 92.6
Source: Based on Shenzhen  Special Econom ic Zone Yearbook 1985:581.
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C h a ra c te r is tic s
The delineation of Shenzhen's demographic and associated social characteristics is 
im portan t  both for gaining an understanding of the nature of Shenzhen's population and 
fashioning a basis for examining the distribution of economic power and the accessibility 
to social services. In particular, the following needs to be explored: the sex structure: 
rural-urban composition; age structure; education a tta inm ent and skill level; and 
employment structure.
S ex  stru c tu re . As shown in Table 5.6, the male population of Shenzhen had 
tripled between 1978 and 1984, whereas the female component had expanded by less 
than two and a half times. Consequently, the male to female ratio rose from 97 males 
per hundred females in 1979 to 130 in 1984. Hence, the predominately female population 
of Shenzhen had been transformed to a heavily male-dominant population within a 
time-span of five years. Since the population growth of Shenzhen is largely due to 
in-migration, this change shows tha t  the process had been strongly sex-selective.
T ab le  5-6: Sex and Urban-rural S tructure of Shenzhen Special
Economic Zone, 1979-1984 (permanent residents)
Year Sex Composition Urban-rural Composition
Male
Number
(1,000)
Female
Number
(1,000)
Per/100 
Female 
Ratio
Urban
(1,000)
Per
cent
Rural
(1,000)
Per
Cent
Per/100 
Rural 
Ratio
1978 33 35 94.3 27 39.7 41 60.3 65.9
1979 35 36 97.2 35 49.3 36 50.7 97.2
1980 42 42 100.0 46 54.8 38 45.2 121.1
1981 49 49 100.0 59 60.2 39 39.8 151.3
1982 65 64 101.6 78 60.5 51 39.5 152.9
1983 100 70 142.9 119 72.1 46 27.9 258.7
1984 108 83 130.1 152 79.6 39 20.4 389.7
Source: Based on Shenzhen  Special Econom ic Zone Yearbook 1985:581; Zheng, 1981.
U rb a n -ru ra l ra tio . Reflecting rapid industrialization, the urban population of 
the Zone had expanded fivefold between 1979 and 1984, while the rural population more 
or less stagnated  (Table 5.6). Consequently, the proportion of urban population to total 
population had increased sharply from 49 per cent in 1979 to 80 per cent in 1984, and 
the proportion of rural population dropped correspondingly. Similarly, this change 
reflects the origin-selective characteristic of the in-migration process, engendering high 
population concentration in the urban area (namely, Luohu and Shangbu).
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T ab le  5-7: Age Structure of Shenzhen Special Economic Zone, 1982
Age Groups Per cent
0 - 1 4  30.0
1 5 - 4 9  56.0
Over 50 14.0
1 0 - 3 4  49.0
2 0 - 3 4  27.0
4 5 - 5 4  9.9
Source: Based on Zhang et al. (1984:28).
A ge stru ctu re . A general census taken in 1982 has been the sole source of 
information on Shenzhen’s age structure (Table 5.7). Only 30 per cent of the population 
were shown to be under the age of fifteen years, but possibly 7 to 11 per cent were over 
sixty-four (since 14 per cent were over fifty). The Zone’s population, therefore, can be 
described as ‘m atu red ’ - a characteristic common to developed countries. However, this 
‘m atu red ’ structure (or ‘aged’, as described by Wilson, (1973)) - low proportion of the 
age group under fifteen years and high proportion of the group under sixty-four years, as 
compared with other countries - did not evolve from demographic m aturation (i.e. low 
birth and death rates) as in the case of developed countries. Rather, it was due to a 
deliberate policy of allowing young and economically-active people to migrate to the 
Zone. Consequently, 27 per cent of the population were between the age of twenty and 
thirty-four years, and a further 10 per cent were between the age of forty-five and 
fifty-four (Zhang et a l., 1984:28). As the age-selective migration process continued 
apace after 1982, the Zone’s population in 1984 was likely to be dominated further by 
the young and economically-active group.
E d u ca tio n  a tta in m en t and sk ill leve l. The 1982 census da ta  show that  the 
education level of Shenzhen had been raised significantly. In 1964, only 48 per cent of 
the population in the present Shenzhen Zone area had received primary education or 
above. In 1982, however, 78 per cent had attained the equivalent standard. Further, 
comparing the education achievements of Shenzhen’s population with those of the 
Guangdong Province and the whole country, higher proportions of Shenzhen's 
population had finished university (2 per cent compared to Guangdong’s 0.5 per cent 
and the country’s 0.4 per cent), or higher secondary (18 per cent compared to
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Guangdong's 8 per cent and the coun try ’s 6.4 per cent), or lower secondary (26 per cent 
compared to Guangdong's 17 per cent and the coun try ’s 17 per cent) (Table 5.8). 
Correspondingly, smaller proportions of Shenzhen's population had received only 
primary education (32 per cent compared to Guangdong's 41 per cent and the country 's 
34 per cent), or were illiterate or semi-illiterate (9 per cent compared to Guangdong's 16 
per cent and the country’s 23 per cent) (Zhang et al., 1984: Ta R ung  Po, 28 October 
1982). Thus, the education level of Shenzhen's population was higher than  the 
provincial and national standard . As remarked by Zhang and others (1984:30), the high 
education level was due to the influx of educated and skilled migrants - a reflection of 
the fact tha t  the in-migration process was education and skill-selective.
T ab le  5-8: Education A ttainm ent of the Population of
Shenzhen Special Economic Zone and Guangdong Province
E d u c a t i o n  A t t a i n m e n t S h e n z h e n  SEZ 
Per cent
G u a n g d o n g  P r o v i n c e  
Pe r  cent
U n i v e r s i t y 2 . 0 0.5
H i g h e r  s e c o n d a r y 18.0 7.9
L o w e r  s e c o n d a r y 2 5 . 9 16.9
P r i m a r y 3 1 . 6 4 0 . 6
I l l i t e r a t e  or s e m i - i l l i t e r a t e  
(over 12 y e axs old)
9.1 16.4
Source: Zhang et al. (1984:30).
Indeed, the number of professionals and technocrats in Shenzhen had increased 
phenomenally - from 130 in 1978 through 5,000 in 1983 to 12,000 in 1984 (Shenzhen  
Special Zone D aily , 20 April 1984, 13 May 1985). Thus, in 1984, 6 per cent of 
Shenzhen’s population comprised skilled labourers or professionals (i.e. engineers, 
lecturers and medical doctors).
E m p lo y m e n t s tru ctu re . Similarly, the employment structure  had undergone 
radical change. As shown in Table 5.9, employment in s ta te  enterprises in the Zone 
expanded more than fivefold between 1979 and 1984, increasing from 23,000 to 118,000. 
Further ,  the source of employment had diversified beyond s ta te  enterprises and 
institutions: collective enterprises, commenced in 1982. employed 18,000 in 1984;
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foreign-related enterprises (including sole proprietorships, joint ventures, and co­
operative production enterprises) employed 19.000 in 1984. The state  enterprises and 
institu tions, however, remained the largest source of employment. In 1984, they 
accounted for 76 per cent of total employment while collective and foreign-related 
enterprises each totalled 12 per cent.
T ab le  5-9: Employment in Shenzhen Special Economic Zone
by Nature of Enterprises*
(Numbers in 1,000)
Nature of Enterprise Employment (at end of year)
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984
State ownership 23 27 39 61 87 118
Collective ownership 0 0 0 6 10 18
Foreign-related 0 0 0 0 10 19
Total 23 27 39 67 107 155
Note: * It is not stated whether temporary workers were included. Judging from the
size of total employment in 1984, temporary workers (e.g. contractual 
employees) could have been included since the employment size exceeded the 
economically active population by 40,400. Nevertheless, it is impossible to 
verify whether all temporary workers are included.
Source: Based on Shenzhen  Special Econom ic Zone Yearbook 1985:606.
An analysis of the employment s tructure of state  enterprises and institutions by 
sector, therefore, holds the key to changes in the general employment pattern of the 
Zone between 1982 and 1984 (Table 5.10). In 1982, the largest sector was commerce and 
services (23 per cent), followed by manufacturing (20 per cent), and agriculture, forestry, 
water and meteorology (13 per cent). In 1983, though the commercial and services 
sector had expanded, it nevertheless gave way to the construction and resource 
exploration sector which employed 28,000 people (32 per cent). In 1984, the commercial 
sector had narrowly resumed its top rank, providing 27 per cent (32,000) of total 
employment, outstripping the construction and resource exploration sector by 2 per cent. 
Between 1982 and 1984, the number of industrial workers had only increased marginally 
(from 12,000 to 19,000), indicating the slow growth of the s ta te  manufacturing sector. 
Foreign-related enterprises, however, have concentrated in the manufacturing sector,
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and therefore have comprised a major source of manufacturing employment. Hence, the 
total industrial workforce had grown to 50,000 workers by 1984. accounting for 32 per 
cent of total employment (see Chapter 4).
T ab le  5-10: Employment in State Enterprise by Sector, 1982-1984
Sector
1982
Number Per
(1,000) cent
Employment
1983
Number Per
(1,000) cent
1984
Number Per
(1,000) cent
Industry 12 19.7 12 13.8 19 16.2
Construction and 6 9.8 28 32.2 30 25.6
resource exploration
Agriculture, forestry, 8 13.1 3 3.4 3 2.6
and water and 
meteorology
Transport, mail and 6 9.8 4 4.6 7 6.0
telecommunications
Commerce and services 14 23.0 21 24.1 32 27.4
Urban public facilities 4 6.6 4 4.6 7 6.0
Science and research 0* 0.0 1 1 . 1 0* * 0.0
Education, health and 3 4.9 3 3.4 6 5.1
social welfare
Finance and insurance 1 1.6 1 1.1 2 1.7
State and mass 7 11.5 10 11.5 11 9.4
organization
Total 61 100.0 87 99.8 117* * * 100.0
Notes: * The original figure before rounding is 100. ** The original figure before
rounding is 200. *** The difference from tha t  contained in Table 5.9 is due to 
rounding.
Source: Based on Shenzhen  Special Econom ic Zone Yearbook 1985:606-7.
In contrast to the s ta te  industrial sector, the construction industry had expanded 
rapidly, particularly between 1982 and 1983, when 22,000 jobs were created. The 
commercial sector had also undergone significant growth. Zheng and others (1981)
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reported tha t  the commercial and services sector only occupied 8 per cent of the 
employment provided by state  enterprises and institutions in 1981. This sector, 
however, had grown quickly since 1982; it accounted for 23 per cent of s ta te  employment 
in 1982, 24 per cent in 1983 and 27 per cent in 1984 (Table 5.10). Thus, throughout 
these three years, the sector had remained as a significant source of employment - 
providing one-quarter of total employment in s ta te  organizations. Conversely, the 
proportion of workers involved in agriculture, forestry, water and meteorology had 
declined since 1982, accounting for less than 3 per cent of total employment in 1984. 
The science and research sector remained insignificant: although it increased from one 
hundred people in 1982 to seven hundred in 1983, it declined to two hundred in 1984. 
S tate workers, therefore, had been mainly involved with commerce, services, 
construction and resource exploration activities. In contrast, less than one-fifth of the 
workforce was involved in manufacturing. A part from the industrial sector, the 
employment structure  is indicative of the general employment pa tte rn  in Shenzhen. As 
noted, the workforce in commerce and construction ranked second and third after 
manufacturing (Chapter 4).
Thus, the increasingly urbanized population of Shenzhen had shifted from being 
predominantly female to being predominantly male. A developed demographic profile 
had emerged - reflecting the dominance of the working age group. Education and skill 
levels had been heightened, with the former raised above the provincial level. All these 
changes were brought about by the large inflow of migrants. They had also diversified 
the employment structure, and boosted the industrial, commercial, services and 
construction sectors. As the in-migration process had caused these drastic changes, it 
deserves to be examined more carefully by investigating the governm ent’s migration 
policy.
M igration  P o licy
As repeatedly stressed by Liang Xiang, the Mayor of Shenzhen Municipality, 
inadequate semi-skilled manpower has been both an initial and a perennial problem of 
Shenzhen (Shenzhen  Special Zone D a ily , 20 April 1984, 7 February 1985; B a ilin g , 1 
March 1985). Accordingly, two recruiting teams were despatched to major cities in May 
1983 and March 1984. They aimed at recruiting professionals, technicians and educated 
labourers - the prime targets of Shenzhen’s in-migration policy. Simultaneously, 
qualified or experienced personnel of different trades, especially the service industry, 
were also desired. Following the national policy of containing urban population growth, 
in-migrants to the Zone were generally limited to existing urbanites (M ing Pao, October 
1981; Fieldw'ork, 1982; Ng, 1983; Shenzhen  Special Zone H erald , 9 May 1983: Shenzhen
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Special Zone Daily , 23 March 1984). Nevertheless, transfers of unskilled or low-skilled 
cadres into the Zone have been considerable (Shenzhen Special Zone D aily , 6 November 
1984). Further, personal connections have also caused skilled or semi-skilled cadres to 
be transferred from Shenzhen's neighbouring counties where trained manpower was 
needed (Shenzhen Special Zone D aily , 15 November 1984). Indeed, according to Zheng 
et al. (1981), more than 14 per cent of the transferred personnel in 1980 migrated to the 
Zone through improper means. Nonetheless, several recruiting methods have been 
devised. They were designed to provide the widest channel to lure appropriate 
manpower to the Zone. As revealed in discussions with Shenzhen’s in-migrants, the 
Zone has become a desired destination. The obstacles to such movement were, according 
to a transferred lecturer, the reluctance of the original institutions or enterprises to 
release their staff and the policy of the Shenzhen authority  to Fight for only the high 
priority applicants (Fieldwork, 1982). Indeed, preferential trea tm ent has been offered to 
a t t rac t  skilled cadres to this yet developing Special Economic Zone.
As stressed by Wen Wei Po (30 July 1982), the Shenzhen Government was fully 
aware of the importance of the intelligentsia to the development of the Zone. Hence, in 
1982, the government guaranteed adequate social services to this target group. In the 
same year, the authority  allocated three hundred newly-finished three-bedroom units to 
cadres who were equivalent to or above the rank of lecturers or engineers. In August 
1982, the target group for preferential trea tm ent was formally defined. They were 
high-ranked or intermediate technocrats including engineers, agriculturalists, 
veterinarians, horticulturalists, accountants, economists, lecturers, reporters, editors and 
others such as writers and athletes. The terms of preferential trea tm ent included: 
access to political documents at the ‘chu’ level by high-ranked technocrats, and ‘xinke’ 
level by the intermediate technocrats; the allocation of residential units of 80 sq m to 
high-ranked technocrats and units of 50-70 sq m to intermediate technocrats; the 
provision of a guaranteed gas supply; the ability of technocrats (aged 40 or above, with 
fifteen or more years working experience) to apply for the transfer of their rural-based 
spouse and children (under sixteen years old) to the urban area; and the granting of 
certificates to high-ranked technocrats for priority medical trea tm ent and the provision
6. Seven basic recruiting methods had been devised: (a) an annual public recruitment drive in 
designated cities since 1982; (b) direct invitation to contractual employment involving temporary 
residence with the prospect of a subsequent transfer to permanent status; (c) direct transfers of 
suitable cadres with the approval of their original working institutions (an examination of their 
educational standards and professional proficiency has been required since 1984); (d) open recruit­
ment for contractual employment; (e) promotion of workers; (f) assignment of university and 
secondary school graduates to work in the Zone; and (g) transfer from the army (Shenzhen Spe­
cial Economic Zone Yearbook 1985:545-6).
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of private transport for work. These incentives were re-stated in May 1983 when a 
recruiting team was sent to Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai and other provinces (Wen Wei Po, 
26 August 1982; Shenzhen  Special Zone Herald. 9 May 1983; M ing Pao, 16 May 1983). 
In short, the Shenzhen authority a ttem pted  to a t t r a c t  top-level technicians and 
professionals by ensuring political privileges, high living standards and rural-urban 
transfer of family members. By the end of 1984, fifty-five high-ranked and 1,805 
intermediate technocrats had been recruited (Shenzhen  Special Econom ic Zone 
Yearbook 1985:545).
Thus, we have demonstrated tha t  Shenzhen’s population has grown enormously 
since 1980, characterized by a high proportion of tem porary residents. The population 
has been concentrated in the Central Region, particularly a t Luohu. Also, the growth 
has been due to in-migration rather than natural increase. This large influx of migrants 
has altered the demographic and social characteristics of Shenzhen's population, creating 
a male-dominant, urbanized, economically active, and relatively better educated and 
trained population. Most people worked in s ta te  organizations - particularly in 
commercial and construction enterprises - but the industrial workforce was the largest 
sector. The in-migration policy has been further examined to reveal the au thority ’s 
deliberate intention to entice skilled and semi-skilled labourers to the Zone. As 
professionals and technicians have been offered preferential trea tm ent, they have formed 
a special class in Shenzhen. This tendency of polarization is further reflected by the 
examination of the economic well-being of Shenzhen’s population.
ECONOMIC WELL-BEING
The wage reforms and the relaxation of rural policy accompanying the special 
economic zone strategy has diversified the income struc tu re  and raised income levels in 
Shenzhen. Between 1979 and 1984, the average wage per worker was raised by two and 
a half times; rural income, however, had multiplied fivefold. Nevertheless, the rise in 
real income was diminished by the simultaneous inflation in the prices of goods. 
Appraisals of changes in income and living costs, therefore, are necessary for any 
comprehension of the economic well-being of Shenzhen’s population. Further, the 
distributive patterns also have to be considered because variations exist between workers 
in different sectors and enterprise types. Scarcity of da ta , however, impedes further 
explorations of the ‘horizontal’ apportionment of income. Nevertheless, by focusing on 
distributional trends and patterns, it is possible to examine the following topics: wage 
earnings; rural income; basic living costs; and the resultant real income.
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W a g e E arn in gs
In order to stimulate productivity, innovative remuneration measures have been 
introduced since the zone policy commenced, creating a more flexible and 
performance-oriented wage structure, and a general rise in rural income. Nevertheless, 
the reformed wage structure and the amended wage levels have not been homogeneous 
over the years. It is, therefore, necessary to detail wage reforms and the changes in wage 
levels.
W a g e reform s. Prior to the official launch of wage reforms in 1982, various 
paym ent methods, including piece-rate wages, duty wages and floating wages, had 
already been practised in foreign-related firms, whereas workers in state-owned and 
collectively owned enterprises only received an extra amount of Rmb 15 as ‘border 
district subsidy1 (Guangdong Jingji Tequ Yaolan 1981:84-5). Subsequently, considerable 
wage discrepancies have developed among workers of different enterprises and sectors, 
and especially between factory workers, bureaucrats and teachers. As the achievements 
of the  la t te r  two categories were intangible, remuneration according to performance was 
difficult. Aggravated by the general rise in living costs, a universal wage reform was 
urged.
Thus, in March and April 1982, official wage reforms were initially carried out by 
the Youyi Restaurant and the Bamboo Garden Hotel on a trial basis, based on the 
R egula tions on Special Econom ic Zones in Guangdong Province and the Provisional 
Regula tions o f  the Special Econom ic Zones in  Guangdong Province on Labour 
M anagem ent and Wages in E nterprises. The main items of reform included: (a) a shift 
from ‘low wages but high subsidy1 to ‘high wages but low subsidy1; (b) the creation of 
duty wages and floating wages which associated wage levels with the worker’s duty, 
responsibility, performance, and overall achievement of the enterprise. These practices 
were later applied to all new employees enlisted from 1 July 1982. In August 1983, the 
reform was further extended to all wage earners under the management of government 
instrumentalities, including Communist Party  Organizations. As individual enterprises 
and institutions retained the right to formulate the precise wage structure, a range of 
wage systems had emerged by 1984, exhibiting differences in flexibility and incentives. 
They included: (a) piece-rate wages; (b) duty wages and floating wages; (c) duty wages, 
basic wages and floating wages; (d) duty wages, basic wages, seniority wages and 
floating wages (Shenzhen  Special Econom ic Zone Yearbook 1985:542; Chen, 
1984:294-300). Piece-rate wages and floating wages were the most common methods. 
These reforms had boosted the general wage level by raising the basic level and widening 
the channels for earning secondary salaries.
In August 1984, the wage policy was revised again in line with the imminent
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abolition of the coupon system. Subsidies on the five basic goods (staple foods, oil, pork, 
coal and vegetables) channelled through the coupon system were transferred to the 
workers' m onthly wages. Coupled with a general price subsidy and the 10 per cent 
increment derived from the reform of wage policy, the monthly salary for government 
and s ta te  enterprise employees was raised to Rmb 189 - an increase of 19 per cent on the 
previous year (Shenzhen  Special Econom ic Zone Yearbook 1985:550). As a result of the 
wage reforms, there have been continuous variations in wage levels.
W age lev e l. Changes in the general wage levels in Shenzhen between 1979 and 
1984 are provided in Table 5.11. The average monthly wages had increased from Rmb 
65 in 1979, through a s tagnant high of Rmb 103 in 1982 and Rmb 106 in 1983, to Rmb 
165 in 1984. The 1982 wage level was one and a half times of the national average of 
Rmb 798 (Ip and Wu, 1985:221). This substantial increase in 1984 was the result of 
both the full extension of the wage reforms to state-owned enterprises and institutions 
since August 1983, and the revision of wages for government employees in August 1984 
in preparation for the price reform of November 1984. As wages paid by state-owned 
enterprises and institutions accounted for the majority of total wages paid (79 per cent 
in 1983 and 81 per cent in 1984), the wage rise in state-owned enterprises and 
institutions had significantly raised the overall wage level. In 1985, wages continued to 
rise. Consequently, during the Plenary Session on Labour Wages in March 1985, the 
Shenzhen Government had to stress tha t  monthly wage levels should be restricted to 
Rmb 200, except for highly profitable enterprises which could raise the wage ceiling to 
Rmb 250 (Shenzhen  Special Zone D a ily , 31 March 1985).
T ab le  5-11: Average Yearly and Monthly Income in
Shenzhen Special Economic Zone, 1979-1984
Year Yearly Income 
Rmb
Monthly Income 
Rmb
Increase Rate 
Per cent
1979 778.3 64.9
1980 998.9 83.2 28.3
1981 1180.3 98.4 18.2
1982 1238.2 103.2 4.9
1983 1267.5 105.6 2.3
1984 1981.0 165.1 56.3
Source: Based on Shenzhen  Special Econom ic Zone Yearbook 1985:606-7.
143
Wage reforms, therefore, led to rises in income, either through the direct pay rises 
or a more flexible method of remuneration. By 1984, all wage earners were paid under 
the ‘high wages but low subsidy' policy which emphasized performance. Rises in wages 
were rapid initially from 1979 to 1981. then subsided during 1982 and 1983, and were 
resuscitated in 1984. Having ascertained the earnings of urban workers, we can now 
proceed to examine rural income.
R u ra l In co m e
In the same vein, the rural sector has undergone a series of reforms to promote 
production and income. The mushrooming of the ‘ten-thousand yuan households’ 
endorses the success of these reforms. Thus, rural Shenzhen has been ascribed by the 
Chinese leadership as a successful model of rural reform. Indeed, rural income in 
Shenzhen has outstripped urban earnings. Hence, there is a pressing need to detail the 
rural reforms and the consequent changes in rural income, and compare them with 
variations in urban income.
R u ra l reform s. Radical reforms have occurred in rural Shenzhen since 1979. 
They have included: (a) the relaxation of regulation by the rural administration, (b) the 
diversification of agricultural production, and (c) ‘pluralization’ of rural activities. Since 
1979, several liberal administrative measures have been introduced. For instance, some 
farmers have been allowed to g ro w  vegetables and fish across the Hong Kong border. 
Some are also perm itted to conduct ‘border differential trade’, tha t  is, to sell their fresh 
agricultural products to Hong Kong privately and buy back goods for production and 
daily necessities. Imports of foreign investment and technology have also been 
promoted. Moreover, farmers residing in the border districts are granted full autonomy 
in farming (i.e. they can decide when and what to grow). In fact, since 1979, the 2,069 
production brigades in the Municipality have been administered under the most liberal 
form of production responsibility system - baogan daohu  (i.e. contracting everything to 
individual households). Under this system, all decision-making is devolved to individual 
households. The only obligation is the submission of an output value of HKS150 for 
each mu (0.0667 ha) of agricultural land contracted to the authority (Zhang and Hu, 
1984). Coupled with the governm ent’s intention to commercialize farming, this policy 
had led to diversification of farming and rural activities.
Since 1979, the cultivation of fresh agricultural products (e.g. vegetables, fruits, 
flowers, poultry, dairy cattle and aquatic products) for commercial distribution has been 
introduced, occupying more than  one-quarter (100.000 mu) of original paddy field. 
A part from supplying for local consumption, these products were also marketed in Hong 
Kong where they were sold for higher prices, thus augmenting rural income.
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Non-agricultural activities were permitted and encouraged by the authority, 
leading to the flurry of commune enterprises. These firms have been mainly involved 
with industry (especially the processing industry), commerce, services, and transport (for 
construction work). In 1982, 273 non-agricultural enterprises were in operation. They 
had a capital of Rmb 92,860,000, and generated a total income of Rmb 20,330,000, 
which comprised 55 per cent of total rural income. They employed 3.885 workers, 
constitu ting 33 per cent of total rural employment.
In c o m e  leve l. These new measures had greatly increased rural income. As 
shown in Table 5.12, the total amount of collective income apportioned to rural 
members had increased almost fivefold between 1979 and 1984 - from Rmb 34,690,000 to 
Rmb 153,700,000. Similar growth rates were found in the net average income per capita 
- from Rm b 152 in 1979 to Rmb 656 in 1984 (S h ijie  J in g ji Daobao, 28 September 1981; 
Shenzhen  Special Econom ic Zone Yearbook 1985:586). The increase was particularly 
noticeable in 1982, with growth rates of 73 per cent in the total am ount and 71 per cent 
at net average income per capita. Rates over 30 per cent were also achieved in 1980 and 
1984.
T ab le  5-12: Yearly Rural Income in Shenzhen Municipality,
1979-1984
Year Total Amount 
to Commune 
Amount 
Rmb
(1,000)
Apportioned 
Members 
Change 
Per cent
Net Average Income 
per Capita 
Amount Change
Rmb Per cent
(1,000)
1979 34,690 152.2
1980 46,500 34.0 208.5 37.0
1981 51,960 11.7 230.0 10.3
1982 89,640 72.5 393.0 70.9
1983 109,820 22.5 469.0 19.3
1984 153,700 40.0 656.0 39.9
Source: Based on Shenzhen Special Econom ic Zone Yearbook 1985:586.
F urther , in 1982, a to ta l of 2300 ‘ten-thousand yuan households’ had emerged - 
one-quarter of the total rural households. Simultaneously, four ‘ten-thousand yuan 
villages’ near the border had arisen: the Yunong Village; Yumin Village, Luohu Village; 
and the Luofang Village (Zhang and Hu, 1984). Such an acceleration in rural income 
was unprecedented before the establishment of a Special Economic Zone in the area.
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R u r a l - u r b a n  in c o m e  c o m p a r i s o n .  Comparison of rural and urban income is 
difficult as a semi-wage economy has to be compared with a wage economy. Conroy 
(1984:2) has s tated tha t  as urban workers receive most of their income in wages and 
bonuses, and receive varying social and welfare benefits, it is difficult to quantify exactly 
the total benefits to the individual and his/her family gained from labour. Others have 
argued, however, that collective income of peasants has been consistently understated 
because a considerable portion of it has been paid in kind and valued below market 
prices (O ’Leary (1981) as quoted in Conroy (1984)). Further, payment in kind is 
substantially undervalued, and richer collective units have often assigned considerable 
resources to the welfare sector (charging nominal fees or providing free services). 
Nevertheless, taking the ability to purchase consumer goods as the variable, Conroy 
(1984) has suggested tha t  a net rural income of Rmb 500 per capita would derive a 
living s tandard  comparable to tha t  of the urban population - a s tandard  only achieved 
by the rural sectors of Beijing and Shanghai. As shown in Table 5.12, Shenzhen's rural 
income level almost reached this s tandard in 1983, then surpassed it in 1984 when the 
net income level amounted to Rmb 656. Further, since 1982, Shenzhen’s rural income 
has ascended well above the Rmb 300 criterion set for relative rural prosperity (Conroy, 
1984).
Since the urban income of Shenzhen, however, is more than twice the average 
national wage level, the comparable level of rural income should be raised by a 
corresponding amount. Nevertheless, private income (such as tha t  acquired through the 
sale of surplus produce, family sideline farming, profits from the ‘differential border 
trade’, wages obtained from working in the New Territories of Hong Kong) has gone 
unrecorded. Consequently, peasants have constituted the highest income group in 
Shenzhen (The Seventies , March 1982; Zheng M ing , January  1983; two Chinese 
economists interviewed in Guangzhou on 18 March 1982 and 15 May 1982). Indeed, a 
Chinese economist estimated an average weekly income of Rmb 300 to Rmb 400 for 
peasants but only Rmb 150 to Rmb 180 for urban workers (Fieldwork, 1982). Peasants 
at the border districts, according to another economist, enjoyed the highest income, 
followed by wage workers, peasants outside the border district, cadres and teachers. 
W ithout taking living costs into account (which are lower in the rural sector because a 
portion of basic food is provided by subsistence farming), rural incomes were comparable 
to, if not higher than, urban income.
Between 1979 and 1984, therefore, both urban and rural incomes had multiplied, 
with the former increasing by two and a half times and the latter  by fivefold. The 
change in real income and thus purchasing power, however, has to be assessed in relation 
to variations in the costs of living.
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C osts  o f  Living
The costs of living in Shenzhen have escalated as the rapid expansion of urban 
population has resulted in shortages in housing and non-staple foodstuffs and created 
tension in transport and city management. The supply of non-staple foodstuffs was 
particularly inadequate. As reported in Shenzhen  Special Zone Herald  (19 July 1982), 
the average price for vegetables in 1981 was Rmb 10.6 per dan (50 kg), which was 130 
per cent of the 1978 price. Further, supplies at listed price at the s ta te  grocers were 
always insufficient, hence, two-thirds of the shoppers had to purchase vegetables at 
negotiated prices.7 8 Indeed, the living costs in Shenzhen increased sharply during the 
initial three years following the informal operation of the Zone in 1979 but declined 
considerably in 1982 and 1983 when some controlling measures were taken. In 1984, the 
costs soared again when price reform was introduced. Each of these periods deserves 
further examination.
As shown in Table 5.13. the living costs of Shenzhen (calculated from the prices of 
forty-five basic commodity goods) rose sharply from Rmb 32 in 1978 to Rmb 58 in 1981 
- an increase of 81 per cent in three years. The inflation is particularly remarkable when 
compared to the 23 per cent increase over the previous period of twelve years between 
1966 and 1979 (Chen, 1984b). There was also a 42 per cent increase in the average price 
of ‘social retailing goods’ (i.e. non-staple food and service fees) between 1978 and 1981. 
Although manufactured goods, especially imported goods, were sold at prices lower than 
the national level, the general living costs in Shenzhen were the highest in the country.
Q
In view of the mounting costs of living, several measures0 for controlling prices and 
improving supplies of essential goods were undertaken in the latter  half of 1981 and were 
vigorously pursued after April 1982. Consequently, prices were stabilized with some 
even showing a noticeable decline.9 On the whole, the basic living costs between 1981
7. Both prices are set by the government. The negotiated price is decided according to supply 
and demand, and is therefore higher than the listed price. By setting a portion of the goods at the 
negotiated price, the market is confined to the genuine or better-off buyers, thus partially alleviat­
ing the supply problem.
8. These measures were aimed at enlarging the production of non-staple foods, facilitating the 
retail network, gaining more domestic supply, and conducting an overall price rectification over 
commodity goods and service fees (Guangdong Jingji Tequ Yaolan 1982; Shenzhen Special Zone 
Herald, 19 July 1982).
9. A survey conducted by the Shenzhen Municipal Pricing Bureau in mid-December 1982 
showed that when the current prices of 197 commodity goods (of thirty-eight categories) were 
compared with those on 9 January 1981, only twelve were priced higher while eight were lower. 
Thus, the Bureau maintained that the 1982 price change complied with the national strategy of 
allowing marginal rises and falls which cancelled each other out overall (Guangdong Jingji Tequ 
Yaolan 1982:76).
T ab le  5-13: Monthly Costs for Basic Living in
Shenzhen Special Economic Zone, 1966, 1978-1984
Year Amount
Rmb
Increase Rate 
Per cent
1966 26.2
1978 32.1 22.5
1979 40.9 27.4
1980 49.8 21.8
1981 58.0 16.5
1982 50.1 -13.6
1983 51.1 2.0
1984 57.8 13.1
Sources: Guangdong J in g ji Tequ Yaolan 1982:75-78; Chen (I984b:311); Shenzhen
Special Econom ic Zone Yearbook 1985:551.
and 1982 had dropped to Rmb 50 - a decrease of 14 per cent (Table 5.13). Although the 
average price for ‘social retailing goods'1 increased by 8 per cent, the rise was trivial 
compared with the 42 per cent rise during the previous year (Chen. 1984b). More 
specifically, the supply of non-staple foods was improved and the price lowered. Larger 
quantities of non-staple foods were available in the market with a higher proportion sold 
a t  the listed price. The prices of some groceries had actually declined. According to the 
survey of 6 June 1982, most foodstuffs in the Shenzhen market were either lower than, or 
equivalent to, the prices of the same commodity in neighbouring counties10 (Shenzhen  
Special Zone H erald , 19 July 1982).
In 1983, the basic living costs increased by 2 per cent only. The average price for 
‘social retailing goods1 also rose at the same rate (Chen, 1984b). Moreover, the volume 
of goods had increased.11 A notable feature of the year was the increased influence of the 
m arket principle on the pricing system. It represented a gradual shift from listed or 
negotiated price monitored by the state  to market prices decided by individual 
enterprises which offered goods of better quality and quantity . During the year, only 25
10. For instance, the price of pork in Shenzhen was the same as that in Dongguang and lower 
than Huizhou; fresh chickens were one-third cheaper than those in Guangzhou; fish was priced 
lower than that in Huizhou, Shantou and Guangzhou; vegetables were dearer than in Guangzhou 
but cheaper than in the neighbouring counties.
11. For example, vegetable supplies expanded by 96 per cent, aquatic products by forty-three 
times, poultry by more than twice, and pork by 98 per cent.
148
per cent of retail goods, and 35 per cent of the ‘social retailing goods’ were sold at listed 
prices (Chen, 1984b).
In November 1984, a drastic measure - the abandonment of the subsidized coupon 
system for the five basic necessities (staple foodstuffs, oil, pork, coal and vegetables) - 
was undertaken bv the Shenzhen government to reform the price system. Instead of 
purchasing these goods at fixed quantities and at subsidized rates, the abolition of 
coupons meant tha t  residents had to purchase them at negotiated prices. As shown in 
Table 5.14, prices rose. The price rise for peanut oil was the highest (116 per cent) 
whereas the lowest was briquet (14 per cent). Also, the prices for entertainment fees, 
newspapers, magazines, medicines and fuel increased markedly (Shenzhen  Special 
Econom ic Zone Yearbook 1985:552).
T ab le  5-14: Prices of Five Basic Goods Before and After
the Price Adjustment on 1 November 1984
Goods Unit of 
Measurement Before 
Adj ustment 
Rmb
Price
After
Adj ustment 
Rmb
Increase
Rate
Per cent
Rice 
a) N o . 3, precision 93 catty 0.15 0.29 98.6
b) No. 3, precision 88 catty 0.18 0.32 81.8
Peanut oil catty 0.93 2.00 115.1
Pork Dan* 106.34 160.00 50.5
a) pork with fat catty 1.40 2.10 50.0
b) lean pork catty 2.40 3.20 33.3
Gas Bottle (15 kg) 9.40 12.00 27.7
Briquet Piece 0.025 0.06 140.0
Note: * One dan equals 50 kg.
Source: Shenzhen  Special Econom ic Zone Yearbook 1985:552.
Consequently, the average price index rose by 16 per cent between October and 
December 1984 - a sharp rise compared with the 3 per cent increase rate between 
January  and September. Accordingly, the monthly costs of living had risen to Rmb 66 
in November and Rmb 72 in December (Shenzhen  Special Econom ic Zone Yearbook
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1985:551). Indeed, the average monthly living costs in 1984 reached Rmb 58, which 
were comparable to the highest recorded price in 1981 (Table 5.15).
T ab le  5-15: Changes in Monthly Basic Living Costs and
Real Monthly Income, 1979-1984
Year Living Costs Money Wages Real wages Rural Real Income
Per Capita
Increase Increase
Rmb Index* Rmb Rmb Per cent Rmb Per cent
1979 4 0 .9 100 .0 6 4 . 9 6 4 . 9 12 .7
1980 4 9 .8 121.8 83 .2 6 8 .3 5 .2 14 .3 12 .6
1981 5 8 .0 141.8 9 8 . 4 6 9 . 4  ' 1 .6 13 .5 5 . 6
1982 50 .1 122 .5 103 .2 8 4 .2 2 1 .3 2 6 .8 9 8 .5
1983 51 .1 124 .9 105 .6 8 4 .5 0 . 4 3 1 .3 16.8
1984 57 .8 141 .3 165.1 116.8 38 .2 3 8 .7 2 3 . 6
Note: * The base year is 1979.
Source: Based on Shenzhen  Special Econom ic Zone Yearbook 1985:551, 586, 606-7; 
Guangdong J in g ji Tequ Yaolan 1982:75-78; Chen (1984b:311).
Nonetheless, the volume of fresh agricultural products continued to expand in 
1 9 8 4 .^  Indeed, Shenzhen enjoyed the best supply of non-staple foods. As well, the 
average price of 53 ‘sideline' agricultural products decreased by 5 per cent (Shenzhen  
Special Econom ic Zone Yearbook 1985:548). Fresh agricultural products in the
Shenzhen market, however, also a ttrac ted  external customers. Lower prices and the 
availability of some delicacies banned in the Hong Kong market (e.g. pangolin and 
masked civet) a ttrac ted  housewives to shop in Shenzhen. Although the number of 
external shoppers was unrecorded, their presence raised the prices of, and demand for, 
goods in Shenzhen’s free market (Fieldwork, 1984).
Hence, living costs in Shenzhen increased by 81 per cent between 1978 and 1981 
because of the lack of price controls. Since 1982, however, the introduction of several 
effective measures increased the supply of goods and regulated prices, which deflated 
prices and facilitated stability until October 1984. Meanwhile, the influence of the free 
m arket on prices had widened, resulting in a higher proportion of goods purchased by
12. For example, vegetables increased by 96 per cent, aquatic products by 17 per cent, poultry 
by more than onefold, and pork by more than twofold.
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negotiation. The removal of subsidies on the five basic goods in November 1984, 
however, has reinforced inflation. Nevertheless, the rise was anticipated and wages were 
revised prior to the price reform. Thus, we need to compare wage fluctuations with 
price variations to determine the real income and the purchasing power of Shenzhen's 
population.
R ea l In co m e and  P u rc h a s in g  P o w er
Both wage levels and living costs in Shenzhen have escalated, but at different 
rates. Hence, money wages have to be adjusted for inflation so tha t  the real wage levels 
can be ascertained. The proportion of income spent on basic living costs also has to be 
examined to assess the population 's ability to purchase tertiary and luxury goods. A 
comparative study between sectors is also necessary for identifying the distribution of 
real income.
R eal in com e. The inflation rate in Shenzhen, as shown in Table 5.15, was 
consistently higher than 20 per cent between 1980 and 1984; it reached 41 per cent in 
both 1981 and 1984. The rise in money wages, however, was able to combat high 
inflation. Nevertheless, real wage increases wrere negligible in 1981 and 1983: 1.6 and
0.4 per cent respectively. In contrast, the increase was considerable in 1982 and 1984, 
particularly in the latter year, when a 38 per cent increase was recorded. Whereas the 
high rate in 1982 was a ttr ibu tab le  to effective price control, tha t  of 1984 was due to a 
substantial wage increase.
Variations existed, however, between different types of enterprises. As illustrated 
by Table 5.16, the real wage levels of state-owned enterprises and institutions rose 
continually between 1980 and 1984. Paralleling the general trend of wage rises, growth 
in 1981 and 1983 was very low (0.9 per cent and 0.6 per cent respectively), but the 
increase in 1982 and 1984 was substantial, particularly in the la tte r  year when real 
wages rose by 51 per cent. Conversely, real wages in collectively-owned enterprises 
dropped from Rmb 110 in 1982 to Rmb 81 in 1983. Although a 20 per cent rise occurred 
in 1984, the wages w'ere still below the 1982 levels. Workers in foreign-related firms 
enjoyed the highest wage level in 1983 (Rmb 109), but received the lowest in 1984 - the 
result of a 20 per cent decline in real wages. If the higher wage level (Rmb 148) quoted 
by Shenzhen  Special Zone Daily  (16 April 1984) is adopted, however, the real wages 
was Rmb 105, showing only a slight decrease of 3.7 per cent.
Further differentiation among sectors can be identified within the state-owned 
enterprises (Table 5.17). Although basic living costs only increased by 2.4 per cent 
between 1982 and 1983, owing to a decline in money wages, real wages diminished in the 
sectors of construction and resource exploration (24 per cent), finance and insurance (14
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T ab le  5-16: Changes in Real Wages in Enterprises of
Different Ownership, 1979-1984
Year Real Wages of Different Enterprises
State-owned Collective Foreign-related
Amount
T?mh
Increase Rate 
Per Cent
Amount
Rmh
Increase Rate 
Per Cent
Amount
Rmb
Increase Rate 
Per Cent
1979 64.0
1980 69.6 8.8 - - - -
1981 70.2 0.9 - - - -
1982 82.1 17.0 109.6 - - -
1983 82.6 0.6 80.5 -26.6 108.8 -
1984 124.7 51.0 96.2 19.5 86.9 -20.1
Note: The base year is 1979.
Source: Based on Shenzhen  Special Econom ic Zone Yearbook 1985:606-7.
per cent), industry (9 per cent), and s ta te  and mass organizations (5 per cent). On the 
other hand, substantial rises in real wages were evident in all other sectors, particularly 
education, health and social welfare (47 per cent), urban public facilities (47 per cent), 
and agriculture, forestry, water and meteorology (36 per cent). Nevertheless, the 
situation was almost reversed in 1984. Wage increases were found in all sectors tha t  
experienced a decline in wages during 1983. The extent of increase ranged from: 117 per 
cent for construction and resource exploration: 59 per cent for state  and mass 
organizations; 48 per cent for industry; to 45 per cent for finance and insurance. In 
addition, wage levels in the science and research sector and the commerce and services 
sector continued to rise at the rates of 106 per cent and 53 per cent respectively. 
Conversely, only marginal rises were experienced in sectors which enjoyed substantial 
wage increases in 1983. The agriculture, forestry, water and meteorology sector, and 
education, health and social welfare sector, in particular, suffered losses in real wages - 
16 per cent for the former and 7 per cent for the latter. Hence, it seems tha t  the 
Shenzhen government a ttem pted  to regulate real wage differences between sectors by 
alternating massive wage rises with meager increments or even wage reductions, and vice 
versa. By 1984, workers and staff in the science and research sector constituted the 
highest income group (Rmb 139), whereas those in the commerce and services sector 
ranked second (Rmb 137). In contrast, workers in agriculture, forestry, water and 
meteorology were the poorest paid (Rmb 83). Thus, five years of reforms and regulation 
have produced high income groups comprised of s ta te  workers and staff in the science 
and research sector, and the commerce and services sector.
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T a b le  5-17: Changes in Real Monthly Wages in State
Enterprises by Sector, 1982-1984
Sector Real
1982
Rmb
Monthly
1983
Rmb
Wages
1984
Rmb
Rate of Wage 
1982-83 
Per cent
Increase 
1983-84 
Per cent
Industry 89.2 81.1 120.3 -9.1 48.3
Construction and
resource exploration
78.9 60.3 130.6 -23.7 116.6
Agriculture, forestry, 
and water and 
meteorology
72.6 98.9 83.0 36.2 -16.1
Transport, mail and 
telecommunications
90.1 97.8 104.1 8.5 6.4
Commerce and services 83.3 89.8 137.2 7.8 52.8
Urban public facilities 87.5 128.6 130.6 47.0 1.6
Science and research 47.6 67.4 138.6 41.6 105.6
Education, health and 
social welfare
85.4 125.7 116.6 47.2 -7.2
Finance and insurance 94.6 81.1 118.2 -14.3 45.7
State and mass 
organization
70.3 67.1 106.5 -4.6 58.7
Source: Shenzhen  Special Econom ic Zone Yearbook 1985:606-8.
Comparison of urban and rural real income is problematical because of differential 
living costs (rural living cost is lower due to the general practice of subsistence farming 
and private housing), exacerbated by a lack of da ta  on rural living costs and rural 
earnings on a per worker basis. Nevertheless, by comparing the rates of change, it is 
possible to indicate the relative affluence of these two population aggregates. As can be 
observed from Table 5.15, rural real income expanded annually between 1980 and 1984 
despite high inflation rates. The growth was remarkable in 1982 - achieving almost a 
100 per cent increase. The rates of increase, with the exception of 1984, were often 
markedly higher than  those exhibited by the urban sector. Thus, the improvement in 
the s tandard  of living was far more significant for the rural population than the 
urbanites until 1983. The wage reforms introduced in 1984 reversed the situation - real
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urban wages expanded bv 38 per cent and rural income by only 24 per cent. 
Nevertheless, the rural rate of growth was still greater than  tha t  managed by the 
collectively-owned and foreign related enterprises (Table 5.16).
R a tio  o f  L iv in g  C osts to  In com e
Having compared the changes in income levels with price inflation, the proportion 
of income spent on basic living costs shall be ascertained to indicate the population’s 
purchasing power for tertiary and luxury goods. During the 1984 wage and price 
reforms, the Shenzhen government forecast tha t  a sum of Rmb 48 was necessary to cover 
the basic living costs and accordingly raised the average monthly wages to Rmb 189 
(Shenzhen  Special Econom ic Zone Yearbook 1985:550-1). In other words, only 25 per 
cent of money wages was expected to be spent on basic living costs. Table 5.18 shows 
th a t  this standard  had never been achieved although the ratio of living costs to wages 
had diminished by almost half between 1979 and 1984. The decline in the ratio from 
0.6:1 in 1979 to 0.4:1 in 1984, implies th a t  the purchasing power of Shenzhen’s 
population on tertiary and luxury goods had been expanding overall. Indeed, visits to 
their homes confirmed tha t  recently acquired electrical household appliances, such as rice 
cookers, tape recorders, refrigerators, stereo sets and television sets, were common. Gold 
ornam ents in the two newly-opened jewellery shops were always out of stock since they 
were sold out quickly, indicating the purchasing power of the residents (Fieldwork, 
1984).
T ab le  5-18: Ratio of Basic Living Costs and Monthly Wages in
Shenzhen Special Economic Zone, 1979-1984
Year Living Costs/Average 
Monthly Wages
Living Costs/Monthly Wages by 
Enterprise Ownership 
State Collective Foreign-related
1979 0.63 0.64
1980 0.60 0.59 - -
1981 0.60 0.58 - -
1982 0.49 0.50 0.37 -
1983 0.48 0.50 0.51 0.38
1984 0.35 0.33 0.41 0.47
Source: Based on Shenzhen  Special Econom ic Zone Yearbook 1985:551, 586.
Vlore specifically, the ratio of living costs to monthly wages for those employed in
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the state-owned enterprises declined slightly faster than the overall average - from 0.6 in 
1979 to 0.3 in 1984 (Table 5.18). In contrast, it fluctuated for those employed in 
collective enterprises - increasing from 0.4 in 1982 to 0.5 in 1983, and then declining to 
0.4 in 1984. For those employed in foreign-related Firms, it increased from a low of 0.4 
in 1983 to 0.5 in 1984 (Shenzhen  Special Econom ic Zone Yearbook 1985:551, 586). The 
ratio remained static , however, if the wage levels provided by Shenzhen Special Zone 
D aily  (16 April 1984) are adopted. Thus, on the whole, s tate  workers enjoyed a steady 
improvement in their s tandard of living while those in the collective andToreign-related 
firms experienced little or no growth in their power to purchase tertiary and luxury 
goods.
Table 5.19 provides further detail on the distribution of purchasing power between 
employees in different sectors. In 1982, workers in the finance and insurance sector 
devoted the lowest proportion (43 per cent) of their wages to basic necessities whereas 
those in science and research had to spend a major part of their income on basic living 
costs (86 per cent) - a difference of 43 per cent between the two sectors. Conversely, 
workers of other sectors had to spend about half of their wages on basic living costs. 
The pattern  changed in 1983. Workers in the sectors of urban public facilities and 
education, health and social welfare devoted 32 per cent of their wages to basic living 
whereas construction and resource exploration workers devoted 68 per cent, and those in 
science and research, and sta te  and mass organizations spent 61 per cent of their wages 
on basic goods. The purchasing power of Shenzhen's population, therefore, had 
improved. Differences between the highest and lowest ratios had diminished marginally 
to 36 per cent, and workers in most sectors spent less than half of their wages on basic 
living costs. Further advances were made in 1984. On average, workers spent only 35 
per cent of their income on basic goods. The gap between groups with the highest and 
lowest ratios had been reduced to 0.2 (0.3 for the sectors of commerce and service, and 
science and research, and 0.5 for the sectors of agriculture, forestry, water and 
meteorology).
Between 1982 and 1984, the decline in the ratio of living costs to basic wages was 
marked in the science and research sector (i.e. 0.9 in 1982, 0.6 in 1983, and 0.3 in 1984). 
The decrease in the commerce and service sectors was also considerable: from 0.5 in
1982 to 0.3 in 1984. A slow decline was also experienced among workers of public 
facilities and transport,  mail and telecommunications; all other sectors recorded 
fluctuations. Thus, workers in the science and research sector experienced the greatest 
increase in purchasing power.
Unfortunately, it is not possible to ascertain the ability of rural labourers to 
purchase tertiary and luxury goods since da ta  on rural living costs and rural incomes per
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T ab le  5-19: Ratio of Basic Living Costs and Monthly Wages
by Sector in Shenzhen Special Economic Zone, 1982-1984
Sector Living Costs/Monthly Wages
1982 1983 1984
Industry 0.46 0.50 0.34
Construction and
resource exploration
0.52 0.68 0.31
Agriculture, forestry, and 
water and meteorology
0.56 0..41 0.49
Transport, mail and 
telecommunications
0.45 0.42 0.39
Commerce and services 0.49 0.46 0.30
Urban public facilities 0.47 0.32 0.31
Science and research 0.86 0.61 0.30
Education, health and 
social welfare
0.48 0.33 0.35
Finance and insurance 0.43 0.50 0.35
State and mass 0.58 0.61 0.38
organization
Source: Based on Shenzhen  Special Econom ic Zone Yearbook 1985:551, 606-8.
worker have not been published. Nevertheless, d a ta  on the savings of the urban and 
rural sectors shed some light on this m atter. As illustrated in Table 5.20, savings per 
cap ita  increased almost eightfold between 1980 and 1984, confirming the improved 
purchasing power of Shenzhen’s population. Moreover, the rates of increase had 
expanded from 78 per cent to 119 per cent. More specifically, the increased rates of the 
rural sector were always higher than the urban sector. Although the amount of savings 
per capita  in the latter  sector were higher than the former between 1980 and 1982, rural 
savings were considerably greater than urban savings in 1984. The lower savings of the 
rural in the initial years could possibly be due to investments in farming facilities as 
rural activities diversified. Hence, the ability of the country residents to purchase 
ter tia ry  and luxury goods could have been higher than, or comparable to, city dwellers.
Since the operation of the special economic zone policy, therefore, Shenzhen's
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T ab le  5-20: Savings in Shenzhen Special Economic Zone, 1979-1984
Year Amount Change Urban Population Rural Population
Per capita* Amount .Amount
Per capita Change Per capita Change
Rmh Per cent Hmb Per cent Hmb Per cent
1979 - - 374 - - -
1980 231 - 270 - 2 7 .8 183 -
1981 410 7 7 . 5 424 5 7 . 0 390 1 1 3 .1
1982 525 2 8 . 0 554 3 0 . 7 480 2 3 0 .8
1983 819 5 6 . 0 800 4 4 . 4 869 8 1 .0
1984 1 ,7 9 6 1 1 9 .3 1 ,7 0 0 1 1 2 .5 2 ,1 6 8 1 4 9 .5
Note: * Based on permanent residents only.
Source: Shenzhen  Special Zone H erald , 14 February 1983; Shenzhen  Special Economic  
Zone Yearbook 1985:604.
population has experienced a marked improvement in its real income, especially after the 
wage and price reforms of late 1984. Prior to these reforms, rural real income grew 
faster than urban wages. Moreover, the ability to purchase tertiary and luxury products 
was stronger in the rural sector. After the 1984 wage and price reforms, the economic 
well-being of the urban sector increased to match tha t  of the rural population. The 
desired criterion of spending only one-quarter of money income on basic living costs, 
however, had not been achieved. Nevertheless, the government had succeeded in 
minimizing differential real income between sectors through regulation of wage levels 
between 1983 and 1984 by granting substantial or marginal increments. Yet, a marked 
increase for workers in the science and research sector shows tha t ,  despite its regulatory 
policy, the government had been determined to raise their socio-economic status. Both 
income levels and the basic living costs in Shenzhen had increased between 1979 and 
1984. Further, the patterns of expansion were similar: an initial surge between 1979 
and 1981; a slow or negative growth in 1982 and 1983; and a resurgence in 1984. The 
general increase in wages, however, had always been higher than tha t  of living costs 
despite high inflation in 1980, 1981 and 1984. Thus, the population of Shenzhen had 
experienced a genuine improvement in real income. More specifically, prior to the 1984 
wage and price reforms, the rural population, particularly those residing in the border 
region, enjoyed a faster growth in income and a rapid improvement in their purchasing 
power. Among the urban wage earners, the real income of those in state-owned 
enterprises and institutions increased, whereas those in the collective firms fluctuated
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and those in foreign-related firms declined. By 1984. workers in the science and research 
sector, and in the commerce and services sector had acquired the highest real income 
levels. Although the economic well-being of Shenzhen's population had been improved, 
and a ttem pts  had been made to minimize sectoral variation in wages, differential income 
levels did emerge. In order to further comprehend this process of socio-economic 
stratification occurring within the Zone, we need to examine the provision of social 
services.
PROVISION OF SOCIAL GOODS
An examination of the provision of social goods in Shenzhen provides an indication 
of whether the special economic zone policy can meet the daily needs of the masses - the 
pronounced beneficiaries of the general modernization program. In Shenzhen, as in other 
Chinese cities, ‘social goods’ range from housing through medical facilities and education 
to public transport, recreation facilities, and the supply of water and fuel. Apart from 
delineating the supply of these goods, it is im portant to highlight the standard of 
provision by contrasting Shenzhen's levels with those provided in Guangzhou, the 
provincial city. Accessibility to these goods will also need to be explored through an 
identification of their geographical and socio-economic distribution. Although the 
absence of transport da ta  precludes an analysis of residents’ accessibility, an 
enumeration of land-use activities within a defined geographical area does give a good 
indication of the supply of local opportunities (see Rimmer, Black and Kuranami, 1982). 
Because available da ta  on public transport, recreational facilities and public utilities is 
poor, a ttention is focused on housing, medical facilities and education.
H o u s in g
Housing was initially one of the chronic problems of the Zone as construction could 
not keep pace with rapid population expansion. Indeed, new arrivals had to live under 
appalling conditions (such as in an abandoned school) for up to a year before proper 
accommodation could be offered. In particular, temporary construction workers had to 
stay in ‘m at shed’ type dormitories (Fieldwork, 1982). To ease the problem, old houses 
in the nearby villages were renovated for leasing (Ng, 1983b). The large-scale 
construction of s ta te  housing, however, has been the major means used to resolve the 
problem. Thus, the progress of housing construction, types of housing, and the rent and 
purchase policy need to be addressed.
H o u s in g  C o n s t r u c t io n .  As illustrated in Table 5.21, the size of residential floor 
areas had expanded tremendously between 1979 and 1984 from 53,000 sq m to 1.238,000 
sq m. In 1984 alone, 614,000 sq m was added to the store. Also, the per capita
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residential floor area had improved - increasing from 3.5 sq m in 1979 to 9.6 sq m in 
1984. While the increase in 1982 was negligible (0.3 sq m), tha t  in 1984 was notable 
(1.9 sq m). Indeed, by 1984, Shenzhen had acquired the highest per capita residential 
floor area in the country (Shenzhen  Special Econom ic Zone yearbook 1985:315). 
Compared with Guangzhou, which provided 3.5 sq m residential area per capita in 1982, 
4.9 sq m in 1983, and 5.3 sq m in 1984, the residents of Shenzhen were offered living 
units at least 57 per cent larger1“* (G uangzhou Econom ic Yearbook 1984:662; 
G uangzhou Yearbook 1985:597; Shenzhen  Special Econom ic Zone Yearbook 1985:315).
T ab le  5-21: Housing Construction in Shenzhen Special
Economic Zone, 1979-1984
Year Finished Residential
Floor Area 
sq m 
( 1 , 000)
Residential Floor Area 
per capita
sq m Annual increase 
(1,000) Per cent
1979 53 35 27.4
1980 179 56 60.0
1981 234 62 10.7
1982 456 65 4.8
1983 624 77 18.5
1984 1238 96 24.7
Total 2784 - _
Source: Based on Shenzhen  Special Econom ic Zone Yearbook 1985:315.
T yp es o f h ou sin g . Most new housing units have been living quarters supplied to 
workers by their institutions or enterprises. Basically, three types of living quarters 
have been built: three or four bedroom units with one or two verandahs tha t  are offered 
to factory directors, section chiefs, school headmasters, high-ranking technicians and 
professionals; two bedroom units tha t  are offered to married workers of different trades; 
and rooms with two double-decked bunks shared by four single workers (Fieldwork, 
1982). Hence, different types of housing were allocated according to employment and
13. This comparison, and those in the following sections, are based on the permanent popula­
tions in both cities. Although the number of temporary residents in Shenzhen may be larger than 
that in Guangzhou, and therefore lowers the per capita ratio of social facilities to the total popula­
tion, the absence of official data on the size of Guangzhou's temporary population impedes full 
comparison. In any case, comparisons based solely on permanent population are more meaningful 
in the long term.
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marital sta tus, with a major emphasis on the former. As individual institutions or 
enterprises usually accommodated their staff and workers within the same building 
adjacent to or at the workplace, the different types of quarters were located at the same 
place - a practice preventing the emergence of spatial stratification of housing types.
A part from living quarters, the Shenzhen authority  also began to construct 
housing estates in designated residential areas. Between 1982 and 1984, fourteen 
housing estates were developed (e.g. Xiabumiao, Yuanling, Huaxin, Mutoulong). These 
housing estates were usually surrounded by green belts, and provided with shopping 
centres, post offices, markets, sports grounds, recreation areas, clinics and kindergartens. 
The size of apartm ent ranged from fifty to 120 sq m. Better building m ateria ls14 were 
also used. These housing estates had been built and administered by the Shenzhen 
Special Zone Urban Contruction and Residential Development Company. Apart from 
renting or selling the units to institutions and enterprises as living quarters for their 
staff, they were also available for private sale. Unfortunately, no da ta  have been 
available to analyse the socio-economic sta tus  of the occupants (Shenzhen  Special 
Econom ic Zone Yearbook 1985:614; Shenzhen  Special Zone D aily. 16 January  1985).
In the rural areas, owing to the substantial income rise, most families were able to 
build their own houses which were usually two-storey buildings costing Rmb 40,000. 
The floor area of each house averaged 180 sq m. Usually, these houses had a big lounge 
room, a kitchen, a toilet, a bathroom and a bedroom downstairs, and another lounge 
room, two bedrooms and one or two verandahs upstairs. These rural houses, financed by 
private funds, were known to be the best type of housing in the Zone (Fieldwork, 1982, 
1984; New Look o f  Shenzhen  Special Econom ic Zone: 15).
R en t and p u rch ase  p o licy . Since housing is a subsidized social good, rent in 
Shenzhen was very low before the full implementation of the ‘high rent but low sale 
price' policy which was s tarted  in Shekou in 1981. In 1982, monthly rents, depending on 
the type of housing supplied, only ranged between Rmb 0.08 to Rmb 0.12 per sq m. 
Hence, for a unit of 40 sq m, the monthly rent was only Rmb 3.2 to Rmb 4.8 
(Guangdong J ing ji Tequ Yaolan 1982:76). In 1984, however, a family occupying a two 
to three bedroom unit in Shangbu might have to pay a monthly rent of Rmb 15 to 20. 
Rents were even higher in Shekou because of the higher wages enjoyed by workers. 
Singles sharing a room were charged Rmb 9 for rent and Rmb 1.1 for electricity, while a 
family keeping a two to three bedroom unit were charged Rmb 30 (Fieldwork, 1984).
The ‘high rent but low purchase price1 policy which was motivated by the desire to 
quicken capital return for construction and mitigate government subsidies after
14. For example, spray lacquer, latex paint, aluminium window frames.
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substantia l wage rises. Due to the relatively higher wages offered to workers in the 
Shekou Industrial Zone, the policy was first introduced to this Zone in early 1981. As an 
encouragement to residents to purchase their own housing, rent was raised to Rmb 0.7 
per sq m, while the ten-year instalment rate for house purchase w'as only set at Rmb 1.2 
per sq m (Guangdong J in g ji Tequ Yaolan 1981:78). Further, if a resident bought the 
same unit as a sitting tenant,  the purchase price was reduced by the total amount of 
rent paid. The policy seemed to have received a good response, as the Party  Secretary of 
Shekou claimed th a t  it had helped to resolve the housing problem (Shenzhen  Special 
Econom ic Zone Yearbook 1985:62-3).
Commodification of housing in other parts of Shenzhen was not vigorously 
promoted until 1984. In February 1985, the Shenzhen authority offered a further 
subsidy to house purchasers through the issue of The Trial M ethod for the 
C om m odi fica tio n  o f  H ousing for W orkers and S t a f f  o f  the A d m in is tra tive  U nits and  
In s titu tio n s  o f  Shenzhen  Special Econom ic Zone (Shenzhen  Special Zone D a ily , 6 
February 1985). The regulations stipulated th a t  the government would extend a 50 per 
cent subsidy to all prospective house purchasers. The size of subsidized housing ranged 
from 70 sq m to 190 sq m, allocated according to the vocational ranking of the 
purchaser. Units were priced between Rmb 400 and Rmb 500 per sq m, depending upon 
the facilities installed and the quality of the building. The subsidized cost could be paid 
by instalment, deducted from wages and cleared within a maximum period of fifteen 
years. If the whole sum was paid within one year, a 30 per cent discount would be 
granted. If paid within three years, 25 per cent would be deducted, and within five 
years, 20 per cent. The regulations also stipulated tha t  the buyer possessed the 
ownership of building property which could be transferred or inherited, but not leased, 
mortgaged or sold. Although the regulation was drafted for workers and staff in 
government administrative units and state-owned institutions, other organizations were 
encouraged to make arrangements based on the regulations (Shenzhen  Special Zone 
D aily , 9 February 1985). No data  have been provided on the total number of units sold. 
It is known, however, tha t  8,118 units in the housing estates had been sold to domestic 
buyers by 198415 (7.084 units to foreign buyers) (Shenzhen  Special Econom ic Zone 
Yearbook 1985:465). Assuming th a t  all these units were purchased by private 
households (some would have been purchased by various institutions and enterprises to 
accommodate their staff), 25 per cent of the urban households would have acquired their 
own dwellings by tha t  date.
15. As the average monthly income in the Zone was Rmb 165 in 1984 but the lowest instalment 
payment was Rmb 156 per month, house purchases had to be limited to those who either had high 
wages or had accumulated considerable savings, and families with more than one wage earner 
(Fieldwork, 1984).
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Thus, despite speedy population expansion, Shenzhen residents were offered more 
spacious housing than those in Guangzhou. More specifically, the rural population 
enjoyed the highest quality of housing, followed by the top echelon of cadres and 
technicians. As noted, there was no segregation of house types. Hence, no geographical 
residential patterns based on socio-economic characteristics emerged. It is clear from the 
housing allocation policy, however, th a t  higher ranked cadres and staff had the best 
access to higher quality housing either for rent or purchase. Indeed, the subsidization 
method assisted the higher income groups to acquire their own housing more cheaply as 
further concessions were granted to those who could afford to buy housing units, and 
pay within a shorter time limit. The commodification of housing, as evidenced from the 
fivefold rent increase between 1982 and 1984, and the encouragement of house purchase, 
stemmed from the government's desire to reduce subsidies in view of the mounting wage 
levels. Conversely, the provision of medical services was fully borne by the government.
M edical Facilities
At the onset of the special economic zone policy, medical facilities in Shenzhen 
were limited, comprising only one small hospital, six clinics, one epidemic prevention 
station and one m aternity  and child care centre. Total medical personnel numbered 555, 
130 of whom were medical practitioners (including qualified doctors and those receiving 
intermediate medical education only). While only 258 hospital beds were available, 
medical equipment was scarce. (Shenzhen  Special Econom ic Zone Yearbook
1985:507).
The explosion of population since 1980 demanded urgent improvements. By 1984, 
over Rmb 35,000,000 had been spent on medical facilities. As can be observed from 
Table 5.22, five new hospitals had been built since 1982, and the number of clinics also 
increased from sixteen to eighty-six. Although not all the hospitals provided 
accommodation, after five years of hospital construction and renovation, the number of 
hospital beds had mounted to one thousand in 1984, fostering a ratio of 5.2 beds per 
1000 population. It compared favourably to the 2.9 beds per 1000 population in 
Guangzhou. Further, much advanced and sophisticated equipment had been imported1' 
(New Look o f  Shenzhen  Special Econom ic Zone:'213).
Four hospitals were classified as ‘first-grade’ - the Shenzhen Municipal People's 
Hospital, the Shenzhen Municipal Chinese Medicine Hospital, the M aternity and Child 
Care Hospital, and the Kangning Hospital (psychiatric hospital). The Shenzhen
16. It consisted of two electrocardiogram machines, two ultrasound units, and one X-ray unit.
17. It included a central oxygen supply system, a central respiration system, computer- 
controlled sectional scanners, and B-type ultrasonic diagnosis instruments.
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Table 5-22: Medical Facilities in Shenzhen Special
Economic Zone, 1979-1984
Year Hospital* Clinics Hospital Beds 
Number Ratio
per 1000 
population
1979 8 16 258 3.6
1980 8 29 254 3.0
1981 8 34 402 4.0
1982 9 47 367 2.8
1983 13 57 432* * * 2.6
1984 11** 86 1000*** 5.2
Notes: * Not all hospitals provide accommodation. ** The drop in number is owing to
the exclusion of two commune hospitals as hospitals. *** The Figure provided 
on p.510 of the Yearbook, rather than p.613 is adopted because the former is 
included in a section which deals specifically with medical facilities and offers 
an explanation of the changes in the number and ratio of hospital beds. The 
reasons for the decline in number and ratio were the rapid expansion of 
population and the demolition of some existing hospitals for renewal and 
expansion, -f Perm anent population only.
Source: Based on Shenzhen  Special Econom ic Zone Yearbook 1985:510, 613.
Municipal People’s Hospital was the pivotal hospital. It occupied a total floor area of 
27.700 sq m, and provided six hundred beds equipped with an intensive medical care 
ward. The capacity of its O utpatien t Department was 3,000 patients per day. Seven 
thousand medical employees were employed, catering for a number of specialized medical 
departm en ts .18 Other hospitals were mostly specialized hospitals; these included the 
Shenzhen Municipal Chinese Medicine Hospital, the Gynaecological and Paediatrical 
Hospital, the Ophthalmological Hospital and the Stomatology Hospital. Hence, by 1984, 
Shenzhen had been able to provide a wide range of medical services (Shenzhen  Jingji 
Tequ Shouce: 161; Shenzhen  Special Econom ic Zone Yearbook 1985:507; Wen Wet Po. 3 
January  1985).
Geographically, these hospitals were located in the most populated districts of 
Luohu and Shangbu (Fig. 5.S). Indeed, all four First-grade hospitals were based in these
18. These included internal medicine, surgery, gynaecology, paediatrics, dermatology, ophthal­
mology, otolaryngology, radiography, and Chinese medicine, acupuncture and moxibustion.
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two districts. Although the locations of other medical centres and clinics were not 
published, an examination of the distribution of hospitals suggests th a t  the pattern  
minimized travel time.
In terms of medical personnel, the Zone was able to recruit a larger and better 
qualified workforce. As shown in Table 5.23, not only was the number of medical staff 
expanded, but the ratio of doctors and nurses per 1000 population also increased. Prior 
to the establishment of the Zone, there were only 1.1 nurses and 1.5 doctors for every 
1000 persons. By 1984, the ratios had steadily increased to 2.2 and 3.4 respectively. In 
fact, both ratios were higher than those for Guangzhou in 1983 and 1984: 2.0 nurses per 
1000 population compared to 1.8, and 2.5 qualified doctors compared to 2.1 in 1983; and 
2.2 nurses compared to 1.8, and 3.4 doctors compared to 2.0 in 1984 (G uangzhou  
Yearbook 1985:526, 569).
Since the establishment of the Zone, therefore, the Shenzhen authority  had been 
able to improve medical services by providing a wider range of medical trea tm ent. 
Moreover, by 1984, the ratios of hospital beds, doctors, and nurses to the population size 
had been raised above the levels of Guangzhou, the provincial city. As noted, the 
distr ibution of hospitals closely matched the pattern  of population distribution, thereby 
facilitating accessibility to these services. The distributive pattern  of schools also 
exhibits similar characteristics.
E d u c a t io n  F a c i l i t ie s
At the onset of the special economic zone policy in 1980, there were 238 primary 
schools, seven secondary schools and one intermediate vocational school in Shenzhen, 
catering for 14,744 students, with a teaching staff of 757. Since 1980, the influx of 
young and economically active immigrants put great pressure on education facilities as 
they brought their school age children with them. In 1982 and 1983, more than 12,000 
students  had migrated with their parents to the Zone, thus causing the problems of 
insufficient teaching staff and school facilities (Shenzhen Special Zone D aily , 10 
January  1984). As those problems directly affected the willingness of prospective 
m igrants  to move to the Zone, the Shenzhen authority had given priority to solving 
these problems. Hence, in 1982 and 1983, a to ta l amount of Rmb 22,882,000 was put 
into school construction (Shenzhen  Special Zone D aily , 10 January  1984). A further 
Rmb 30,000,000 was invested in 1984 (Shenzhen  Special Zone D aily. 27 February 
1984). In 1984, in order to hasten school construction, the task was assigned as a 
project under urban planning and construction, rather than delegating it to individual 
school authorities.
Consequently, between 1980 and 1984, one tertiary institution (the Shenzhen
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T able 5-23: Medical Personnel in Shenzhen Special
Economic Zone, 1979-1984
Ye sir Nurse*
Number per 1000
population**
Doctor***
Number per 1000
population**
1979 79 1.1 108 1.5
1980 106 1.3 140 1.7
1981 137 1.4 160 1.6
1982 170 1.4 241 1.9
1983 326 2.0 410 2.5
1984 429 2.2 643 3.4
Notes: * Nursing aides are included. ** Permanent population only. *** Qualified
doctors only.
Source: Based on Shenzhen  Special Econom ic Zone Yearbook 1985:510.
University), six intermediate vocational schools, seven secondary schools and 
twenty-four primary schools had been built (Table 5.24). The total number of students 
had also increased two and a half times from 14.744 to 38,722. In particular, the 
number of secondary school students had increased more than threefold from 3,718 to 
12,900, while primary school students had more than doubled from 10,884 to 24.800. By 
the end of 1984, the demand for primary and secondary education had been met, 
according to newspaper reports, and surplus places were available for newcomers (see, 
for example, Shenzhen  Special Zone Herald, 25 December 1984). Universal secondary 
education had been achieved as 90 per cent of primary school graduates had continued 
on to lower secondary education, and 85 per cent of lower secondary school graduates 
had been promoted to higher secondary education (Shenzhen  Special Zone D a ily , 26 
February 1985). By 1984, Guangzhou had been able to achieve universal primary 
education. Thus, the younger population of Shenzhen enjoyed better opportunities for 
higher education.
More specifically, in the most populated district of Luohu, six secondary schools 
and nineteen primary schools had been built by December 1984, providing over 20.000 
places. In the Shangbu District, three secondary schools, and six primary schools had 
been constructed since 1980, catering for 4,800 students. Most students attended 
schools, according to reports, within their own residential districts (Shenzhen Special 
Zone D a ily , 25 December 1984).
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T ab le  5-24: Number of Schools and Students in
Shenzhen Special Economic Zone, 1979-1984
Year Tertiary Intermediate Secondary Primary Total
Institutions Vocation School School School
( U *No.
(2) * 
No. (1)No.
(2)
No. (1)No.
(2)
No. (1)No.
(2)
No. (1)No.
(2)
No.
1979 80 7 3,480 38 9,326 46 12,886
1980 - - 1 142 7 3,718 39 10,884 47 14,744
1981 - - 4 133 9 4,761 43 13,458 56 18,352
1982 - - 5 262 10 6,901 45 15,996 60 23,159
1983 1 216 4* * 310 12 9,400 49 18,600 65 28,310
1984 1 689 7 1,072 14 12,900 63 24,800 84 38,772
Note: * ( l)  =  School; (2) =  Student. ** The decline was due to the combination of
Shenzhen Municipal Teachers' Training School with the In-service Training 
School for Secondary and Prim ary School Teachers to form the Shenzhen 
Municipal Education College a t  the end of 1982. However, a training school for 
lower secondary school teachers at the intermediate vocational level was 
re-established in 1984.
Source: Based on Shenzhen  Special E conom ic Zone Yearbook 1985:611.
Alongside an increase in the number of schools and students, the Shenzhen 
au thority  had also recruited teachers from other parts of China (e.g. Beijing, Shanghai 
and Guangzhou). Between 1980 and 1984, the number of teachers had increased from 
twenty-five to 128 in the intermediate vocational schools, from 284 to 714 in the 
secondary schools, and from 448 to 981 in the primary schools (Table 5.25). Although 
the student-teacher ratios (number of students  per teacher) fluctuated between 1979 and 
1984, they were much higher in 1983 and 1984. Compared with the same ratios in 
Guangzhou, each secondary teacher in Shenzhen had to cater for five more students in 
1983, and 2.2 more in 1984. Similarly, each Shenzhen primary school teacher had to 
take care of four more students in 1983, and 3.4 more in 1984 (G uangzhou Economic  
Yearbook 1984:704; G uangzhou Yearbook 1985:622; Shenzhen  Special Econom ic Zone 
Yearbook 1985:611-2).
Thus, due to the rapid progress in school construction and the recruitment of 
teachers from different parts of the country, the Shenzhen authority  was able to provide 
sufficient primary and secondary education to children of school age by 1984. As noted, 
s tudents  in the two most populated administrative districts had only to travel a short 
distance to school. Compared with Guangzhou, however, teachers had to cater for a
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T ab le  5-25: Size of Teaching Workforce and the Student-teacher Ratio
in Shenzhen Special Economic Zone, 1979-1984
Year Tertiary Intermediate Secondary Primary
Institutions Vocational School School School
Teacher No. of Teacher No. of Teacher No. of Teacher No. of
Number Students Number Students Number Students Number Students
per per per per
Teacher Teacher Teacher Teacher
1979 - - 22 3 . 6 266 1 3 . 1 381 2 4 . 5
1980 - - 25 5 . 7 284 1 3 . 1 448 2 4 . 3
1981 - - 50 2 . 7 354 1 3 . 4 417 3 2 . 3
1982 - - 31 8 . 5 479 1 4 . 4 743 2 1 . 5
1983 80 2 . 7 44 7 . 0 470 2 0 . 0 700 2 6 . 6
1984 109 6 . 3 128 0 . 4 714 1 8 . 1 981 2 5 . 3
Source: Based on Shenzhen  Special Econom ic Zone Yearbook 1985:611-2.
higher number of students in 1983 and 1984 when full primary and secondary school 
education was provided to all children.
O ther F a c ilit ie s
T ran sp ort. Since 1980, public transport in Shenzhen has been improved and 
diversified. In addition to buses, minibuses and taxis have also been introduced. As 
shown in Table 5.26, the number of buses had increased from twelve in 1979 to 142 in 
1984. Similarly, the number of routes had also expanded from two to fourteen, among 
which nine were inter-city routes serving all industrial, residential and commercial areas. 
Despite these improvements, passengers still found the bus service inadequate as the 
buses were infrequent and full. As illustrated by Table 5.26. no improvement was made 
in the ratio of population to buses until 1983 when it declined to 1875 persons per bus 
and 1348 persons per bus in 1984. Although the ratios had declined below the 
Guangzhou level in 1983 and 1984 (2436 and 2656 persons per bus respectively), the 
presence of a comparable size of temporary population had, in fact, almost doubled the 
ratio  in Shenzhen to 4404 in 1983, 3239 in 1983, and 2380 in 1984. Indeed, fieldwork in 
1984 confirmed th a t  bus services were far from adequate. Further, although the supply 
of taxi services appeared to be ample, totalling 1296 cars in 1983 and 2046 in 1984, local 
residents made little use of this more expensive option. In order to gain higher fares in 
foreign exchange certificates and Hong Kong currency, drivers refused to take locals and 
passengers who either paid in Chinese Currency, or went for short trips (Fieldwork, 1982
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and 1984; Shenzhen Special Zone D aily. 30 August 1984). Although the authority 
despatched inspectors to eradicate these malpractices, the problems still persisted in 
November 1984 (Shenzhen Special Zone D a ily , 15 November 1984). Hence, self-owned 
bicycles and services provided by minibuses were good alternatives to buses and taxis. 
Although the minibuses were more flexible and efficient, they charged Rmb 0.5 per trip - 
ten times the normal bus fare (Rmb 0.05) (Fieldwork, 1984).
T a b le  5-26: Bus Service in Shenzhen Special Economic Zone, 1979-1984
Year Bus Bus
Intra­
city
Route
Outskirts
Passenger Volume Population*/Bus
Number Number Number (1,000) persons
1979 12 2 - - 5 ,9 0 8
1980 38 2 1 - 2 ,2 1 3
1981 44 3 2 1 ,5 8 0 2 ,2 3 4
1982 52 3 2 5 ,3 6 0 2 ,4 7 3
1983 88 5 2 1 3 ,9 9 0 1 ,875
1984 142 9 5 2 9 ,7 4 0 1 ,348
Note: * Permanent population only.
Source: Based on Shenzhen Special E conom ic Zone Yearbook 1985:339. 581.
R e c re a t io n  fac ili t ies .  Recreation facilities in Shenzhen were minimal by 1984, 
despite the undertaking of construction projects (a sports centre, five parks, library, 
museum, theatre, book stores and an art centre) two years earlier. Although the number 
of film screening units had increased to sixty-six, there were only three cinemas in 
Shenzhen (Table 5.27). The old cultural centre, museum and library were poorly 
equipped (Fieldwork, 1982). Fortunately, although there were only three local 
performing organizations, others had visited the Zone. In 1983 alone, thirty-five theatre 
troupes performed in the Shenzhen Cinema (Shenzhen  Special Zone D aily, 30 April 
1984).
Recreation activities had been hosted by government organizations (e.g. the 
Municipal Cultural Bureau, W orkers’ Union, the Communist Youth League), various 
workers’ clubs, and other am ateu r  organizations (e.g. the Luohu Troupe of Musicians 
and Artists, and the Workers’ Music Association). These activities included singing 
contests, art exhibitions, d ram a, musical performances, Tai Chi classes, dancing classes, 
dancing parties, and speech contests (Shenzhen  Special Zone H erald , 19 July 1982;
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T ab le  5-27: Cultural and Entertainm ent Facilities in
Shenzhen Special Economic Zone, 1979-1984
Facilities
1979 1980 1981
Year
1982 1983 1984
Film screening units 4 11 16 38 44 66
Performance organization 1 1 1 2 3 . 3
Cultural centre 1 1 1 1 1 1
Museum - - - - - 1
Libraxy 1 1 1 1 1 1
Television channel - - - - 1 1
Source: Based on Shenzhen  Special Econom ic Zone Yearbook 1985:610.
Shenzhen  Special Zone D a ily , 16 January  1984, 17 May 1984, 10 June 1984, 27 August 
1984).
Private  leisure activities ranged from watching television at home to visiting 
holiday resorts. Television and radio programs broadcast from Hong Kong were very 
popular. Visits to the tourist spots, originally built to a t t rac t  Hong Kong tourists, were 
exciting as they provided activities not offered elsewhere. These included horse riding, 
archery, boating and shooting. Disco dancing and electronic games were also favoured 
by youngsters. Sports activities, such as badminton, basketball, soccer and martial arts 
also received m ounting interest. Dining in the new restaurants  or taking supper at the 
foodstalls along the street were also enjoyed. A general interest in reading was reflected 
by the large patronage of the two new book shops selling imported as well as indigenous 
publications. The favoured subjects were history, foreign languages, technology and 
economics. Gambling was popular but was carried out beyond the public gaze 
(Fieldwork, 1982 and 1984; Shenzhen  Special Zone D a ily , 4 May 1984: The Seventies , 
March 1982). Thus, with the limited recreation facilities, a considerable proportion of 
the leisure activities enjoyed by local residents were related to Hong Kong (e.g. the 
television and radio programs) or originally provided for Hong Kong tourists (e.g. 
electronic games, activities in the holiday resorts and restaurants). Finally, we have to 
consider water and gas supplies in Shenzhen.
W a te r  su p p ly .  The construction of new water pipes and water utility (e.g. the 
Shatoujiao water utility and Shangbu water u til ity ), had resulted in a steady expansion
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in the supply of tap water to residents (Table 5.28). Between 1979 and 1984, the 
Shenzhen Municipal Tap W ater Company was able to provide tap  water to an extra 
137,000 people. The proportion of the population using tap water also increased from 43 
per cent in 1979 to 89 per cent in 1984. Although considerable progress has been made 
in Shenzhen, it still fell short of the 100 per cent tap water supply in Guangzhou 
(■G uangzhou Yearbook 1985:596). Similarly, the supply of natural gas had not been 
universal.
T ab le  5-28: Tap W ater Supply in Shenzhen Special Economic Zone, 1979-1984
Year Total Population* Population Served 1 
Tap Water Supply 
Number Per cent
1979 71,000** 30,796 43.4
1980 84,057 38,562 45.9
1981 98,337 51,678 52.6
1982 116,571 75,900 65.1
1983 165,040 148,360 89.9
1984 188,356 167,800 89.1
Notes: * Perm anent population only; the size of population quoted for 1982 and 1984
is smaller than th a t  provided on p.581 of the Yearbook, but the difference is 
negligible. ** This figure is obtained from p.581.
Source: Shenzhen  Special Econom ic Zone Yearbook 1985:513, 581.
N a tu r a l gas su p p ly . In 1983, Shenzhen was only apportioned 15,000 tons of 
natural gas by the sta te  - a figure only sufficient for 10,000 households (assuming four 
members in each household). Bv March 1984, the situation had been improved: over
30,000 tons were provided which met the demand of 20,000 households - 50 per cent of 
the to ta l .19
Thus, social facilities were minimal at the onset of the Zone but the Shenzhen 
authority  had been able to improve their supply and access despite the burgeoning 
demand. Since 1983, the provision of housing, medical services, education, and transport 
has been superior to tha t  provided in Guangzhou. The ratio of s tudents and teachers 
and the supply of tap  water, however, lagged behind those in the provincial city.
19. Comparison with Guangzhou is impossible as only the supply of gas, but not natural gas, is 
recorded by the Guangzhou Yearbook 1985.
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Although it is difficult to compare recreation facilities in the two cities, the limited 
facilities in Shenzhen were inadequate as most leisure activities either originated from 
Hong Kong or were related to tourism. As they were concentrated in the more 
populated districts (Luohu and Shangbu), the catchment areas of hospitals and schools 
indicate th a t  locations of social facilities were efficient as they minimized travel time. 
Nevertheless, there is evidence tha t  socio-economic sta tus affected accessibility to social 
goods. Housing, for instance, was allocated according to bureaucratic ranking or 
vocational status. Also, Shekou residents were able to purchase their own dwellings at 
an earlier period owing to higher incomes; better-off residents were subsidized to enable 
them to acquire their own housing; better transport services were available to those who 
could afford higher fares; and wider channels of more costly leisure activities were 
available to those who could afford them. In addition, more qualified technicians and 
professionals were lured by the provision of spacious housing, priority medical treatm ent 
and private transport. Individuals of higher social and economic status, therefore, 
possessed better access to social goods. Thus, the process of socio-economic
stratification accelerated. Nevertheless, the government’s ability to provide relatively 
high s tandards  of social services indicates the viability of the special economic zone 
policy to improve general living standards.
RESUM E
This Chapter has examined the well-being of the Zone's population by focusing on 
its economic ability and the provision of social goods. A ttention has also been devoted 
to variations engendered by different socio-economic characteristics. Prior to the 
analysis of the population’s economic well-being and the provision of social goods by the 
government, the demographic structure of Shenzhen was studied to provide a basis for 
assessing the distribution of economic and social assets. This review highlighted tha t  
between 1979 and 1984, rises in income had always been higher than inflation, fostering 
a real expansion in income. As the population is dominated by the young and 
economically active group, the rise in income had a greater significance to the general 
economic well-being of the population than  if it is dominated by another group. Also, 
prior to the wage and price reforms introduced between August and November 1984, the 
rural population, which only constituted one-fifth of the total population in 1984, 
enjoyed the highest income in the Zone. In the urban sector, workers and staff of the 
state-owned institutions and enterprises had enjoyed a general rise in income. In 
particular, workers in the science and research sector had experienced the greatest 
growth. By 1984, their income level had escalated from the lowest to the highest. 
Workers in the commerce and services sector which constituted the largest segment of 
the workforce in s ta te  enterprises and institutions, followed with the second highest
income.
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The discussion of social goods underlined tha t  the Shenzhen authority has been 
able to provide services to an expanding population beyond those achieved by 
Guangzhou, the provincial city. Recreation facilities for indigenous leisure activities 
were, however, inadequate. Given the large number of in-migrants, the need for ample 
recreation facilities cannot be overstated as social activities would otherwise be minimal 
for these newcomers. Generally, the location of social services has followed the pattern  
of population distribution. Hence, hospitals and schools were concentrated in the most 
populated districts. Nevertheless, accessibility to the social goods was affected by an 
individual’s income and social s ta tus  as instanced in the allocation of housing (rent and 
purchase), access to cheap and efficient transport, exotic leisure facilities, priority 
medical trea tm ent, and private transport. Population groups which enjoyed better 
income and higher vocational ranks obviously enjoyed better access to higher quality 
services. Hence, the differences in accessibility have promoted the process of 
socio-economic stratification. Peasants residing in the border region and high-ranked 
technicians and professionals constituted the highest socio-economic groups in the Zone. 
Despite this socio-economic polarization and the removal of subsidies on basic goods, the 
performance and incentive-oriented wage reforms and new rural policy ensuing from the 
general zone policy were able to improve the well-being of the masses.
P A R T  III
C H A P T E R  6
S H E N Z H E N  A N D  C H I N A ’S M O D E R N IZ A T IO N
The Shenzhen experiment has been designed and implemented as a novel urban 
and economic endeavour with the ultimate aim of accelerating the speed of China's 
modernization. It is, however, only after analysing the development of Shenzhen in 
term s of other processing zones tha t  we can comprehend its potential impact on China’s 
modernization. We have to compare and contrast Shenzhen’s development, therefore, 
against the two divergent views on the ability of export processing zones to ‘bootstrap’ 
industrialization: those represented by the United Nations Industrial Development
Organization (1980) and Fröbel, Heinrichs and Kreye outlined in The New International 
D ivis ion  o f  Labour (1977). The viability of Shenzhen as an effective development 
s trategy will depend upon the extent to which it conforms to these schools of thought 
and the strength  of their underlying rationale when applied to the Chinese case.
Once Shenzhen's role as an export processing zone is understood we can proceed to 
evaluate the degree to which this large coastal centre has fulfilled its designated function 
as an ‘open c ity ’. In the process, we assess its preliminary contribution to China’s 
modernization. Although the cost of establishing the Zone has been high, the Zone 
should be able to generate long-term gains to the country. As these effects have just 
begun to emerge, this final appraisal is focused on the evaluation of Shenzhen’s local 
achievements in the context of the export processing zone phenomenon.
SH ENZH EN AND THE EXPORT PRO CESSING  ZONES
At the end of 1984, the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone had been in existence for 
less than  five years. Given its short official life-span, a full assessment of its performance 
is prem ature. Rather than follow the comprehensive evaluation framework devised by 
UNIDO (1980) and Fröbel and others (1977), a tten tion  is concentrated on Shenzhen’s 
objectives, investment incentives, economic performance, and social consequences. 
Hence, the aims of the assessment are to ascertain major similarities and dissimilarities 
between Shenzhen and other export processing zones, to evaluate the performance of 
Shenzhen in the light of the general export processing zone phenomenon, and finally to 
indicate the ability of the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone to act as a catalyst for 
industrial development in China. Before the investment incentives can be considered, 
the Zone's objectives have to be examined.
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O b jectiv es
The objectives of the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone include and transcend those 
of other export processing zones. Apart from pursuing goals common to other zones - 
gaining foreign capital, foreign earnings, foreign technology, managerial skills and 
employment expansion - Shenzhen has other targets. It is also destined to: develop into 
a growth pole; serve as a test-ground for new economic policies; and act as a showplace 
demonstrating C hina’s openness to capitalist initiatives. These unique objectives have 
both diversified the types of activities and deepened the importance of the Zone to 
China.
The planned development of Shenzhen into a large city has necessitated a much 
wider spectrum of economic activities than tha t  found in other export processing zones. 
In particular, commerce developed quickly. Shenzhen was designed to develop into a 
major industrial city according to the Shenzhen O utline Social and Econom ic Plan and 
Shenzhen  Special Econom ic Zone M aster O utline Plan published in September 1982. 
In 1984, however, the authority  had to add trade and commerce to the list of approved 
economic activities at the announcement of the Seventh Five Year Plan (1986-1990). It 
was specified in the Plan th a t  the Zone should develop into an entrepot handling both 
national and international trade. Indeed, between 1979 and 1984, commercial activities 
had accounted for the highest proportion of ou tput and registered the highest 
employment gain. In 1983 alone, a total amount of Rmb 1,437,000,000 was involved in 
trade, 80 per cent of which was trans-shipments. Although the relaxation of constraints 
on commercial activities was a conscious strategy adopted by the government to 
accumulate capital for development, the designation öf Shenzhen Special Economic Zone 
as a m etropolitan city has provided the venue for, and entailed the undertakings of, 
large-scale commercial activities.
The use of the Zone as a laboratory for understanding and testing either capitalist 
or hybrid economic policies is unique to China (see reasons for establishing export 
processing zones cited in Chapter 2). Since 1978, China has been urgently seeking 
effective measures th a t  can modernize the socialist economy, after almost two decades of 
isolation. Thus, the export processing enclave has been used to observe, learn and test 
new economic measures - including those thought to be the preserve of capitalists. In 
turn , the tried, tested and modified policies will be transplanted to other parts of the 
country. Hence, the ‘pacesetter’ function of the Zones has raised their national 
significance above th a t  of other export processing zones.
The establishment of an export processing zone has been used by the host country
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to indicate its long-term commitment to collaborate with foreign companies (UNIDO, 
1980). In the case of China, however, the ‘showing of the flag’ has additional political 
connotations. By stating tha t  capitalist practices are tolerated, the Zone represented a 
plan for national unification with the Chinese population of Hong Kong and Taiwan. 
Further, the creation of a Special Economic Zone close to Hong Kong has been regarded 
as a strategic and pragmatic step to prepare the Colony for a smooth changeover of 
government in 1997. These additional political factors amplify the prominence of 
Shenzhen compared with its counterparts  in other parts of the world.
These additional objectives certainly impinge upon the viability of the Special 
Economic Zones as catalysts for economic development. The encompassing variety of 
economic activities bedevilled administrators, but enhanced the linkage with the 
domestic economy - a crucial connection for the transfer of technology. Naturally, the 
augm entation of the Zone's economic and political significance to the nation requires a 
stronger comm itm ent by the Central Government to fashion the Zones, particularly the 
Shenzhen Special Economic Zone, into successful showcases.
In v e s tm e n t In cen tiv es
Among the various investment incentives offered by the Shenzhen authority , the 
granting of taxation concessions and the rapid progress in infrastructural provisions 
resembled those provided by other export processing zones. In contrast, the terms 
specifying capital transfer and labour policy exhibited some minor differences. Further 
still, the relaxation on the exports to the internal market and the stress on domestic 
participation in Shenzhen’s economy was a major departure from the experiences of 
other export processing zones. These dissimilarities changed the perception of the Zone’s 
a ttractiveness in the eyes of potential investors and strengthened its connections with 
the domestic economy.
Paralleling the regulations on capital transfer in other zones, Shenzhen stipulated 
no restriction on the repatriation of profits and initial investment. Nevertheless, the 
inconvertibility of the Chinese Currency aggravated administrative delays in the transfer 
of capital. The imposition of m aximum  investment limits - common to most other zones 
- was, however, removed in Shenzhen. Thus, the financial system impeded some 
potential clients, but provided more favourable conditions for big investors.
The investors’ nominal freedom to hire, fire and penalize employees was a 
significant concession from a Chinese perspective but it is a common practice in other 
export processing zones. The inclusion of social security costs in the gross wages was, 
however, rare in other zones (Frobel et al., 1977). Nonetheless, the hourly wrage in 
Shenzhen in 1984 was only about US$0.1 higher than the average wage level in other
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zones in 1978 (UNIDO. 1980). Moreover. Shenzhen’s wage levels were only about half of 
those in Hong Kong. Hence, leaving productivity aside, the cheapness of labour was 
certainly inviting to the small businessmen in Hong Kong, although it might not be 
particularly a ttrac tive  to transnational investors.
The most a ttrac tive  incentive, however, was the ability to sell a portion of the 
manufactured products to the domestic market - not only Shenzhen but China as a 
whole. Further ,  products could be sold internally if they were either manufactured with 
Chinese equipment and raw materials, or produced with advanced equipment installed 
by the foreign investors. Irrefutably, overseas capitalists were attracted  by the 
possibility of gaining access to the vast and yet unopened Chinese market through the 
Special Economic Zones. In turn , the local consumption of products furnished forward 
linkages between the Zone and the domestic economy.
The promotion of domestic participation in Shenzhen was another device to 
vitalize the Zone’s bondage to the domestic economy. Indeed, the stress on internal 
participation had already been underlined in the two development plans published in 
1982. As indicated in Chapter 4, only 58 per cent of total investment in the Zone was 
expected to be generated from overseas sources. In contrast, foreign investment 
predominated in other export processing zones (e.g. 85 per cent in the case of Masan 
Zone in the Republic of Korea) (UNIDO, 1980). In May 1983, the promotion of 
domestic investment in Shenzhen was institutionalized with the announcement of the 
In te r im  Regulations on C ertain  Policies o f  Recent D om estic  Enterprises and 
In s titu tio n s  in  Shenzhen  Special Econom ic Zone. These included more generous 
incentives than  those granted to overseas investors. By the same token, joint ventures 
were much preferred to other forms of investment. Although the presence of a domestic 
partner might not appeal to a foreign investor, jointly-run activities were yet another 
avenue of facilitating the transfer of technology.
In summary, the incentives offered by the Shenzhen authority  were not more 
conducive than those offered by other export processing zones to a ttrac t  foreign 
investment. By permitting local consumption of products and emphasizing domestic 
participation, the main advantage of Shenzhen’s incentives were tha t  they reinforced the 
backward and forward linkages between the Zone and the domestic economy. According 
to UNIDO (1980:37-8), the strengthening of this relationship should result in the Zone 
fulfilling its catalytic function. The effectiveness of these incentives, however, should be 
reflected in Shenzhen’s economic performance.
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E co n o m ic  P erform an ce
As a guide to Shenzhen's overall success in stimulating economic development, 
a tten tion  is focused initially on its industrial performance. The interest is centred 
successively on foreign participation and profit, local earnings and balance of payments.
In d u str ia l p erform an ce. Capital from overseas sources only accounted for 54 
per cent of total investment in the manufacturing sector of Shenzhen - a marked 
deviation from the experience of other export processing zones. Another dissimilarity 
was the emphasis on real estate and commerce during the initial years of the Zone’s 
operation, compared with the manufacturing bias of the other processing zones. By 
1984, however, manufacturing activities had gained equal significance in terms of ou tput 
and emerged as the main contributor to employment. Indeed, the pace of industrial 
development has been satisfactory in terms of planned growth rates, generation of 
employment and the anticipated number of enterprises and labour productivity. 
Industrial development, however, had not followed the desired path. Labour-intensive 
production of consumer goods, especially electronic products, had predominated a t  the 
expense of capital-intensive and high technology activities. Nevertheless, industrial 
production with a low technological content is an all too common feature of export 
processing zones. Shenzhen’s exports, however, appeared extremely low when compared 
to the virtual total export of products in other zones; they accounted for only 20 per 
cent of total production in 1984. Nevertheless, 99 per cent of exports originated from 
foreign-related firms, which were able to sell 72 per cent of their products on the 
international market. Hence, it was mainly the goods produced by domestic enterprises 
th a t  were consumed locally. Thus, the general industrial s tructure and the export 
performance of goods produced by foreign-related enterprises resembled other zones, 
albeit products of locally-financed firms were marketed domestically.
The spatial pattern  of Shenzhen’s industrial development provides more insight 
into the Zone’s manufacturing performance. Due to the establishment of ten discrete 
industrial districts established within the Zone, development had not been evenly 
distributed. Among the three most developed industrial estates, Shangbu has 
spearheaded the electronics industry based primarily on domestic capital and market, 
whereas Shahe has managed to import advanced equipment. Shekou, under the efficient 
management of the Hong Kong-based China Merchant Steam Navigation Company, has 
developed a wide industrial base, underpinned by foreign investment. Shekou also 
exported 70 per cent of its total production in 1984; its foreign investment occurred in 
joint ventures with domestic enterprises. Paradoxically, its linkage with the domestic 
economy was, therefore, stronger than tha t  of other zones. Further, heavy industry 
accounted for at least 47 per cent of the total number of industrial projects in 1984 - a
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feature most uncharacteristic of export processing zones (Table 4.12). Thus, although 
the general industrial structure of Shenzhen complemented tha t  of other export 
processing zones, its pioneering Shekou Industrial Estate surpassed the achievements of 
other zones (see Appendix IV for the main factors leading to Shekou’s success).
F o re ig n  p a r tic ip a tio n  and p rofits . Between 1979 and 1984, Shenzhen was 
mainly engaged in infrastructural construction. Therefore, it was only able to a t t rac t  20 
per cent of its development capital from overseas. Nevertheless, in contrast to other 
export processing zones, more than one-quarter of Shenzhen’s construction capital was 
derived from foreign sources. Further, the flow of foreign investment to the Zone had 
been increasing steadily, and the boost in 1984 probably signified an upsurge in the 
Zone’s consumption of overseas capital. By 1984, however, more than four-fifths of its 
foreign investment had originated from Hong Kong. Thus, although Shenzhen’s 
absorption of foreign capital had been rapid, it has been derived almost exclusively from 
one source. Since the planned target for foreign investment was only 58 per cent of total 
capital in Shenzhen, the participation of foreign investment was expected to be lower 
than  in other zones.
Further ,  foreign investment projects had mainly been in the form of joint ventures 
and co-operative activities (over three-fifths of total investment in 1984) (Shenzhen  
Special Econom ic Zone Yearbook 1985: 95). Unlike other zones, the domestic sector in 
Shenzhen was strongly linked to the foreign firms. As noted, these forms of joint 
activities require the active participation of the Chinese partners and, in the case of 
co-operative production arrangements, all equipment rights are transferred to China at 
the expiry date  of the contracts. Thus, a favourable condition for the transfer of 
technology was formulated.
Similar to other zones, foreign capital has mainly been used in the industrial 
sector. Nevertheless, the mere 44 per cent share is low compared to the predominantly 
industrial use of overseas capital in other zones. Also, compared to their exclusive 
export of manufactured products, the export of 72 per cent of goods produced by 
foreign-related firms in Shenzhen is unimpressive. As well, these firms only provided 12 
per cent of the Zone’s to ta l employment in 1984. Hence, foreign participation in 
industry, exports and employment is relatively low, particularly in employment.
Nevertheless, most of the firms were able to make a profit. The Shenzhen 
au thority  claimed tha t  more than four-fifths of the foreign-related enterprises had 
averaged profits above 14 per cent between 1982 and 1984. The annual rate, however, 
had declined from 18 per cent in 1982 to 12 per cent in 1984. Further, tourist ventures, 
ra ther  than manufacturing, were the most profitable (16 per cent). Between 1982 and 
1984, a to ta l profit of Rmb 196,660,000 was generated. Only a quarter of the amount,
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however, represented dividends from industrial activities. Compared w'ith the profit rate 
of foreign companies operating in other export processing zones (e.g. 40 per cent in the 
Philippines), however, the profit rate was not particularly high (Fröbel et a l., 1977:382).
L ocal earn in gs. As noted, the Zone had suffered from an overall deficit of Rmb 
662.010,800 by the end of 1984, even after taking into account all forms of income, 
including the profits of domestic investors. Hence, the 15 per cent profit target for 
investment in a zone had not been met. Similarly, the balance of external payments on 
current account had been in deficit.
B a la n ce  o f  ex tern a l p a y m en ts . As with other processing zones, Shenzhen was 
designed by the authorities to improve the structure  of the balance of external 
payments. Contrary to this intention, trade deficits have resulted in the Zone from high 
imports and the low export content of the domestic-related firms. Thus, the Zone has 
been used by local investors to obtain foreign raw materials and commodities to produce 
goods for internal consumption.
Hence, the economic performance of Shenzhen has resembled tha t  of other zones in 
term s of having a low level of technology, the bulk of manufactured exports produced by 
foreign-related firms, and the mass of foreign investment involved in manufacture. 
Nevertheless, Shenzhen has not surpassed other export processing zones except for the 
dominance of joint ventures. The foreign component, however, has been unable to offset 
the adverse results produced by the domestic sector. Further, the participation of 
foreign investment in Shenzhen was not as strong as in other zones - as reflected by its 
relatively low share in development capital, industry, export and employment. As well, 
the sources of foreign investment have been ‘shallow' in tha t  they have been mainly 
focused on Hong Kong - an economy conspicuous for the absence of high technology. 
Nevertheless, the achievement of the Shekou Industrial Zone was notable. It had 
diversified its industrial structure and strengthened its linkages with the domestic 
economy through the establishment of joint ventures. Consequently, it has outstripped 
the performance of other zones. Indeed, Shenzhen’s success hinged on Shekou - the 
model for the rest of the Zone. Success, however, should not be judged solely on 
economic performance - the transformation of social conditions is equally important to a 
socialist regime. Hence, a ttention is focused on the Zone's social conditions.
S ocia l C on seq u en ces
The inception of the special economic zone policy permeated all aspects of life in 
Shenzhen. A ttention, however, is focused on the three issues most pertinent to the 
general export processing zone debate: the question of human resources; the economic
well-being of workers; and the provision of social goods. As human resources are 
fundamental to Shenzhen’s operation, they will be considered first.
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H u m a n  resou rces. The heavy drain of skilled people from other parts of China 
to Shenzhen was obvious from the outset. Between 1979 and 1984 over 114,210 people 
migrated to the Zone - 93 per cent of its growth in to ta l population. Unlike other export 
processing zones, however, in-migrants were not only recruited from the surrounding 
rural area, but from all parts of China (even as far as Liaoning in the north-east). 
F urther ,  demographic changes demonstrate th a t  recruitment has focused on drawing 
educated and skilled male urbanites from the economically-active age groups. This bias 
was evident in the incentives offered to this particular cohort. Consequently, the 
education level in Shenzhen was substantially higher than tha t  in the Guangdong 
province and the country as a whole. This large-scale transfer of human resources has 
adversely affected the development potential of the source regions. Although temporary 
residents may take back innovative skills as they return, the transfer would be minimal 
at this early stage. Trained labour was a particularly scarce resource in China in view of 
the s tagnation  in education - a reflection of the political upheaval in the past thirty 
years, particularly during the campaign of the Cultural Revolution.
There are no specific da ta  on industrial workers in the Zone. Broad 
generalizations, therefore, cannot be made. Nevertheless, the Shenzhen Zone was 
notable for the high proportion of male employees. Admittedly, females predominated 
in m anufacturing whereas males were more prominent in other sectors. The male 
orientation, however, did little to assuage the strains on marriages tha t  were common to 
the preponderant female employee of the non-Chinese export processing zones. As only 
12 per cent of Shenzhen's workforce was employed in foreign-related firms, there was less 
job insecurity compared with its overseas counterparts.
The working conditions of industrial labourers, as summarized from the Provincial 
Regula tions o f  the Special Econom ic Zones in  Guangdong Province on Labour 
M anagem ent and Wages in  E n terprises , appeared to be better than tha t  of other zones. 
Although the forty-eight working hours scheme was general, the Chinese workers 
enjoyed more legal holidays, better job security, better working conditions, insurance 
and care for female workers. Indeed, the ‘social labour insurance* policy, implemented in 
1982 and 1983, was comprehensive. It covered retirement pensions, medical expenses, 
burial costs, condolence funds for the families of the deceased, and living allowance to 
the needy unemployed; the most a ttrac tive  feature, however, was the high wage level.
E co n o m ic  w e ll-b e in g . In 1982, Shenzhen's wage level was 50 per cent higher 
than  the national average. Although the inflation rate was high and subsidies on some 
basic goods had been withdrawn, real income rose at an average rate of 14 per cent 
between 1979 and 1984. Within Shenzhen, the Government was also able to stabilize 
wage levels between sectors, though it was particularly committed to raising that of the
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science and research sector above others, a reflection of its stress on the value of skilled 
workers. Paradoxically, however, the rural sector was found to have the highest income 
level. On the whole, Shenzhen’s population was paid sufficiently high wages to meet 
daily needs. In fact, they were able to raise their s tandard  of living. Indeed, the ratio of 
basic living costs to wages had dropped from 0.6 in 1979 to 0.4 in 1984. Thus, tertiary 
and luxury goods were commonly consumed.
A crucial factor contributing to the wage rise was the introduction of a more 
flexible, incentive-oriented wage policy spearheaded by the foreign-related firms. The 
transfer of management skills from foreign investors to the socialist enterprises and 
adm inistra tion, was indeed an im portant part of the Shenzhen experiment. These 
m anagement skills also infiltrated the provision of social services.
P r o v is io n  o f soc ia l serv ices . The performance-oriented labour policy has 
quickened the construction of public buildings such as houses, education institutions and 
medical facilities. More relaxed management practices have also allowed the 
diversification of means of transport. Although the construction of recreational facilities 
still fell behind the demand - a reflection of its perceived secondary importance - the 
general provision of social services was of a relatively high standard.
Two noteworthy features relating to social services had emerged: the influence of 
socio-economic sta tus  on the accessibility to social goods; and the priority given to 
education. Clearly, population groups enjoying better income and higher vocational 
ranks also possessed better access to higher quality services. Thus, polarization has been 
occurring. Stress has been given to the construction of education facilities - primary and 
secondary schools, vocational schools and tertiary  institutions. Given the range of 
training courses run by various research institutes, government bodies and individual 
enterprises, Shenzhen has made an effort to upgrade its labour force. The incentives 
offered to skilled workers and the priority given to the educational sector demonstrated 
the governm ent’s clear com m itm ent to providing the conditions necessary for the 
transfer of technology so th a t  a strong technological base can be developed in Shenzhen. 
Such a strategy, however, has been largely at the expense of skilled manpower in other 
parts of China.
Compared with other export processing zones, therefore, the achievement of 
Shenzhen Special Economic Zone is mixed. As yet, Shenzhen has not been able to fulfil 
its more immediate goals - the generation of a favourable balance of payments on 
current account and the recuperation of the cost of infrastructural provision. Shenzhen, 
however, has laid the foundation for long-term gains by strengthening its linkages with 
the internal economy through large-scale commercial activities and joint enterprises, the 
promotion of domestic investment, and permitting the local consumption of products. It
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has also paved the way for the transfer of technology by upgrading the skill and 
education level of the labour force. The participation of sole proprietors in Shenzhen’s 
economy, however, needs to be regulated. Although it strengthened the Zone's linkages 
with the host economy and permitted the multiplier effects to occur, the preoccupation 
with the domestic economy has defeated the purpose of establishing an externally 
oriented economy in Shenzhen. Rather than using the Zone as an export base, the 
relaxation of customs policy has been manipulated by domestic investors to import 
foreign goods and raw materials. Their subsequent inability to export the manufactured 
goods had, therefore, caused a marked deficit in the current account of the balance of 
payments. Nonetheless, the successful case of Shekou indicates the tendency for, and the 
possibility of, Shenzhen developing into a sophisticated industrial zone with a marked 
dependence on exports. The social consequences represented other achievements. Due 
to the reforms in labour and management policies, real wages rose continuously and 
demands for social services were rapidly met. The living standards were therefore raised 
above the provincial level. The changes in management were, in fact, a kind of 
technological transfer. The viability of the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone as an 
industrialized base, however, has to be considered in the context of the export processing 
zone debate epitomized in the 1980 working paper of UNIDO and the pertinent chapters 
in The N ew  In ternational D iv ision  o f  Labour written by Frobel, Heinrichs, and Kreye 
in 1977.
S h en zh en  and th e  E x p o rt P r o c ess in g  Zone D eb a te
Similar to the situation of other zones, as described by Frobel and others, 
Shenzhen has not provided financial returns on investment in the Zone as yet. Going 
beyond Frobel and others, however, the Zone has exerted an adverse effect on the 
current account of the balance of payments. More management experience, however, 
would mitigate this adverse effect. Indeed, Shenzhen had only operated for five years by 
1984, whereas the more successful zones of Kaosiung in Taiwan and M asan in Korea had 
been run for eighteen and thirteen years respectively. Indeed, Shenzhen cannot be 
expected to mature within such a short period. After five years, Shenzhen had gained, 
or paved the way for, longer term achievements. These have been the strong linkages 
established with the domestic economy, the introduction and transfer of management 
skills, and the trend towards more sophisticated industrial production. The ensuing 
social consequences have been favourable. The improved living standards of the Zone s 
population and the rural sector in particular, contradicted Frobel and others' 
contentions tha t  workers could not meet their daily needs and the rural population 
suffered from the construction of an export processing zone in its region. On the 
contrary, the economic and social conditions of Shenzhen s population matched the
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description of UNIDO. Further, the Organization has stressed tha t  the adoption of a 
general outward-looking policy is essential to the success of the zones. Hence, China’s 
continual pursuit of its ‘open door' policy, and specifically, the opening of fourteen 
coastal cities and Hainan Island, should provide a more conducive environment for 
Shenzhen. If the Chinese Government has to fashion Shenzhen into a successful avenue 
because of the Zone's political and experimental significance, it has to commit itself to 
reducing domestic investment to an appropriate  level and controlling its form of 
operation, tightening the restrictions on imports of raw materials and goods, and 
exporting the products produced by domestic firms. When these objectives have been 
achieved, it will then be possible for China to recoup its capital investment in the Zone. 
Fu r the r ,  when the multiplier effects take full force, Shenzhen will be able to send skilled 
and semi-skilled human resources to other parts  of the country. If these goals are 
achieved, Shenzhen would be seen as an effective development strategy.
SH ENZH EN AND C H IN A ’S U R BA N IZATIO N  
A N D  ECONOM IC POLICIES
As the Special Economic Zones, particularly Shenzhen, bear the national goals of 
propelling China towards modernization, it is im portant to evaluate their performance 
and potential in the context of China's modernization policies. As canvassed in Chapter 
1, the creation of Special Economic Zones was an outcome of the revived economic policy 
based on foreign investment and high technology. In particular, the creation of the 
Shenzhen Special Economic Zone, a de facto  international city located in the coastal 
region, was a product of the current urbanization policy which emphasized a ‘shift-back 
to the cities and coast’. Hence, the performance of Shenzhen has to be appraised in the 
light of the urban and economic roles entrusted  to it. Before the function of Shenzhen 
can be examined against the new economic policy, it is necessary to analyse its 
contribution to urbanization.
Shenzhen and the ‘N ew ’ Urbanization Policy
As discussed in C hapter 1, coastal cities - and Shenzhen in particular - were 
expected to establish international relations, to import foreign capital, and to absorb 
foreign technology. Further, the establishment of Shenzhen exemplified the dominance 
of the camp th a t  emphasizes the construction of medium and large cities as the 
precondition for generating a spatially-integrated urban pa tte rn  and an overall reduction 
of rural-urban divergence. Hence, apart from its general commercial service to the 
hinterland as a city, Shenzhen should also generate ‘growth pole' impacts into the 
interior. This raises the critical question: does this strategy contrast China’s urban
policy of creating ‘productive’ (as compared to consuming) cities? In resolving this
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question, a ttention is focused on Shenzhen’s international relations; its ‘growth pole’ 
effects; and its industrial characteristics.
In tern a t io n a l  re la tion s. As a result of the ‘open door’ economic policy, the 
cities, especially the coastal ones, have been urged to expand international relations. 
This mission is obvious in Shenzhen’s case. In fact, the choice of Shenzhen was mainly 
based on its connections with the overseas Chinese. Indeed, foreign investment in the 
Zone has largely stemmed from Hong Kong. Nevertheless, the electronics and textile 
industries of Hong Kong are mainly labour-intensive production. High technology was 
not obtainable through the Hong Kong connection. Managerial skills, however, have 
filtered to the Zone from Hong Kong - an economy which rewards economic efficiency. 
Access to, and knowledge of. international markets were also obtainable by the Chinese 
through the operation of joint ventures. Thus, Shenzhen’s international connections 
were largely established through the ties with its neighbour, the metropolitan city of 
Hong Kong. In contrast, the ‘growth pole’ effects of Shenzhen have been more 
diversified.
G r o w th  pole effects. The growth pole effects of Shenzhen can be broadly 
divided into three categories - production technology, managerial skills and financial 
support. Due to the low technological level of production in Shenzhen, technological 
transfer was still premature. Nevertheless, as noted, some preconditions for importing 
higher technology have been realized. Indeed, the transfer has been effected in Shekou 
owing to the dominant practice of joint ventures.
The transfer of management skills was more substantial. As noted, wage reforms, 
rural reforms, and management reforms in construction had all produced positive effects 
in Shenzhen. Their success can certainly be copied, though the reforms may have to be 
modified before being transplanted elsewhere. Indeed, it has been reported tha t  the 
filtering of management skills to the interior has occurred (Liu and Liang, 1985). Thus, 
the transfer of management skills to other parts of the country was reportedly one of the 
most immediate effects of the establishment of Shenzhen.
In great contrast, no financial support could be directly generated by the Zone to 
facilitate the development of other regions. In fact, it has drawn capital from the 
Central Government, the state  banks, and various s ta te  enterprises to finance 
infrastructural construction. A total sum of Rmb 5,802,020,000 had been invested in the 
Zone. The slow accrual of profits by the Zone authority reduced the returns on capital. 
This capital represented a high opportunity cost to the potential development of other 
regions in China. As well, Shenzhen was granted the privilege of retaining all revenue 
until 1985 to assist its operation. Until then, the state  would not have been able to 
benefit financially from the Zone. However, indirect means of creating profit for other
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regions has occurred. As the Zone was also opened for domestic investment, domestic 
enterprises were able to make profits through their operation in the Zone. Reportedly, a 
total profit of Rmb 70,000.000 was derived in 1984. As yet, the greatest achievement of 
Shenzhen lies in its ability to develop industry as the main sector at the end of 1984.
A n in d u str ia l c ity . As the experiment of Shenzhen exemplifies China's new 
urbanization policy, it is necessary to ascertain whether the city has been planned and 
developed in a manner conforming with C hina’s overall emphases on establishing 
'p roductive’ cities. As noted, Shenzhen was planned to be ‘productive’ by being 
developed into a major industrialized city. Commercial activities, however, flourished 
quickly because of the relaxed import policy and the need of the local government to 
accum ulate the necessary development capital through trading. Hence in the initial four 
years of development (1979-1983), commercial activities, both in terms of transaction 
value and employment, have dominated the economy. By 1984, however, industrial 
ou tpu t matched the value of commercial transactions, and industrial employment 
dom inated the workforce. Thus, Shenzhen can be considered a ‘productive’ city, on 
present evidence.
Further, Shenzhen was successful in reducing the rural-urban difference within the 
Zone. In fact, rural reforms were so successful tha t  between 1979 and 1983, peasants 
constitu ted  the highest income group in Shenzhen. Rural activities in Shenzhen were 
also commercialized and industrialized, producing a rural living standard comparable to, 
and in places higher than, the urban sector. Shenzhen, therefore, will not jeopardize the 
overall emphasis of C hina’s urbanization policy in the long run. Having examined the 
present and potential roles played by Shenzhen in China’s urbanization, we can proceed 
to investigate the function of Shenzhen in the broader economic scene.
S h en zh en  and  E con om ic  P o lic y
The economic policies which are related to the Shenzhen experiment can be 
classified into two groups: those pertinent to foreign economic policies - international
trade, acquisition of foreign technology and foreign investment; and those relating to the 
domestic economic policies inherent in its test-ground function - wage policy and 
agricultural policy. The creation of the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone can be 
regarded as a concentration of efforts over a geographical locality to pursue the desired 
goals pertinent to these specified policies. As Shenzhen's main emphasis has been placed 
on external economic relations, its contribution to foreign economic policy will be 
evaluated ahead of the domestic economic policies.
F o re ig n  econ om ic  p o lic ies . An im portan t component of the post-1976 foreign 
economic policy was the opening of China to international trade. Although imports
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were limited to those needed by the country, a commensurate expansion of exports was 
necessary to earn foreign exchange to pay for them. Hence, export bases, including the 
Special Economic Zones, were set up to m anufacture goods for sale in the overseas 
m arket. Shenzhen did not achieve this goal. While the small-scale export of local goods 
was negligible in the national context, the massive inflow of foreign goods has accounted 
for 3.3 per cent and 3.6 per cent of the country’s imports in 1983 and 1984 respectively. 
The opening of the internal market, the relaxation of customs policy, and the retention 
of a portion of profits in foreign exchange by indigenous enterprises, though perceived as 
a necessary stra tegy to entice initial foreign investment and technology, has nevertheless 
fostered massive imports. However, the loss of foreign earnings and exchange has been 
staggering. As economic crimes were ram pant, official deficits represented but a 
proportion of the foreign exchange lost through Shenzhen (The N in e tie s , December 
1985:55-7). Although the great loss (estimated to be between US$4,000,000,000 to 
US$6,500,000,000) in the national foreign exchange reserve in late 1984 and early 1985 
was mainly due to the shortfalls of C hina’s general foreign exchange policy, it has been 
alleged th a t  a major proportion of the loss was fostered by the illegal or semi-illegal 
trade transactions in Shenzhen (The N in e tie s , July 1985). Hence, in contradiction to 
the objective of improving the national balance of payments, Shenzhen had greatly 
undermined it. Although this may be regarded as a ‘teething problem’, it calls for a 
serious tightening of administrative and commercial policies. Indeed, in the long term, 
the Shenzhen Government has to decide on the extent to which the internal market 
should be opened to lure investment - foreign as well as domestic - and enhance the 
Zone's forward linkages with the domestic market. In other words, the ‘international 
c ity’ function of Shenzhen - trading and a ttrac ting  capital - has to be prudently 
implemented. The growth pole effects achieved through the Zone’s strong linkage with 
the host economy have also to be weighed against the degree of foreign-orientation tha t  
is desired by the state .
The filtering of foreign technology by Shenzhen was most successful in the 
transferring of m anagement skills. Thus, Shenzhen has been fulflling its role as a 
test-ground. And yet, management is only one form of ‘technology’ tha t  the Chinese 
Government desires to acquire through Shenzhen. The introduction of other forms of 
foreign technology (e.g. sophisticated industrial production) has been minimal. 
Although Shenzhen had been able to lay the conditions for future absorption of 
industrial production of a higher technology content, Hong Kong investment will have to 
be replaced by another source to realize this goal. In terms of quantity , progress in the 
absorption of foreign investment was also far from meeting the target set for the year 
2000. In the national context, foreign investment expended in the Zone only occupied 3 
per cent of the to ta l volume of foreign capital channelled into the country between 1979
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and 1984. A portion of this capital might still have been committed to the country even 
if the Zone was not created. Nonetheless. Shenzhen’s share in the country’s foreign 
capital imports has expanded from 6 per cent in 1983 to 8 per cent in 1984 ( 1985 
A lm anac  o f  C h in a 's  Foreign Econom ic Relations and Trade: 1066; Shenzhen  Special 
Econom ic Zone Yearbook 1985:599). The dominant practice of joint ventures and
co-operative production arrangements has also facilitated the acquisition of technology 
a t  the lowest import costs and minimum use of foreign exchange.
D o m e stic  econ om ic p o lic ies . Domestically, Shenzhen was able to introduce 
more positive effects upon the country. As noted, the most advanced wage reforms were 
practised in all enterprises and institutions (including Communist Party  Organizations). 
The effectiveness of these policies, as exemplified by the efficient construction of social 
facilities, had testified to the importance of performance-oriented management for 
productivity. As well, the ‘Shekou model’ has demonstrated the importance of efficient 
m anagem ent in economic development. Also, the successful introduction of commercial 
and industrial activities and the diversification and specialization of farming activities 
had confirmed the direction of agricultural reforms recently undertaken by the country. 
Nevertheless, similar to the rest of the country, these reforms have engendered 
socio-economic polarization. This occurrence points to the loss of some of the socialist 
tenets (such as egalitarianism and the pursuit of a classless society), at least 
temporarily. The change, though undesirable, is an inevitable consequence of
introducing an incentive-oriented management strategy.
R E S U M E
This C hap ter  has a ttem pted  to evaluate the contribution of the Shenzhen Special 
Economic Zone to China's current drive for modernization. The assessment, owing to 
the recency of its inception, has focused on the viability of Shenzhen as an export 
processing zone to induce industrialization. Nevertheless, a preliminary report has been 
made to estim ate  its performance as a large coastal city and its contribution to the 
current economic endeavour as an externally-oriented city.
Shenzhen’s potential to induce industrialization has been ascertained, through an 
examination of its major similarities and dissimilarities with other export processing 
zones, and the interpretation of its development in the context of the export processing 
zone experience. Although Shenzhen has not made a financial return to the country’s 
investment in the Zone and it had strained the national reserve of foreign exchange, the 
inexperience of Shenzhen’s adm inistration and the short span of operation have to be 
considered. Indeed, Shenzhen had gained, or prepared for, longer-term achievements, 
which are most evident in its strong domestic linkages and the emphasis and priority
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given to education and skilled labourers. Given the country 's continuing adherence to 
the 'open door' policy, the Zone's potentials are reinforced. Further, its pacesetter, the 
Shekou Industrial Zone has moved onto more sophisticated production. Socially,
Shenzhen has had positive effects on the population's well-being. Nonetheless, judging 
from the immense amounts of capital and manpower invested in the Zone by the state  
and the loss of foreign exchange through the Zone, the achievements of Shenzhen have 
been expensive. As yet, the Zone has not been able to facilitate China’s rapid 
modernization.
Nevertheless, some positive ‘growth pole' effects have occurred, the most notable 
being the transfer of management skills. Also, Shenzhen’s role as an international city 
has provided a venue for the interaction between domestic and foreign investors. Strong 
ties have been developed with Hong Kong. These ties, though inevitable and convenient 
during this initial stage, have impeded the development of the Zone’s connections with 
the technologically more advanced countries. Despite the novel nature of the Shenzhen 
experiment, the city has still complied with the country’s general urbanization policy of 
constructing a ‘productive’ city and reducing urban-rural differences.
Ultim ately, the Zone's major contribution to C hina’s current economic endeavour 
had been as a test-bed for observing, learning and testing foreign management strategies, 
and Filtering the experience to the rest of the country. These management skills have 
been most applicable to the country’s agricultural and labour policies. Yet, the amount of 
foreign investment imported to the Zone was insignificant. The transfer of production 
technology and the creation of foreign earnings through expanded international trade 
were also to be realized. With a strong commitment to curbing illegal commercial 
activities, a continuance of the high technology and expertise-oriented bias, and an 
appropriate  regulation of imports and exports, Shenzhen should be able to succeed as an 
effective measure to induce industrialization in China.
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C O N C L U SIO N
Shenzhen has been transformed from a desolate border town to a new modern 
city. It has established an investment environment of a particular standard; it 
has explored the ways for opening China to the outside world! and paved the 
way for; reforms (Liu Guoguang, R enm in  Ribao , 12 August 1985).
This study has evaluated the economic performance and social conditions of 
Shenzhen. While Shenzhen’s contribution to date has been minimal and negative, this 
study has shown tha t  it has the potential in the longer term to induce industrialization 
in China. Although the objectives of the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone, both stated 
and unstated , are rooted in C hina’s development history, its performance and potential 
have to be interpreted with reference to similar global phenomena - the export 
processing zones. Before examining the contribution of this thesis to the special 
economic zone debate, the achievements of Shenzhen in fulfilling its short-term and 
long-term goals have to be summarized.
S h o rt-term  goals. Shenzhen's prime aim of developing industry as the main 
economic sector had been met by 1984. The level of production, however, fell short of 
the ambitious goal of developing a manufacturing base that used high technology. Also, 
an externally-oriented economy has yet to be established in Shenzhen. Most products 
from foreign-related firms are exported. The high import and low export content of 
their domestic counterparts, however, has produced massive trade deficits. Overseas 
investment has only contributed to one-fifth of total development capital, and 12 per 
cent of zonal employment. Investment in the Zone by the Chinese Government has been 
unprofitable. Nevertheless, social conditions have been improved. Real incomes have 
soared and demands for social services has been met with unaccustomed speed. Indeed, 
the provision of social services have reached an enviable s tandard  in Shenzhen. \ e t ,  
socio-economic polarization has been engendered.
The low level of technology in Shenzhen’s industry echoed that of the 
assembly-lines in other export processing zones. Shenzhen’s inability to develop an 
externally-induced economy comparable to tha t  of other zones has been attr ibu ted  to its 
short life and stress given to domestic investment. Only the export performance of the 
foreign sector resembled th a t  of other zones. Government investment in the Zone has
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not been recuperated - a failure also a ttr ibu ted  to the Zone's short life-span. 
Nevertheless, an improvement in living standards was a recurrent feature of most export 
processing zones. Thus, the difference between Shenzhen and its overseas counterparts  
stem med primarily from the recency of its inception. A secondary factor, however, has 
been the dominance of domestic investment which did little to boost exports - the Zone, 
therefore, fell short of being fully-integrated into the world economy.
L o n g -term  goals. The long-term transfer of technology to the rest of the country 
has been limited to the transmission of management skills. Indeed, the twin objectives 
of simultaneously importing foreign capital and technology to help modernize the 
country were far from realization. Nevertheless, Shenzhen's function as a test-ground for 
observing, learning and experimenting with hybrid economic measures have been 
fulfilled. Also, conditions have been established for longer-term achievements, as 
evidenced in the strong domestic linkages, the emphasis and priority given to upgrading 
the labour force, and the adoption of a general outward-looking policy by China. 
Indeed, the successful case of Shekou has provided a model to show how Shenzhen as a 
whole could enhance industrial development in China.
C o n tr ib u tio n  to the sp ec ia l econ om ic  zone d eb ate . This study has broken 
new ground by assessing the development of Shenzhen within the context of the general 
export processing zone phenomena. As highlighted by the opponents of Special 
Economic Zones, the Shenzhen experiment has been costly. This judgem ent, however, 
may be prem ature as a five year time-span is too short to weigh up the costs and 
benefits of the special economic zone policy. Rather than making hasty judgem ents on 
the pros and cons of Shenzhen, it is more pertinent to gauge its s truc ture  and 
performance against similar development elsewhere. Arguments derived by the Zone’s 
proponents th a t  some initial achievements have been generated by Shenzhen are, 
therefore, insufficient. Hence, this study has gone further to include the export 
processing zone experience and demonstrated tha t  it will provide a springboard for 
future industrial development. This study has also examined the oft-neglected social 
impacts in some detail by directing a tten tion  to the Zone's undeniable achievements in 
improving the ‘well-being’ of the people - the ultimate goal of socialist modernization.
This study, however, has left some tasks unfulfilled. At best, it is a prem ature 
assessment of Shenzhen and the special economic zone policy. Hence, a continuing 
research program is required to monitor the Zone’s progress towards meeting the 
short-term  and long-term goals. Before gauging the Zone’s longer term impacts on 
China, we will have to wait until it becomes fully mature. Meanwhile, in-depth studies 
on specific aspects of the Zone need to be undertaken. These could investigate the 
influence of domestic demands for imported consumer goods on Shenzhen’s trade, the
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impact of the coun try ’s foreign exchange control on the Zone’s price and trade policies, 
the evolution of its industrial policies, changing work ethics and life style of local 
residents, and the comparative advantages of Shenzhen to other large coastal cities. 
Thus, this thesis is merely an initial assessment of a policy that promises to change the 
industrial and urban face of China.
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Appendix I
R E G U L A T IO N S  ON SPECIAL ECO NO M IC ZONES  
IN G U A N G D O N G  P R O V IN C E
C h a p te r  I - G en era l P r in c ip le s
A r t ic le  1 . Certain areas are delineated from the three cities of Shenzhen. Zhuhai 
and Shantou in Guangdong Province to form Special Economic Zones (hereinafter 
referred to as Special Zones) in order to develop external economic cooperation and 
technical exchanges and promote the socialist modernization program. In the Special 
Zones, foreign citizens, overseas Chinese, compatriots in Hong Kong and Macao and 
their companies and enterprises (hereinafter referred to as investors) are encouraged to 
open factories or set up enterprises and other establishments with their own investment 
or undertake joint ventures with Chinese investment, and their assets, due profits and 
other legitimate rights and interests are legally protected.
A r t ic le  2. Enterprises and individuals in the Special Zones must abide by the 
laws, decrees and related regulations of the People's Republic of China. Where there are 
specific provisions contained in the present regulations, they have to be observed as 
stipulated herewith.
A r t ic le  3. A Guangdong Provincial Administration of Special Economic Zones is 
set up to exercise unified management of the Special Zones on behalf of the Guangdong 
Provincial People’s Government.
A rtic le  4. In the Special Zones, investors are offered a wide scope of operation, 
favourable conditions for such operation are created, and stable business sites are 
guaranteed. All items of industry, agriculture, livestock breeding, fish breeding and 
poultry farming, tourism, housing and construction, research and manufacture involving 
high technologies and techniques tha t  have positive significance in international 
economic cooperation and technical exchanges, as well as other trades of common 
interest to investors and the Chinese side, can be established with foreign investment or 
in jo in t venture with Chinese investment.
A r t ic le  5. Land-levelling projects and various public utilities in the Special Zones 
such as water supply, drainage, power supply, roads, wharves, communications and 
warehouses, are undertaken by the Guangdong Provincial Administration of Special
208
Economic Zones. When necessary, foreign capital participation in their development can 
be considered.
A rtic le  6. Specialists at home and abroad and personages who are enthusiastic 
about C hina’s modernization program will be invited by each of the Special Zones to 
form an advisory board as a consultative body for the Special Zone.
C h a p ter  II - R e g is tr a tio n  and O peration
A r tic le  7. Investors wishing to open factories or take up various economic 
undertakings with investment should apply to the Guangdong Provincial Administration 
of the Special Economic Zones, and will be issued licenses of registry and use of land 
after examination and approval.
A r tic le  8. Investors can open accounts and deal with m atters  related to foreign 
exchange in the Bank of China in the Special Zones or other banks set up in the Special 
Zones with C hina’s approval.
Investors can apply for insurance policies at the People’s Insurance Company of 
China in the Special Zones and other insurance companies set up in the Special Zones 
with C h ina’s approval.
A r tic le  9. Products of the enterprises in the Special Zones are to be sold on the 
international market. If an enterprise wants to sell its products in the domestic market 
in China, it must have the approval of the Guangdong Provincial Administration of 
Special Economic Zones and pay customs duties.
A r tic le  10. Investors can operate their enterprises independently in the Special 
Zones and employ foreign personnel for technical and administrative work.
A r tic le  11. If investors want to term inate  their business in the Special Zones, 
they should submit the reasons for their termination to the Guangdong Provincial 
Administration of Special Economic Zones, go through related procedures and clear the 
debts. The assets of the closed enterprises can be transferred and the funds can be 
remitted out of China.
C h a p ter  III - P re feren tia l T rea tm en t
A r tic le  12. The land in the Special Zones remains the property of the People’s 
Republic of China. Land to be used by investors will be provided according to the 
actual needs, and the length of tenure, rent and method of payment will be given 
favourable consideration according to the different trades and uses. Concrete methods 
will be specified separately.
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A rtic le  13. Machinery, spare parts, raw materials, vehicles and other means of 
production for the enterprises in the Special Zones are exempted from import duties. 
The necessary consumer goods shall be subjected to full or lower import duties or 
exempted, depending on the merits of each case. Imports of the above-mentioned goods 
and exports of products of the Special Zones must go through existing customs 
procedures.
A rtic le  14. The rate  of income tax levied on the enterprises in the Special Zones 
is to be 15 per cent. Special preferential trea tm ent will be given to enterprises 
established within two years of the promulgation of these regulations, enterprises with 
an investment of US$5 million or more, and enterprises involving higher technologies or 
having a longer cycle of capital turnover.
A rtic le  15. Legitimate after-tax profits of the investors, salaries and other proper 
earnings after paying personal income tax of the foreign, overseas Chinese and Hong 
Kong and Macao workers and staff members of the enterprises in the Special Zones can 
be remitted out of China through the Bank of China or other banks in the Special Zones 
in line with the Zone’s foreign exchange control measures.
A rtic le  16. Investors who reinvest their profits in the Special Zones for five years 
and longer may apply for exemption of income tax on profits from such reinvestment.
A rtic le  17. Enterprises in the Special Zones are encouraged to use China-made 
machinery, raw materials and other goods. Preferential prices will be offered on the 
basis of the export prices of China's similar commodities and settled in foreign exchange. 
These products and materials can be shipped direct to the Special Zones with the 
vouchers of the selling units.
A rtic le  18. Entry and exit procedures will be simplified and convenience offered 
to the foreigners, overseas Chinese and compatriots in Hong Kong and Macao going in 
and out of the Special Zones.
C h a p ter  IV  - L abour M a n a g em en t
A rtic le  19. Labour service companies are to be set up in each of the Special 
Zones. Chinese staff members and workers to be employed by enterprises in the Special 
Zones are to be recommended by the local labour service companies or recruited by the 
investors with the consent of the Guangdong Provincial Administration of Special 
Economic Zones. Enterprises can test them before employment and sign labour 
contracts with them.
A r tic le  20. The employees of the enterprises in the Special Zones are to be 
managed by the enterprises according to their business requirements, and if necessary, 
can be dismissed in line with the provisions of the labour contracts.
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Employees of the enterprises in the Special Zones can submit resignation to their 
enterprises according to the provisions of the labour contracts.
A rtic le  21. Scales and forms of the wages, award methods, labour insurance and 
various state  subsidies of the Chinese staff members and workers in the enterprises are 
to be included in the contracts signed between the enterprises and the employees in 
accordance with the stipulations of the Guangdong Provincial Administration of Special 
Economic Zones in Guangdong Province.
A rtic le  22. Enterprises in the Special Zones should have the necessary measures 
for labour protection to ensure tha t  the staff members and workers work in safe and 
hygienic conditions.
C h ap ter  V  - A d m in istr a tio n
A rtic le  23. The Guangdong Provincial Administration of the Special Economic 
Zones exercises the following functions:
1. Draw up development plans for the Special Zones and organize for their 
implementation.
2. Examine and approve investment projects of investors in the Special Zones.
3. Deal with the registration of industrial and commercial enterprises in the 
Special Zones and with land allotment.
4. Coordinate the working relations among the banking, insurance, taxation, 
customs, frontier inspection, postal and telecommunications and other organizations in 
the Special Zones.
5. Provide staff members and workers needed by the enterprises in the Special 
Zones and protect the legitimate rights and interests of these staff members and workers.
6. Run education, cultural, health and other public welfare facilities in the Special 
Zones.
7. Maintain law and order in the Special Zones and protect according to law the 
persons and properties in the Special Zones from encroachment.
A rtic le  24. The Shenzhen Special Zone is under the direct jurisdiction of the 
Guangdong Provincial Adm inistration of Special Economic Zones. Necessary agencies 
are to be set up in the Zhuhai and Shantou Special Zones.
A rtic le  25. A Guangdong Provincial Special Economic Zones Development 
Company is to be set up to cope with the economic activities in the Special Zones. Its 
scope of business includes fund-raising and trust investment, operating enterprises or
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jo in t ventures with investors in the Special Zones, acting as agents for the investors in 
the Special Zones in m atters  related to sales and purchases with other parts of China 
outside the Special Zones, and providing services for business talks.
C h a p te r  V I - A p p en d ix
A r tic le  26. These regulations shall be enforced after their adoption by the 
G uangdong Provincial People’s Congress and after they have been submitted to and 
approved by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress of the People’s 
Republic of China.
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Appendix  II
A CRITICAL REVIEW  OF THE THREE S T R A N D S  
OF SPECIAL E C O N O M IC  ZONE L IT E R A TU R E
PR E L IM IN A R Y  STUDIES
As exemplified by Zheng Zhuyuan’s (1981) study of the future development and 
Wong Kwan Yiu’s (ed.) (1982) examination of the implication of the development of 
Shenzhen on China, Hong Kong and Shenzhen itself, some of these preliminary studies 
include initial analysis. This characteristic was also a feature of He Li’s (1982) 
consideration of development problems and Zhang Rongfeng’s (1983) study of the 
economic effects of the Zones on China now and in the future. Indeed, these preliminary 
studies exhibit many parallels but, as Table 3.1 shows, each makes a distinctive 
contribution to our understanding of the Zones.
Zheng’s (1981) study, for instance, was narrowly based on planning and 
development problems (Table 3.1). As the first study on the future of the Zones, it 
p inpointed differences between their economic systems and th a t  prevailing in other parts 
of China. Although the writer has succinctly outlined the characteristics and problems 
of the Zones during the experimental period, he left their future open-ended.
He’s (1982) paper, not only covered planning and development problems, but 
examined the nature  of the economy and administrative problems (Table 3.1). Although 
He provides a more detailed account of the formation of the Shenzhen Zone, the major 
emphasis was on its initial development problems. Five case studies are given to bring 
out the clumsy and complicated nature of the bureaucratic system. The author was also 
in a quandary about the ideological explanations of the development of the Zones offered 
by Chinese theorists.
The collective work of Wong and others (1982), Shenzhen Special Economic 
Zone: C h ina 's  E xperim en t in  M oderniza tion  was the most comprehensive study to
th a t  date. As shown in Table 3.1, the topics covered economic activities and economic 
relations and, for the first time, it discussed social conditions. This wide-ranging study 
of the Shenzhen Zone and its encompassing Municipality is divided into three parts: the 
first pa r t  summarizes the rationale of export processing zones and the Municipality’s 
geographical and historical setting; the second part documents and maps the plans,
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progress and problems of the main economic activities - agriculture, mining, 
manufacturing, real estate, transport, tourism and the economic relationships with Hong 
Kong; and part  three investigates the impacts of Shenzhen on the local region, China 
and Hong Kong. In striving for such a comprehensive picture, the book has sacrificed 
some in-depth discussion on such significant topics as the ideological support for the 
special economic zones policy, the risks confronting Shenzhen from being exposed to 
fluctuations in the international market place, and the implications of possible 
over-investment in real estate. The Zone’s needs for technological know-how and 
managerial skills and the importance of the Zone as a platform for discussing and testing 
new economic policies were also not examined.
L.T. Sigel’s (1983) more extensive coverage of the economy and a consideration of 
labour policy has compensated, however, for some of the omissions in the study of 
Shenzhen by Wong and others (see Table 3.1). In particular, Sigel draws attention to 
the im portan t  function of the Zones as pacesetters in C hina’s thrust towards 
modernization. His broader perspectives of the Shenzhen and Zhuhai experiments have 
ranged from C hina’s open door policy through general features and characteristics of the 
Zones to a comparison with other Asian zones. Sigel has a ttem pted  to identify the 
motives and methods of implementing the zone policy. Drawing attention to the 
successful case of Shekou, the various administrative and economic reforms planned or 
undertaken in the Zones are discerned. Having spanned a wide spectrum of issues, Sigel 
concludes th a t  the more tangible benefits of greater foreign investment, expanded foreign 
exchange and job creation are minor compared to their contribution to spearheading 
economic reforms. Nevertheless, Sigel’s study did suffer from the absence of a coherent 
theme.
Zhang Rongfeng’s (1983) monograph entitled ‘Zhonggong Jingji Tequ De Yanjiu’ 
Research on the Special Economic Zones of Chinai was, however, more coherent in its 
identification of the objectives and special features of the Zones, and its systematic 
assessment of the possible economic effects and likely future developments of the Zones. 
On the basis of the characteristics and features of the Zones, as well as the experience of 
other export processing zones, Zhang has argued tha t  the main contribution of the Zones 
will be found in increasing national income through direct channels and serving as a test 
ground for economic reforms. Forecasts on the future development of the Zones by 
Zhang are based on an examination of the investment environment of the Zones, an 
exploration of potential linkages and the possibilities of establishing backward linkages 
with the rest of China. This appraisal led Zhang to a number of conclusions: tha t  the 
Zones have failed to utilize their assets; tha t  among other economic sectors, tourism and 
light industry possess relatively better markets; and tha t  backward linkages will be
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difficult to establish. Thus, Zhang's monograph has offered a strategic study based on 
preliminary analysis of the economic features and organization of the Zones.
Collectively, these five descriptive studies have documented major events, detailed 
plans and progress, and outlined early development problems. These studies did not 
venture beyond preliminary analysis. As the development of the Zones have proceeded 
apace, these initial analyses have become quickly dated and out of touch with current 
developments. For example, the problems of establishing backward linkages highlighted 
by Zhang (1983) have been overcome through the Governm ent’s deliberate policy of 
forging linkages between the Zones and the domestic economy.
There was no unanimity among the writers over the development of the Special 
Economic Zones. Wong (ed.) (1982:106) has optimistically remarked tha t  ‘the Shenzhen 
Special Economic Zones seems quite adequate in fulfilling the primary objectives of 
introducing modern technologies and allowing the Chinese leaders to observe and to 
understand how the economic systems under capitalistic management works*. In 
contras t,  Zhang (1983:90-2) viewed the future with apprehension. Another divergence of 
opinion focused on Hong Kong’s contribution to the Zones and Shenzhen in particular. 
Wong (1982) regarded the Hong Kong relationship as mutually beneficial. Conversely, 
Zhang (1983) argued tha t  the close proximity of Hong Kong to the Zones has 
strengthened their ‘foreign enclave’ s ta tus  by inhibiting backward linkages and copying 
its overheated investment environment (unnecessarily heightening wage levels). More 
contentious opinions are found in the strategic and theoretical studies.
STRATEG IC A N D  THEORETICAL STUDIES
Thirty-nine separate papers are considered. These include studies tha t  were part 
of two collaborative exercises: a monograph prepared by the Geography Department of 
the Zhongshan University in Guangzhou entitled J ing ji Tequ D ili W enji (Collected 
Work on the Special Economic Zones) published in 1981, and a compiled resume of 113 
Chinese writings on thirteen special economic zones issues compiled by the Guangdong 
Research Centre of Special Economic Zones (GRCSEZ), published in the Yearbook o f  
C h in a 's  Special Econom ic Zones 1983. Before discussing the material on specific issues, 
the m aterial covering the broader topics is reviewed.
General Studies
As shown in Table 3.2, there have been fifteen studies on general planning and 
development problems of the Special Economic Zones. These studies can be further 
subdivided into two groups: (a) those examining the problems and factors of
development confronting the Special Economic Zones; and (b) those discussing the 
strategic planning of the Zones.
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D e v e lo p m e n t  p rob lem s. Initial development problems have been the topic of 
papers by Wong Kwan Yiu (1981, 1982), Zeng Muve (1982), He Jiasheng (1984a) and 
the reviewed article of Guangdong Research Centre of Special Economic Zones (1982b). 
O ther pertinent studies have focused their attention on two major aspects of 
development: (a) economic structure and (b) legislation. Papers reviewed by the
Guangdong Research Centre of Special Economic Zones have made a particular 
contribution to these two topics.
(a) Economic structure. There are two basic foci in the academic opinions on the 
economic s tructure  gathered by the Guangdong Research Centre of Special Economic 
Zones: the first has concentrated on the ownership of the means of production in terms 
of sources of investment; and the second has pinpointed the structure of productive 
forces and has been particularly concerned with the level of technology. There was 
general agreement th a t  capital should be derived from foreign sources. Zeng Muye and 
Li Kegang (GRCSEZ, 1982e) have favoured joint ventures but Guan Qixue advocates 
cooperative production (GRCSEZ, 1982e) and Lu Zhuosen (GRCSEZ, 1982e) has argued 
for sole proprietorship. Similarly, diverse views have been expressed on whether 
industry should be capital-intensive or labour-intensive. Liang Zhisen (GRCSEZ, 1982e) 
has argued th a t  the former should be the long-term aim but the latter should be 
welcomed in the short term. It has been generally agreed tha t  there should be no 
restrictions on economic activities. Although light industry should be the prime activity 
and agriculture should concentrate on fresh produce, commerce, property development 
and tourism should also be encouraged. Concerning the policy of economic planning, the 
most popular opinion is th a t  the State will control overall planning (i.e. land use 
planning, industrial allocation and bank credit) in keeping with socialist tenets, but 
market prices should determine the operation of these activities at the micro level 
(GRCSEZ, 1982c). A transitional period in switching from a s ta te  planning economy to 
a market economy is envisaged. Both state  and foreign enterprises, however, should be 
subject to Government planning targets.
(b) Legislation. The legislation underpinning the economic structure of the Zones 
has been discussed by Wang Zhiyuan (1981, 1982), Chu Kim Yu (1983b), Li Xueling and 
others (GRCSEZ, 1982d). While Wang has stressed the importance of a sound legal 
system and expounded theoretically on the principle of legislation, Chu has made a 
preliminary assessment of the legal system under construction in Shenzhen. The 
reviewed articles of the Guangdong Research Centre of Special Economic Zones have 
canvassed the same issues, emphasizing the need, urgency and principles of establishing 
strong systems of legislation, judiciary and arbitration.
S tr a te g ic  p la n n in g . There are five key studies on strategic planning by Zheng
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Weiming (1982), Lam Kin Che (1983a), Kwok Yin Wang (1983), Sit fung Shuen (1981) 
and Yan Zexian (1982). Zheng has disclosed the tentative Master Outline Plan, and 
Lam has severely criticized it. Sit has stressed the high demand for land in Hong Kong 
and Yan has discussed the direction of development. The major research on this topic, 
however, is th a t  undertaken by Kwok.
In analysing the economic and social impacts of the development of Shenzhen, 
Kwok (1983) has addressed the problems of strategic planning. He has pointed out that 
the special features of Shenzhen’s economy - a mixed economy and heavy reliance on 
foreign investment - must, of necessity, dominate the strategies undertaken. 
Accordingly, a short-term, open-ended planning approach is recommended with phases 
based on the volume of public and private investment available. After scrutinizing the 
social and spatial characteristics of Shenzhen, Kwok has suggested th a t  social 
investment will also be high. In particular, t ransport has been accorded a pivotal role in 
both economic and social development because of Shenzhen’s position as a border transit 
point for people and goods. According to Kwok, Shenzhen’s u ltim ate  success will hinge 
on the quality of co-ordination between private and public sectors and different sections 
of the bureaucracy, the clarification of guidelines and controls prior to the adoption of 
the M aster Outline Plan, and constant modification and feedback.
S p ecific  S tu d ies
As showm in Table 3.3, there have been more than twenty studies of individual 
policies or activities. Rather than  a ttem p t to consider each study in turn they are 
grouped into those concerned with public finance, particular sectors of the economy, 
economic relations with other parts  of China and Hong. Kong, and social topics.
P u b lic  fin an ce . The introduction of Special Economic Zones has created a series 
of novel issues of public finance in communist China. These m atters  are conveniently 
grouped together in terms of taxation, land use fees, or currency.
(a) Taxation. Only studies by Zhou Weiping and Li Haifeng (GRCSEZ, 1982h) 
have canvassed this im portant and controversial topic. Both authors have investigated 
the nature  and function of taxation in the Zones. Zhou, however, has gone further and 
examined ways of expanding government revenue and maximizing capital distribution. 
He has also commented on the Central G overnm ent’s financial policy on the Zones, and 
advised on the formulation of taxation  policies.
(b) Land use fees. The need to introduce land use charges has been a novel issue 
in communist China. It has a ttrac ted  the a tten tion  of theoreticians such as Zhou 
Weiping, Huang Jiaju and Huangsun (GRCSEZ, 1982f) w-ho have tried to explain and
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determine the rate of fees from Marxist principles of ’land ren t’. Their conclusion was 
tha t  land use charges were an economic realization of land rights. Hence, absolute and 
relative differences were expected to exist in the Special Economic Zones. The debate as 
to whether the source of land use fees is single, arising from surplus labour of the Special 
Economic Zones, or multiple, taking into account the surplus value of Hong Kong and 
Macao, is still unresolved.
(c) Currency. Another controversial issue has revolved around the issue of the 
currency of the Special Economic Zones. Lin Hongqian and Liu Runhua (1984) have 
offered the most comprehensive study by drawing attention to the problems of three 
currencies ciruclating concurrently in Shenzhen, and considering the pitfalls of 
designating one of them as the sole currency in the Zones. Yuan Shibang (1981) and 
Zhang Yuanyuan (1983) have advocated a new currency for exclusive circulation in the 
Zones. Chu Kim Yu (1983c), however, has drawn attention to the problems of currency 
speculation if this suggestion is adopted. Conversely, Tang Huai (1981) has argued tha t  
China should not issue a special currency but should transform the Chinese Currency 
into an internationally convertible currency common throughout China. A further 
alternative proposed by Hu Mingli and Shi Biao (GRCSEZ, 1982g) suggests the creation 
of a Shenzhen Foreign Exchange Certificate to ease the present situation. Before these 
m atters  can be resolved there has been widespread argument tha t  the banking system 
will have to be reformed (i.e. the China People's Bank should be empowered to act as 
the ‘C en tra l’ Bank of the Special Economic Zones). There has also been the proposal by 
Yuan Shibang (GRCSEZ, 1982g) th a t  foreign banks should be allowed to set up 
branches in the Special Economic Zones. These decisions will have far reaching 
repercussions on individual sectors of the economy.
S ec to ra l s tu d ies . Attention has been focused on the agricultural, industrial and 
the tourist sectors. An examination has also been made by Zhang Kedong (1981b) of 
the Zhuhai Special Economic Zone but this study of the p o r t’s economic potential is not 
pursued here.
(a) Agriculture. The direction and potential of agricultural development have 
been explored by Zheng Tianxiang and Wei Qingquan (1981) and Lei Qiang (1982). All 
authors have contended th a t  since the Zones are close to overseas markets, they should 
concentrate on producing fresh agricultural produce. Also they have stressed tha t  
agricultural policy should be decentralized and controls relaxed. In particular, Lei 
(1982) has emphasized tha t  both the use of domestic resources and advanced technology 
and foreign investment should be promoted. He has also reported tha t  the agricultural 
reforms already undertaken in the Zones have produced favourable results.
(b) Industry. Recommendations on the type of industry tha t  should be located in
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the Zones have been made by Wu Yongming and Ni Zhaoqiu (1981) and Wong Kwan 
Yiu (1983a). Wu and Ni have specified the types of industries tha t  should be 
encouraged in the Zone (e.g. electronics, textiles, oil refining) based on their survey of 
the geographical characteristics of the Zones, the nature of industries in export 
processing zones, and international market conditions. In contrast, Wong has been more 
concerned with the industrialization process. A three stage process of industrialization 
has been suggested together with recommended locations for different types of industry.
(c) Tourism. Studies of the tourist sector by Chen Qiaozhi, Zheng Yluye and Luo 
Fuqun (GRCSEZ, 1982k) and Wang Yanyu (1984) have focused on the determinants of 
development. Collectively, they have distilled a set of favourable conditions: natural
endowment, locational advantage, strong overseas kinship ties and outward orientation 
of the economy. Conversely, they have also recognized a series of deficiencies: lack of 
overall planning, lack of pre-feasibility research: over-investment in similar tourist 
facilities; and a disturbing ‘get-rich quick' a ttitude. Not surprisingly, a series of policies 
for resolving these difficulties were recommended. However, these suggestions, as well as 
those recommended for the above two sections, cannot be view'ed in isolation but must 
be considered with studies examining Shenzhen's economic relations with both her 
Chinese hinterland and Hong Kong.
E con om ic  re la tio n s. Three studies, by Liao Yan and others (1981), Lin Bin and 
others (1982) and Sun Zhongwei (1983) have discussed Shenzhen’s economic relations 
with its hinterland and Hong Kong. Liao and others have focused on the necessity of 
good communications between zonal and non-zonal areas of Guangdong to maximize the 
use of Guangzhou, the provincial city, and the Pearl River Delta on which Shenzhen and 
Zhuhai are located. More specifically, Lin and others have expounded theoretically on 
the advantage, principles, direction and forms of economic cooperation between Special 
Economic Zones and Guangzhou. In contrast, Sun has focused on Shenzhen’s 
relationship with Hong Kong which is expected to benefit the Hong Kong Government 
and investors rather than the people of China and Hong Kong - an outcome something 
less than  envisaged by their respective Governments.
S ocia l to p ic s . The limited range of topics investigated have been transport, wage 
reforms, employment opportunities, environmental issues and ‘spiritual civilization’. A 
transport  study by Zhang Kedong (1981a) has highlighted the need for studies of 
passenger and freight flows prior to large-scale urban construction. Wage reform has 
been deemed necessary by Zheng Deliang, Chen Suhui and others (GRCSEZ, 1982i) as 
uniformity in wage levels and absence of dismissals do not fit the requirements of the 
Special Economic Zones. Employment opportunities provided by the Special Economic 
Zones have been analysed by Wang Zhengxian (1981, 1982), who has concluded that
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they cannot be a panacea for China's employment problem. Adverse environmental 
effects of accelerated economic development on Shenzhen's environment have been 
considered by Lam Kin Che (1983c) and Hsu Sheng I (1983), particularly in relation to 
water and air pollution, and remedial measures proposed. Building a socialist spiritual 
civilization has been considered by theorists such as Zhang Keliang, Sun Ru (GRCSEZ, 
19821) to be as im portant as the construction of material civilization typified by 
Shenzhen.
R esu m e
The publication of a considerable number of prescriptive studies has been timely. 
As Special Economic Zones in China are in their infancy, there is the need for strategic 
studies to map out their future development. All th a t  this literature survey of strategic 
studies has a ttem pted  has been to provide brief insights into the debates over the 
principles involved in formulating zonal policy. There is still a need, however, for 
further empirical studies to assess the viability of recommendations and to formulate 
new recommendations. The theoretical derivation of policies alone does not suffice.
T O P IC A L  S T U D IE S
The bulk of this set of studies has been published as articles but there are two 
major edited collections: The Largest Special Econom ic Zone in  C h ina  - Shenzhen
(Chu Kim Yu, 1983) published in Hong Kong and Zhongguo Tequ J in g ji  The Economy 
of China's Special Economic Zones (Zhao Yuanhao and Chen Zhaobin, 1984) published 
in China. Rather than consider these studies as a whole they are divided into those 
examining economic issues and those studying social problems.
E con om ic  Issu es
N a tu r e  o f econ om y. There has been considerable theoretical debate about 
whether the economy should be socialist based on s ta te  and collective investment (Yu 
Guangyuan, 1983), s ta te  capitalist with a role for foreign enterprises, capitalist 
underpinned by foreign investment, or a hybrid based on a mix of external and internal 
influences (see GRCSEZ, 1982a). In a bid to resolve this theoretical issue, an empirical 
analysis by He Jiasheng (1984b) has sought to differentiate the Special Economic Zones 
from similar areas in capitalist countries, the Zones from the future Special 
Administrative Zones of Taiwan and Hong Kong, the Zones’ societal nature  from their 
economic organization, and the Zones and non-Zones in China. He concluded tha t  the 
Special Economic Zones were based on a mixed economy dominated by s ta te  capitalism 
and operated under the guidance of a socialist government.
220
M a n a g e m e n t. As shown in Table 3.4, there have been few studies of the Zones' 
m anagem ent in general, and economic, administrative and legal s tructure in particular. 
Most of these studies are very brief. Nevertheless, they provide im portant insights into 
the m anagem ent of Special Economic Zones.
(a) General. There has only been one study on the general management of the 
Zones. The jo in t article by Wong Kwan Yiu and Chu Kim Yu (1983) has a ttem pted to 
assess the investment environment of Shenzhen. The seven aspects reviewed range from 
the adm inis tra tive  system, development and enforcement of legislation, through the 
financial system, land policy and infrastructural provision, to labour and labour 
productivity, entrepreneurship and preferential trea tm ent. They concluded tha t  
investment risk in the Shenzhen Zone was still high.
(b) Economic structure. The most comprehensive study of economic management 
has been undertaken by He Jiasheng (1984c) but Chu Kim Yu (1983e) has also 
contributed. By examining the Zones’ management in foreign trade, taxation, and 
economic planning, and their financial commitment to the Central Government, He 
concluded th a t  the Zones enjoyed a high, though not full, degree of autonomy. At a 
micro scale, Chu has scrutinized the pricing of land in the Shenzhen Zone, and 
commented th a t  the principle of exchange value has been employed and the concept of 
‘differential land re n t ’ applied. Chu further remarked tha t  upon the completion of 
massive land development, the market will exert a greater effect on land pricing in 
Shenzhen.
(c) Legal structure. An analysis of the legal system in the Special Economic Zones 
is found in Jiang Zhenliang’s article (1983). A major part of the article is devoted to the 
delineation of the unique feature of the Zones. Nevertheless, J iang’s analysis also 
includes an examination of laws and ordinances governing the Zones. As the review was, 
at best, a preliminary analysis, further work is required on the legal structure governing 
the Special Economic Zones.
(d) Adm inistrative structure. Chu Kim Yu (1983a) has investigated administra­
tive changes in Shenzhen Zone. He has demonstrated tha t ,  before January 1982, the 
adm inistra tive structure  of the Zone was riddled with overlapping responsibilities. Since 
then, the adm inistrative structure  has been simplified ‘to a t t rac t  more overseas 
investors’ (Chu, 1983a:182).
P la n n in g  and  d ev e lo p m en t p rob lem s. Economic planning for Shenzhen has 
been discussed only by Chu Kim Yu (1983d). He points out th a t  the targets set for 
industrial and agricultural growth are extremely high although their achievement may 
not be impossible. He also criticizes the mere target-setting of the plan. The more
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popular topics of physical planning and development have been discussed by Yeh Gar 
On (1983), Lam Kin Che (1983b) and Wong Kwan Yiu (1983b,c). Yeh (1983) has 
considered land development in the Shenzhen Zone by detailing the M aster Outline Plan, 
the procedure of land development, and canvassing Shenzhen’s growth, factors of 
investment and the need to compromise between the planning standards of both China 
and Hong Kong. Lam (1983b), however, has discussed massive land development and 
justifies it in terms of the Leninist philosophy, the financial situation in China and the 
principles underlying the development of Shenzhen. In contrast, Wong (1983b. 1983c) 
has concentrated his attention on two development models: Shekou which has been
managed by the China M erchants Steam Navigation Company; and Chiwan which has 
been developed as a supply base for South China Sea oil exploration. It is anticipated by 
Wong tha t  these models will be incorporated into plans for other sections of the Zone. 
Shenzhen Old Town, however, will be redeveloped into a low density commercial and 
tourist centre with an 'oriental style’. He has also described the resettlement process of 
affected households.
E con om ic  a c tiv itie s . Studies of industry (Hu Youqing, 1984b), agriculture 
(Zhang Zhangcai and Hu Youqing), tourism (Wang Yanyu), property development 
(Zhen Qinfeng) and commerce (Zhang Zhangcai) have been incorporated in Zhao and 
Chen’s (1984) edited readings entitled Zhongguo Tequ J ingji  The Economy of C hina’s 
Special Economic Zonesj. All authors have discussed characteristics, trends, progress, 
strategies, problems and contribution of the particular sector to the Zones' overall 
development. Zhang’s (1984) analysis of commercial activities was an exception as he 
considered the transformation of the supply and management systems. Another special 
feature is Chen’s (1984) discussion of the policy of land use fees and commodification of 
housing in conjunction with property development. Other studies on agriculture and 
tourism have been undertaken by Lee Fong Mo Kwan (1983a, 1983b and 1983c). 
Although these studies provide interesting information, the interconnections between 
individual sectors have not been specified.
E x tern a l and in tern a l re la tio n s. Both external and internal relations have to 
be discussed in examining the Special Economic Zones. Those with Hong Kong are 
discussed before considering the degree of integration between zonal and non-zonal 
China.
(a) Relations with Hong Kong. Economic relations with Hong Kong have received 
some atten tion  in two semi-academic journals published in Hong Kong: Wide Angle and 
The Seventies  (now renamed as The N ineties) .  In Wide Angle , Chen Kun Yao (1983) 
has argued tha t  Shenzhen Special Economic Zone could be seen as a weapon to force 
Hong Kong to concentrate on capital-intensive industry. The slow progress of
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Shenzhen's development, however, has undermined this proposition. In The Seven ties , 
Liu Pui King (1982b) has compared Shenzhen's industrial environment with industrial 
estates in Hong Kong and concludes the former will become a strong competitor unless 
the colonial government improves its land policy and assistance to firms.
(b) Relations with China. A comprehensive account of the Special Economic 
Zones1 economic relations with China has been provided by Hu Youqing (1984a). After 
detailing the scale of the economic integration, Hu has outlined its purposes and 
significance. In particular, he has highlighted tha t  the integration was intended to 
increase the attractiveness of the Zones to foreign investors. In the process, the 
transmission of advanced technology to the interior would be enhanced. Also Hu has 
emphasized th a t  the initial results of integration had been favourable to both the Zones 
and the non-zonal area of China.
D e v e lo p m e n t s tr a te g ie s . Prediction of the future economic success of the policy 
of creating Special Economic Zones has been provided by Yuan Shibang (1979) and Sun 
Ru (1980). Both have a ttem pted  to justify the policy, drawing precedents from Lenin’s 
Concession Area Program introduced under the New Economic Policy (1921-29). They 
have argued th a t  socialist countries should and could make use of the material wealth, 
advanced technology and scientific management of the more developed capitalist 
economies to enhance their economies. In particular, Yuan has emphasized th a t  the 
policy of Special Economic Zones would not result in any loss in sovereignty and would 
ultimately provide the basis for breaking away from control and suppression exercised bv 
imperialist countries. This viewpoint has been challenged by Chossudovsky (1982). 
According to his analysis, the Zones1 policy has merely established extraterritorial rights 
for foreigners similar to those set up after the Opium War (1839-42). At best, the Zones 
have encouraged an ‘overflow1 of small scale manufacturing firms from Hong Kong. As a 
result, the Zones are likely to have a backwash effect on the economic development of 
the interior as the enclaves have prevented forward and backward linkages being 
generated. Even the much anticipated transfer of technology has not materialized. 
Smuggling and bribery engendered in the Zones have also strained C hina’s balance of 
payments. As Chossudovsky’s (1982) claims have not been supported by empirical 
evidence, his negative s ta tem ents  remain unsubstantiated. This controversial nature  of 
the Zones has been underlined by Sit Fung Suen’s (1981) open-ended projection of their 
future.
More recent empirical analysis of the Zones by Sun Ru (1982), He Jiasheng 
(1984a), and Chen Zhaobin (1984a) have argued that they have provided a successful 
development strategy. In particular, Sun and He contended tha t  the objectives of 
absorbing foreign capital, foreign exchange, foreign technology, management skills and
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technicians have been realized in Shenzhen. Indeed, both authors have argued tha t  the 
Zones will serve as test-grounds for spreading management reforms throughout the 
country. In particular, Sun has pinpointed tha t  the Shekou Zone has not only 
stim ulated  and improved enterprise management but also bureaucratic reforms. Also He 
(1984b) has detailed tha t  the zone policy has developed industry and agriculture, 
increased revenues, expanded the resources of the local regions, and provided jobs in 
construction and retailing. As there are some doubts over the statistics used by both 
Sun and He. their case as yet, is rather unconvincing. Chen also argued tha t  although 
the Zones were quite far from achieving all the goals, they had already made several 
breakthroughs in management and development. Hence, he was very confident tha t  the 
Zone would make an ample contribution to China's modernization.
S o c ia l Issu es
P o p u la t io n . Zonal population has been discussed by Ng Yen Tak (1983a) and 
Zheng Tianxiang and others (1981). Ng has focused on the recent population patterns 
by detailing growth rates, rural-urban ratios, population planning, migration and types 
of labour forces. Zheng and others have emphasized population problems and stressed 
the importance of well-designed plans for a ttrac ting  labour to the Zones. In particular, 
Zheng and others have highlighted the adverse effect on the rural area, prompting them 
to advocate labour-intensive industry using superseded technology in the recruitment 
areas.
L iv in g  co n d itio n s. There have only been two studies on living conditions in the 
Zones, by Ng Yen Tak (1983b) and Chiu (1983). Although incomes have increased in 
Shenzhen, Ng (1983b) has argued tha t  the average salaried worker has found it difficult 
to keep pace with the rising prices of basic necessities. Factory workers, however, have 
coped with the situation more easily as they have enjoyed rising wages. Nevertheless, 
housing, medical, recreational and education facilities were inadequate. Not 
surprisingly, Ng has recommended improved facilities for the rapidly expanding 
population tha t  is continuously being fuelled by high immigration. Chiu (1983) has 
assessed the extent of social and spatial changes taking place in Shenzhen Town in the 
context of development and modernization. Judging from rising wage levels and living 
standards, better supply of goods, and changes in a tt i tude  and economic ideology, Chiu 
proposes tha t  development and modernization have taken place, although different 
sectors are advancing at different rates. However, leisure facilities need to be improved 
if socialist a tt itudes and ideology are to be preserved.
L abour p o licy . Four authors have focused their a tten tion  on labour policy: the 
wage system has been discussed by Zhang Yongming (1981) and Luo Fuqun (1981), and
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the general labour policy by VVu (1982) and Chen Suhui (1984). In discussing wages, 
Zhang (1981) has detailed the new system experimented in the Shekou Industrial Zone. 
In con tras t,  Luo (1981) has outlined the nature of the two main wage systems used in 
the Zones: the rigid system used in s ta te  enterprises, and the more flexible system used 
in foreign enterprises. On the basis of this evidence, Luo has proceeded to recommend 
reforms to the wage system. In examining general labour policy. Wu has considered 
China as a whole and Shenzhen in particular with regard to recruitment, housing, 
welfare arrangements, employment security and sources of workers. Chen (1984) has 
gone on to detail the reforms introduced in employment, wages and insurance to bring 
out the contrast between the old incentive-oriented systems and the new, flexible and 
decentralized system.
S p ir itu a l c iv iliz a tio n . The construction of socialist spiritual civilization has 
been a perennial concern of the Chinese authorities and socialist ideologists. Yet, there 
has only been one im portan t study on the subject, prepared by Li Foyan and others 
(1984). After examining the provision and condition of education, technology-related 
and cultural activities in Shenzhen, they comment tha t  spiritual civilization is in 
progress, but further measures are recommended to quicken the process.
R e su m e
The topical studies have provided a wide-ranging series of insights into the Special 
Economic Zones. Their emphasis has been on characteristics, trends, progress, reforms 
and problems. They have not highlighted, however, linkages between different economic 
sectors and the connections between the Zones and the world economy. Besides an 
improved statistical base, therefore, there is a pressing need for an holistic conceptual 
framework to cover both economic issues and social problems.
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A p p en d ix  III
S T A T E M E N T  O F F U L L Y  F O R E IG N - O  W N E D  
E N T E R P R I S E S  IN  F O U R  S P E C IA L  E C O N O M I C  
Z O N E S  IN  C H IN A ,  1979-1983
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Appendix IV
M A IN  F A C T O R S  OF S H E K O U ’S SU CCESS
The success of Shekou has given rise to the so-called ‘Shekou Model’. This has 
been copied by the rest of the country. Under the management of the experienced China 
M erchant Steam Navigation Company, the main factors a ttr ibu ted  to Shekou’s success 
have been its efficient administration and effective labour policy. Three administrative 
characteristics have been identified as significant: the separation of politics and
business, the streamlining of bureaucracy, and reforms in the cadre system. Basically, 
the separation of politics and business has underlined tha t  the China Merchant 
Navigation Company has been able to govern Shekou without financial and 
adm inistra tive constraints. In turn , the State has agreed not to interfere nor subsidize 
the industrial zone provided th a t  the zone’s operation complied with the general policy 
of the country. Closely related to the segregation of business and politics has been the 
streamlining of the bureaucratic system.
W ithin the bureaucracy, the top organs have been the Party  Committee and 
M anagem ent Committee. The actual administration, however, has rested with the 
\ lan ag em en t Committee, which can decided all m atters  without consulting higher 
authorities (Shenzhen Special Zone Herald , 11 April 1984). As a bid to eliminate 
superfluous personnel, less than  fifty cadres have been employed in the Comm ittee’s 
three offices (i.e. the General Office, the Chief Engineers’ Office and the Accountants' 
Office). Under the administration of these offices have been thirteen specialized 
companies th a t  have managed differing zonal facilities. Although these companies have 
been subject to the financial supervision and inspection by the Management Committee, 
they have been granted full power to run their businesses (Shenzhen Special Zone 
Herald , 11 April 1984; Yangcheng Wanbao, 22 September 1982). Also, these companies 
have been held accountable for profits and losses.
Reforms in the cadre system has been another means used to promote efficient 
m anagement. As a corollary, there has been an emphasis on recruiting younger and 
more energetic personnel. In 1982, the average age of cadres had been lowered to 46 
years in both the Party  Committee and the M anagement Committee. Subsequently, 
recruitm ent has been opened to the whole country and applicants are chosen on the basis 
of merit rather than seniority (Shenzhen Special Zone Herald, 11 April 1984). The
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appointees have been given a one-year training program before they have started 
full-time work. Similar changes have also been introduced in the labour policy.
Workers have been recruited from public advertisements. Employment conditions 
have been bound by the terms stipulated in the contract. Workers have been sacked 
where they have violated the contract (Economic Reporter, 9 July 1984). On the whole, 
changes in the wage system have gone through three phases. Before 1981, wages 
comprising both the basic and subsidized wages were little different from the 
conventional wage system. Between 1981 and October 1983, however, the policy of ‘one plus 
one-point-one-five’ was implemented. It was simply the addition of the ‘industrial 
estate  wage' which was 1.15 times tha t  of the basic wage. This policy has reinforced 
work incentives but still retained many of the drawbacks inherent in the egalitarian 
wage system. Finally, in 1983, a revolutionary wage system was introduced in the zone - 
a system which was comprised of a basic wage, a duty wage and a floating wage. The 
most notable component was the floating wage which has accounted for 30 per cent of 
the total wage; it has been calculated in accordance with the performance of the 
enterprise and the worker himself (Shenzhen Special Zone Herald , 11 April 1984). 
Thus, the success of Shekou owes much to its administrative and labour reforms which 
have produced a less hierarchical, more efficient and performance-oriented workforce.
